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ABSTRACT

WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO WHEN THE YELLOW BUS STOPS COMING?
A HISTORICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSITION PROVISIONS
OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
Tanya Leah Carter, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Christine Kiracofe, Co-Director
Jon Crawford, Co-Director

As a result of 1990 amendments, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA) was renamed as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and transition
planning and services were initially mandated. The IDEA’s transition services were designed to
help students with disabilities move from receiving high school special education services to
receiving post high school education, work, or independent living. In 1997, Congress
reauthorized the IDEA and strengthened the language pertaining to transition planning and
services. Congress added a directive that identification of the related services required for
successful transition were to be included in the transition planning process.
Congress again strengthened special education transition planning and services language
with the passage of the IDEA 2004. This reauthorization included language regarding the duty to
prepare children with disabilities for further education along with employment and independent
living. IDEA 2004 mandated transition services were to be delivered via a results-oriented
process focusing on student performance through goals. This change focused upon improving

both the student’s academic and functional achievement in order to facilitate movement from
high school to post-secondary settings, including vocational education.
Subsequent to the implementation of the IDEA’s post-secondary transition language
courts issued several decisions involving transition planning and services. Analyzing these
decisions reveals current trends in special education transition planning and services.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Background/Rationale

Introduction

An educated public was a foundational component of the democratic government
established in the United States.1 However, as public school systems developed, there was no
regulation that governed or guaranteed access to education for students with disabilities.2 Until
the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (§504) and the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA) public schools were not required to educate
students with disabilities. A congressional investigation conducted in conjunction with the
formulation of the EAHCA found more than half of the over eight million school age children in
the United States with disabilities were not receiving appropriate services from public
education.3 Of the students with disabilities who were not receiving appropriate services, over
1.75 million children with disabilities were completely denied access to public educational
services.4 Before 1975, nearly every state in the nation excluded children with disabilities from

1

James P. Baker, David B. Mixner, & Seth D. Harris, The State of Disability in America; An Evaluation of the
Disability Experience by Life Without Limits, United Cerebral Palsy, 26 (2007).
2
Id. at 26-27.
3
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 1975 (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1975) at 1433.
4
Id.

2
public education.5 Illinois was among the few states with special education legislation prior to
the implementation of the EAHCA. However, the Illinois statute allowed school officials to
exclude children who were “maladjusted or retarded” if the local school district could not offer a
program that would benefit the student.6 Illinois law also allowed for placement in private
facilities if local school officials could not offer appropriate services as long as the parent paid
the difference between the state allotment and the cost of the tuition and transportation.7 In 1958,
as a result of The Department of Public Welfare v. Edward Hass, the Illinois Supreme Court
ruled the state’s constitutional mandate for a free education to all children “[did] not require the
State to provide a free educational program, as a part of the common school system, for the
feeble minded or mentally deficient children who, because of limited intelligence, are unable to
receive a good common school education.”8 Maine also provided another example of an
exclusionary law. Maine’s legislation allowed a public school board to exclude any child whose
“physical or mental condition [made] it inexpedient for him to attend.” 9
Today the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), is the primary federal law
governing to delivery of public school special education services.10 The IDEA is a
reauthorization of the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).11 The IDEA
ensures K-12 public officials provide eligible students challenged by a disability a free and

5

James P. Baker, David B. Mixner, & Seth D. Harris, The State of Disability in America; An Evaluation of the
Disability Experience by Life Without Limits, United Cerebral Palsy, 27 (2007).
6
Joan Gittens, Poor Relations: The Children of the State of Illinois, 1818-1990, Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois, 226 (1994).
7
Id.
8
The Department of Public Welfare v. Edward C. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204-213 (1958).
9
11 Maine Rev. Stats. Ann., Title 20, Section 911. (The Maine statute was repealed in 1975 to ensure state
compliance with Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No 94-142, 89 Sat. 773 (1975)).
10
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1491 (2006).
11
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)
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appropriate public education (FAPE).12 This Act guarantees access to education and services to
children with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one.13
As the EAHCA has evolved from its 1975 signing to its current form, the IDEA, there
have been legislative changes and additions. One major change occurred in 1990 with the
addition of language requiring transition services and planning to assist students leaving
secondary schools and entering post-secondary education or training settings.14 Congress
mandated transition services due to a concern that high-school age students with special needs
were at risk of dropping out or graduating from school not being adequately prepared for adult
life and responsibility.15 Congress mandated public school officials to implement transition plans
and services no later than the year in which a student turned 16 years of age.16 Some states
mandate the formulation of transition plans at an earlier than age 16. Illinois, for example,
mandates transition services begin the year in which the student turns 14 ½ years of age.17

12

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 487 (1954) (establishing the right to equal educational opportunity for black
students); Pa. Ass’n. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (mentally retarded
persons are capable of benefiting from education and/or training); Mills v. Bd. of Educ. of D.C., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972) (excluding, suspending, expelling, reassigning and transferring of “exceptional” children from
regular public school classes without affording them due process of law).
13
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (19) (2004) (a coordinated
set of activities for a student, designed within an outcome-oriented process, which promotes movement from school
to post-school activities, including employment, continuing and adult education, adult services, independent living,
or community participation, based upon the individual student's needs, taking into account the student's preferences
and interests, and including instruction, related services, community experiences, the development of employment
and other post-school adult living objectives, and , when appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and functional
vocational evaluation).
14
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1491 (2006).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
105 ILCS 5/Art.14 § 226.30 (2007). Beginning not later than the first IEP to be in effect when the child turns 14
1/2, and updated annually thereafter, the IEP shall include: 1) appropriate, measurable, post-secondary goals based
upon age-appropriate assessments related to employment, education or training, and, as needed, independent living;
2) the transition services that are needed to assist the child in reaching those goals, including courses of study and
any other needed services to be provided by entities other than the school district; and 3) any additional
requirements set forth in Section 14-8.03 of the School Code [105 ILCS 5/14-8.03].
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Changes in Legal Rights

The IDEA does not apply to colleges, universities, and training centers where students
with disabilities may attend to further their preparation and education. Public school officials’
duty to provide special education services terminates once a student either graduates from high
school with a regular diploma or reaches the age the high school’s obligation to provide FAPE
terminates.18 The purpose of transition plans and services is to ensure public school officials
adequately prepare students with disabilities for further education, employment, and independent
living.19 When discussing transition from secondary school settings to post-secondary education
or training settings it is important to note the change in the student’s legal status.
The IDEA protects eligible elementary and secondary students identified with a disability
when the general education program cannot meet their needs.20 Effective with the EAHCA 21 and
continuing thereafter with the IDEA, the law makes it the responsibility of public school officials
to provide a FAPE to students identified as eligible for special education services and supports.22
Elementary and secondary school officials identify eligible students with disabilities through a
referral process and provide services as proscribed by each eligible student’s Individualized
Education Program (IEP).23 Although the IDEA does not protect a student once they have
graduated from high school,24 the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 199025 and Section

18

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1491 (2006).
Id. at 1400(d)(1)(A)-(C).
20
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
21
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975)
22
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
19
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 may afford this population the right to accommodations.26
However, under the ADA it is the responsibility of the student to disclose information
concerning their disability and to seek out accommodations.27 Students must request the
accommodations and the college, university, or training center must determine whether the
requested accommodation; is reasonable, does not provide the student with an unfair advantage,
is not a financial burden, and does not substantially alter the educational or training program. 28
Implementation of the transition plans and services set forth in an eligible student’s IEP is an
important bridge, helping students access needed resources and to being supported and
successful in post-secondary education or training settings.29

Education and Training

The number of students with disabilities attending post-secondary programs has increased
over the last several years.30 In 1978, less than three percent of students enrolled in postsecondary programs reported having a disability.31 By 2003-2004, the number of students in
post-secondary programs reporting a disability had increased to eleven percent.32 In 2012, the

26

P. L. 93-112 § 504, 93rd Congress, H. R. 8070 September 26, 1973.
Heather M. Hartman, & David A.F. Haaga, College Students’ Willingness to Seek Help for their Learning
Disabilities, 25 Learning Disabilities Q., 263 (2002) and Sally S. Scott, A Change in Legal Status: An Overlooked
Dimension in the Transition to Higher Education, 24 J. Learning Disabilities, 459 (1991).
28
Holly A. Currier, The ADA Reasonable Accommodations Requirement and the Development of University
Services Policies: Helping or Hindering Students with Learning Disabilities? 30 U. Balt. L.F. 42, 56-57 (2000).
29
Audrey A. Trainor, Self-determination Perceptions and Behaviors of Diverse Students with LD During Transition
Planning Process, J. Learning Disabilities 38, 233 ( 2005).
30
Sandra J. Janiga & Virginia Costenbader, The Transition for High School to Postsecondary Education for
Students with Learning Disabilities: A Survey of College Service Coordinators, J. Learning Disabilities, 35, 462
(2002).
31
Cathy Henderson, College Freshman with Disabilities, 1999: A Biennial Statistical Profile. Statistical year 1998,
American council on Education, HEATH Resource Center (1999).
32
Lauren Horn & Stephanie Nevill, Profile of Undergraduates in U.S. Postsecondary Education Institutions: 2003–
04: With a Special Analysis of Community College Students (NCES 2006-184). U.S. Department of Education,
National Center for Education Statistics (2006).
27
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percentage of students enrolled in post-secondary programs33 who reported having a disability
remained at eleven percent.34 However, not all students with disabilities who enroll in postsecondary settings identify themselves as having a disability.35
Students with disabilities who are enrolled in post-secondary education or training
programs may choose not to disclose their disability for several reasons including the desire to
distance themselves from special education.36 Other reasons students do not disclose their
disability include: a lack of knowledge or understanding about their disability; a perceived threat
to self-worth if support is requested; commonly held perceptions that persons with disabilities
have low cognitive and limited social abilities; and a belief the disability is limiting or
stigmatizing.37 Many students with disabilities have trouble completing college or training
programs due to a lack of academic preparedness or a lack of learning strategies needed to
generalize skills across the curriculum.38 One study found students with disabilities did not know
what steps to take to allow them to be supported and successful in post-secondary settings.39

33

Postsecondary education includes academic, career and technical, and continuing professional education programs
after high school. Thomas D. Snyder and Sally A. Dillow, Digest of Educational Statistics, 2013, NCES 2015011, 1
(May 2015).
34
Thomas D. Snyder and Sally A. Dillow, Digest of Educational Statistics, 2013, NCES 2015011, 1, 452 (May
2015).
35
Mary Wagner, Lynn Newman, Renee Cameto, Nicolle Garza, & Phyllis Levine, After High School: A First Look
at the Postschool Experience of Youth with Disabilities, SRI International (2005).
36
Sandra J. Janiga & Virginia Costenbader, The Transition from High School to Postsecondary Education for
Students with Learning Disabilities: A Survey of College Service Coordinators, 35 J. Learning Disabilities, 462
(2002).
37
Paul J. Gerber, Lynda A. Price, Robert Mulligan, & Isabel Shessel, Beyond Transition: A Comparison of the
Employment Experiences of American and Canadian Adults with LD, 37 J. Learning Disabilities, 283 (2004) and
Heather M. Hartman, & David A.F. Haaga, College Students’ Willingness to Seek Help for their Learning
Disabilities, 25 Learning Disabilities Q., 263 (2002)
38
Loring C. Brinckerhoff, Making the Transition to Higher Education: Opportunities for Student Empowerment, J.
Learning Disabilities, 29, 118 (1996).
39
Audrey A. Trainor, Self-determination Perceptions and Behaviors of Diverse Students with LD During Transition
Planning Process, J. Learning Disabilities 38, 233 ( 2005).
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Another study surveyed seventy-four colleges and universities in New York State to gain
a better understanding of post-secondary issues and concerns regarding students with learning
disabilities attending post-secondary education programs.40 The study suggested several ways
high schools could improve transition services for students with learning disabilities who plan to
enroll in post-secondary education or training programs. The suggestions included improving
self-advocacy, increasing understanding of individual disability, improving study skills,
developing independence, ensuring adequate reading and writing skills, informing parents and
students of the differences between IDEA and ADA, encouraging realistic college expectations,
providing quality assessments, teaching time management skills, encouraging use of assistive
technology, encouraging higher level high school classes, and providing career orientation. 41
Another study found people with disabilities were an underrepresented population in postsecondary programs and students with disabilities who do attend post-secondary programs tend
to have lower levels of self-esteem and self-determination.42 A 2010 study completed by Easter
Seals reported only 40% of parents with an adult child with a disability believed their child
received an education that adequately prepared them for post high school life compared with
79% of parents with adult children who were not challenged by disabilities.43

40

Janiga & Costenbader, supra.
Janiga & Costenbader, supra.
42
Weol Soon Kim-Rupnow & Sheryl Burgstahler, Perceptions of Students with Disabilities Regarding the Value of
Technology-based Support Activities on Postsecondary Education and Employment, 19 J. Special Educ. Tech., 1, 43
(2004).
43
Living with Disabilities Study, Easter Seals Disability Services (2010) Available at:
www.easterseals.com/site/DocServer/Final_Easter_Seals_Living_with_Disabilities_Fianl_Result.pdf?docID=14135
5 (last visited March 12, 2016).
41
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Employment

Two years after leaving high school, only forty percent of students with disabilities are
employed as compared to an employment rate of sixty-three percent among their non-disabled
peers.44 In 1959 only twenty percent of jobs required employees to have some post-secondary
education or training.45 In 2013, thirty-four percent of jobs required employees to have some
post-secondary education or training.46 Furthermore, there is a significant gap in the
employment rates for adults with disabilities as compared to non-disabled adults. According to
the U.S. Department of Labor, the October 2015 unemployment rate for Americans over age 16
without a disability was 4.6 while the rate for Americans with a disability was 10.5.47 While the
employment rate for Americans with a disability has improved, it continues to be significantly
below the employment rate for Americans without a disability.48 Because an increasing number
of jobs require employees to have some post-secondary education or training, appropriate
transition plans and services are needed in order to provide students with disabilities supports to
graduate from high school and become successful after leaving high school.49

44

Mary Wagner, Lynn Newman, Renee Cameto, Phyllis Levine, & Nicolle Garza, An Overview of Findings From
Wave 2 of the National Longitudinal Transition Study-2 (NLTS2), Nat’l Ctr. For Educ. Stat., (2006).
45
Anthony Carnevale & Donna Desrochers, The Missing Middle: Aligning Education and the Knowledge
Economy, Educational Testing Service (2002).
46
Elka Torpey and Audrey Watson, Education level and jobs: Opportunities by State, U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1, 1 (Sept. 2014) (available at http://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2014/article/educationlevel-and-jobs.htm#top)
47
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment status of the civilian population by sex, age,
and disability status, not seasonally adjusted. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t06.htm (last visited
November 7, 2015).
48
Matthew W. Brault, Disability Among the Working Age: Population: 2008 and 2009, U.S. Census Bureau, 1, 2
(2010).
49
Anthony Carnevale & Donna Desrochers, The Missing Middle: Aligning Education and the Knowledge
Economy, Educational Testing Service (2002).
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Statement of the Problem

Transition plans are mandated through IDEA however, there is much to be learned about
the legal issues surrounding the transition of students identified as eligible for special education
from secondary to post-secondary settings. Therefore, this study will examine the legal history of
transition services for students who are eligible for IDEA special education and supports. This
study will also describe transition services within the law and review federal and state court
cases related to the transition needs of special education students.

Significance of the Study

This legal study will make a unique contribution to the field of educational leadership by
providing a descriptive analysis of the current status of transition services for special education
students from secondary to post-secondary settings. This study is based on an analysis of the
IDEA, the statutes implementing regulations, and case law interpreting the Act’s provisions for
transition services. Although information regarding what is required in the transition plans of
special education students moving from secondary to post-secondary settings is available in the
legislation for school administrators, this information is sometimes difficult to find and
understand. This study will aid administrators in understanding the IDEA’s transition planning
provisions.

Purpose of the Investigation

The purpose of this study is to employ a descriptive legal analysis to investigate the legal
aspects of the IDEA’s provisions for formulating and implementing plans to successfully

10
transition eligible students from secondary settings to post-secondary settings. Data to be
obtained for this study will include state case law, federal case law, case law interpretation,
statutory interpretation, and policy analysis. This data will be collected in an effort to explain the
law regarding post-secondary transition planning.

Research Questions

This study will investigate the process and procedures utilized in formulating and
implementing plans for transitioning students who are eligible for IDEA services and supports
from high school to post-secondary settings. The following questions will guide this study:
1. What is the relevant legal history impacting IDEA transition planning and services
within the public schools?
2. What is the current status of the law in the area of IDEA transition planning and
services within the public schools?
3. How has prior litigation interpreting IDEA transition planning and services within the
public schools informed school officials’ procedures and practices?

Procedures
A legal research methodology will be employed for this study. Research will include an
extensive search of recognized legal sources such as federal legislation and implementing
regulations, case law, law review articles, other scholarly publications, and relevant documents.
These sources will be reviewed, analyzed, and synthesized to construct a historical perspective of
the evolution of the IDEA’s transition services provisions. This investigation will be completed
in order to develop a current composite perspective on the present legal status of these

11
provisions, and to hypothesize the likely future directions for these provisions. The literature
review is arranged in chronological order to provide the reader with a perspective of the
historical development of the IDEA’s transition services provisions.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Access to public education has not always been available to all students. As a result,
some children have limited opportunities for success as adults. For example, until the Supreme
Court’s landmark 1954 decision Brown v. Board of Education,50 African American students were
forced to attend separate and unequal schools. Two decades later federal legislation afforded
children challenged by disabilities expanded access to public schools.51 Until passage of the
Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA) in 1975, only limited specialized
educational services were available to students with disabilities.52
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, children with disabilities received educational
services in their homes.53 In 1817, the American Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb opened in
Hartford, Connecticut.54 This was the first public U.S. school for the deaf. Several years later
Perkins School, the first private U.S. school for the blind, opened in Boston.55 In 1848, an
experimental school opened in Boston named, the Massachusetts School for the Feeble-Minded.
50
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Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (current version at
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52
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This was the first publicly funded formal schooling for children with cognitive disabilities.56 The
Massachusetts School’s goal was to educate “retarded” children properly in order for them to
become self-sufficient adults.57
In 1864, President Abraham Lincoln furthered access to education and helped ensure
greater success for people with disabilities when he signed legislation establishing postsecondary programs for the deaf and dumb at Gallaudet University.58 An Act to Authorize the
Columbia Institution for the Deaf and Dumb and the Blind, to Confer Degrees facilitated an
opportunity for deaf students to earn college degrees.59 Even as schools serving children with
disabilities opened, children with disabilities were often institutionalized and perceived as being
incurably sick.60 School administrators told parents there was neither room in the public schools,
nor resources and time to serve students with disabilities.61
Before World War II, few federal laws, (the Social Security Act of 1935 being the most
significant exception)62 provided benefits to people with disabilities, thereby enabling public
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schools to exclude children with disabilities.63 During the 1950s, parents of children with
disabilities began to speak out in opposition to the institutionalization of their children and called
for the inclusion of their children in public schools.64
In 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower signed An Act to Encourage Expansion of
Teaching in the Education of Mentally Retarded Children through Grants to Institutions of
Higher Learning and State Agencies.65 This Act made grants available to colleges and
universities to expand teacher-training programs in fields related to the education of mentally
retarded children.66 The Act was subsequently expanded in 1963 to include training in a wider
array of disability areas.67
In the early 1970s, two federal court decisions addressed the educational rights of
students with disabilities in public schools. These landmark decisions, Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Citizens (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania68 and Mills vs. Board of
Education of District of Columbia,69 provided the foundation for significant federal special
education legislation and lead directly to EAHCA.
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History of Legislation and Case Law that Led to Mandating
Transition Services for Children Challenged by Disabilities
Watson v. City of Cambridge (1893)70
In the 1800s, students with disabilities were regularly excluded from public schools. For
example, in 1893 in Watson v. City of Cambridge the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled a
student could be expelled from public school as a consequence of either disorderly conduct or
“imbecility.”71 The state’s high court upheld the expulsion of a student from public school
because he was “so weak in mind as not to derive any marked benefit from instruction, and
further, that he [wa]s troublesome to other children, making noises, pinching others, etc. He
[wa]s also found unable to take the ordinary decent care of himself.”72
The court upheld the school committee’s expulsion, noting the state law provided for
school committees to make provisions for the schools thereby enabling them to deny education
to students with disabilities.
Beattie v. Board of Education of the City of Antigo (1919)73
One early example of disability based segregation is Beattie v. Board of Education of the
City of Antigo. Merritt Beattie, a student with a disability, was excluded from public school.
Beattie was a student of average intelligence with a paralysis that affected his nervous system. 74
He did not have typical control of either his voice or extremities. As a result, Beattie had
uncontrollable facial tics, a high, raspy voice, and slow speech, making it difficult for him to be
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understood. He appeared unclean due to uncontrollable drooling onto his clothes and books.75
Beattie attended Antigo Public Schools from first through fifth grade in the general education
program.76 At the beginning of sixth grade, Beattie was transferred to a day school specializing
in educating the deaf or persons with defective speech.77 Five weeks later school officials
transferred him to another public school, the Fourth Ward School.78 Thereafter, a Wisconsin
Department of Public Instruction representative visited the Antigo schools and during her visit,
noticed Beattie.79 She objected to Beattie’s placement in the general education setting and
suggested school officials return him to the school for the deaf.80 Beattie’s parents refused. At
the start of the next school year, he enrolled in an Antigo public school general education
program.81 On the second day of school, Antigo Public School officials denied him access to the
public school.82 Beattie’s parents appealed to the district superintendent and the superintendent
brought the issue to the school board.83 One school board member brought a motion to reinstate
Beattie. However, there was no second to the motion, therefore the school board did not reinstate
Beattie84 Beattie’s parents filed a lawsuit in the municipal court of Langlade County arguing,
school officials violated Beattie’s right to attend school as provided by the state constitution.85
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There a jury found in favor of the parents.86 School officials appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.87 The court ruled in favor of the school district, upholding Beattie’s removal from the
public school program, stating his disability had “a depressing and nauseating effect upon the
teachers and the school children [and] that by reason of his physical condition he takes up an
undue portion of the teacher’s time and attention, distracts the attention of other pupils, and
interferes generally with the discipline and progress of the school”88
The court further observed, “the right of a child of school age to attend the public schools
of this state cannot be insisted upon when [the child’s] presence therein is harmful to the best
interests of the school. This, like other individual rights, must be subordinated to the general
welfare.”89 The court determined if a student’s attendance in the school damaged the best
interests of the school, the school board could exclude the student from the school setting. The
court stated the “action of the board in refusing to reinstate the boy seems to have been the result
of its best judgment exercised in good faith.”90
Buck v. Bell (1927)91
Buck v. Bell92 is not a case involving education. Rather it is discussed to highlight and
place in the historical context the trend of legal decisions regarding persons with disabilities
during this period. Carrie Buck was a “feeble minded” woman who was institutionalized in
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Virginia. Ms. Buck’s mother and daughter were also considered to be “feeble minded.”93 In
1924, an Act established by Virginia allowed for the forced sterilization of the feeble-minded in
order to prevent the procreation of feeble-minded children.94 The institution where Ms. Buck was
placed sought an order for her sterilization by a surgical procedure resulting in the fallopian
tubes being cut.95 Ms. Buck’s attorney argued forced sterilization was illegal because it violated
both Ms. Buck’s right of body integrity and the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment.96 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court held Carrie Buck “is the probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually
sterilized without detriment to her general health and that her welfare and that of society will be
promoted by her sterilization.”97 Justice Holmes likened Ms. Buck’s sterilization to compulsory
vaccinations and stated, “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”98 During this period,
judicial decisions did not generally recognize the basic rights of either individuals with
disabilities or ethnic minorities; i.e., they were neither treated equally nor provided equal access
to education.
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)99
Brown v. Board of Education100 represented a monumental change in the segregation of
public school students on the basis of race.101 In Brown v. Board of Education,102 the parents of
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black children alleged public school segregation based upon race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.103 The parents argued, “separate educational facilities [are]
inherently unequal.”104 This argument challenged the principle of the “separate but equal”
doctrine previously established by the High Court’s 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision. 105
In Brown, a unanimous court observed, “the most important function of state and local
government” was education.106 However, the court stopped short of declaring education to be a
fundamental right.107 The court had, however, declared even with equal facilities and other
“tangible” factors, segregation based on race constituted a deprivation of “equal education
opportunities.”108 The court held racial segregation by public school officials violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees.109 This landmark decision served as a
harbinger to other minority groups, such as the parents of students with disabilities, that the
public school doors could also be opened for their children.110
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Brown expressly established the right to equal educational opportunities for black
students.111 While Brown only addressed the inequality of racially segregated public schools, the
decision planted seeds for the parents of students with disabilities.112 Brown provided the
foundation for parents of children with disabilities to seek and expect public school access for
their children.113
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965)114
The journey toward desegregation and equal rights to education for racial minorities and
students living in poverty continued in April of 1965, when President Lyndon B. Johnson signed
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).115 President Johnson introduced this Act
during his 1965 State of the Union address as part of his War on Poverty, wherein he proposed
“a program in education to ensure every American child the fullest development of his mind and
skills.”116 The Act’s purpose was to improve educational services for children from low-income
families by providing federal grants to school districts with high concentrations of low-income
families.117 The statute provided a plan to redress educational inequality for economically
underprivileged children. The 1966 ESEA amendments established the first federal grant
program to provide special education services at the local level. Additionally, the Title VI of the
ESEA amendments provided oversight by establishing the Bureau of Education for the
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Handicapped.118 On April 13, 1970, amendments to ESEA were signed into law.119 Several
months later, on July 1, 1971, the Education of the Handicapped Act was signed into law.120 Part
B of this Act provided funding to States to assist in initiating, increasing, and improving
programs for disabled students.121
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (1972)122
In the early 1970s, shortly after President Johnson signed the ESEA into law, a group of
parents, encouraged by the Supreme Court’s Brown123 decision, began a fight for basic
educational rights for their children who were challenged by disabilities.124 The parents of
thirteen children with mental retardation joined the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children (PARC), in filing a civil rights class-action case against the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.125 The lawsuit
challenged several Pennsylvania statutes that excluded children with mental retardation from
education and training programs in state-supported public schools. One statute stated:
The State Board of Education shall establish standards for temporary or
permanent exclusion from the public school of children who are found to be
uneducable and untrainable in the public schools. Any child who is reported by a
person who is certified as a public school psychologist as being uneducable and
untrainable in the public schools, may be reported by the board of school directors
to the Superintendent of Public Instruction and when approved by him, in
accordance with the standards of the State Board of Education, shall be certified
to the Department of Public Welfare as a child who is uneducable and untrainable
118
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in the public schools. When a child is thus certified, the public schools shall be
relieved of the obligation of providing education or training for such child. The
Department of Public Welfare shall thereupon arrange for the care, training and
supervision of such child in a manner not inconsistent with the laws governing
mentally defective individuals.126
The parents wanted this and other similar Pennsylvania statutes to be declared
unconstitutional as a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment. The parents
claimed school officials were violating their children with mental retardation’s rights by failing
to provide them with educational opportunities, due process, and equal protection under the
law.127 The Pennsylvania federal district court ruled mentally retarded children had the right to a
free public education, including training programs, until they reached age 21.128 The court also
found the education provided must be appropriate to the learning capacities of the student.129
Finally, the court indicated a preference for students with disabilities to receive educational
services in the least restrictive environment.130 Through a consent agreement, the court set forth
foundational concepts that were later incorporated into the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA).131 For example, PARC provided parents the right to take an
active role in the educational planning for their children by entitling them to mandatory notice of
any changes in their child’s education plan, and an opportunity to challenge the plan.132 PARC
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also provided children with mental impairments guaranteed access to a free public program of
education.133
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia (1972)134
At the time PARC was being litigated, the parents of seven school-aged children with
disabilities filed a class-action lawsuit against the Board of Education in the District of
Columbia. The parents claimed their children were being excluded from the public schools
and/or denied an appropriate publicly supported education.135 The Board of Education
acknowledged both its obligation to educate these students and the accompanying failure to
provide the students with educational programming and due process.136 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia stated the school district was required to provide publicly supported
education and training to “exceptional” children. 137 Additionally, the court observed school
officials could not exclude, suspend, expel, reassign, or transfer a student with a disability from
public school classes without first affording the student due process of the law.138 The district
court signed an interim stipulation, consented to by both parties, providing the students with a
publicly supported education.139 However, the Board of Education failed to comply with the
consent order.140 The Board of Education argued there were insufficient funds available to
support the education of all students with special needs.141 The court rejected this argument
stating, the Board of Education’s “interest in educating the excluded children clearly must
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outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources.”142 The court declared if school
officials excluded a child from a public school placement, school officials must provide the child
an appropriate alternative educational program suited to meet the child's needs.143 The court also
directed eligible students must receive periodic review of their status, progress, and the adequacy
of their educational services.144 PARC145 and Mills146 are examples of cases establishing the right
to education for children with disabilities.
The Rehabilitation Act (1973)147
On September 26, 1973, shortly after the PARC and Mills decisions, President Richard
Nixon signed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 into law.148 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
expanded the rights available to people with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
broadened and improved the authorization of grant money to states for vocational rehabilitation
with an emphasis on rehabilitating persons with severe handicaps.149 Transitioning individuals
with disabilities into gainful employment was also among the Act’s stated purposes.150
Significantly, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 included specific nondiscrimination
language. Section 504 of the original Act stated a qualified individual could not “be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
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program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”151 A qualified individual with a
disability was defined as a person who, “with reasonable accommodation, is able to perform the
essential job functions of the position they have applied or the job they have been hired to
perform.”152 Reasonable accommodation meant an employer was required to take reasonable
steps to accommodate a person’s disability unless it would cause the employer undue
hardship.153 Because public schools received federal assistance, this language ensured access to
public education for students with disabilities.
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (1975)154
The early 1970s was a turning point for activists pursuing expanded educational
opportunities for students with disabilities. The landmark court decisions, PARC v.
Pennsylvania155 and Mills v. Board of Education,156 set forth the contours of the educational
rights of students with disabilities. However, until 1975, the federal government had only
minimally addressed the education of students with disabilities.157 Providing local public school
districts with partial funding for educational opportunities for students with disabilities was
initially addressed in Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of
1966.158 The ESEA provided the first federal grant program to assist local public school districts
in providing special education services.159 In 1970, Congress amended the ESEA, consolidating
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into one statute a number of previously separate federal grant programs related to the education
of children with disabilities.160 A portion of this new authorization became known as Part B and
was titled the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).161 The EHA was the precursor to the
1975 Act that would significantly expand the educational rights of children and youth with
disabilities.162 This 1975 Act provided financial assistance to states to assist in initiating,
increasing, and improving educational programs for students with disabilities.163
In an effort to ensure federal funding and resources would continue to be provided for the
education of children with disabilities, the Senate passed legislation extending the ESEA’s
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) provisions until July 1, 1976.164 This enactment
increased awareness of the educational needs of students with disabilities and drew attention to
the need to augment the federal government’s financial responsibilities.165 In 1974, Senate Bill 6
was reintroduced in Congress with the goal of creating a law to benefit children with disabilities
and their families.166 Senate Bill 6 became the Education of All Handicapped Children Act
(EAHCA). Congress intended for the EAHCA to provide equality and self-sufficiency to
children with disabilities.167 Some believed access to regular schooling would help children with
disabilities later in life when looking for employment.168 Congressman Joseph Karth believed
that educating children with disabilities would eliminate the need to pay for long-term custodial
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care of cognitively disabled children.169 He believed disabled individuals could be educated and
trained to become contributing adult members of society.170 Congress theorized parents of
children with disabilities had not previously vigorously advocated for the rights of their children
because the parents incorrectly believed their children would not be able to lead meaningful
lives.171
The EAHCA’s language relied heavily on the consent agreement emerging from the
PARC litigation.172 The EAHCA included a guarantee eligible children would be provided a free,
appropriate, public education (FAPE) in a regular classroom, if possible.173 The Act also
provided for parents to take an active role in the planning of their child’s educational program.174
Subcommittee hearings took place from April 9, 1973, through April 15, 1975. The testimony at
the hearings supported the need for all eligible students to be provided a FAPE.175 The testimony
also supported the federal government’s protection of the rights of disabled students, and the
need to expand federal assistance and responsibility for educating disabled students.176
In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
into law, thereby legislatively expanding the educational rights of eligible students by providing
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funding.177 The EAHCA joined with the previous federal non-discrimination statute, Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, requiring recipients of federal funds, such as public schools, to
either educate children with disabilities or lose federal financial assistance.178 At the time
EAHCA was enacted, the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped estimated of the
approximately 8 million children with disabilities, 1.75 million children were receiving no
educational services, and 2.5 million were receiving an inappropriate level of services.179 Thus,
less than half of children with disabilities were receiving appropriate educational services.180
Congress recognized many disabled students were not receiving appropriate special education
services, due to the lack of appropriate identification of their disability.181 In the absence of
sufficient educational services, many parents resorted to educating their children at their own
expense.182
One of the EAHCA’s purposes was to develop staff training in special education
diagnostic and instructional procedures.183 Therefore, the EAHCA required states to develop and
implement wide-ranging staff development for special education, general education, and support
personnel.184 The Act also required states to develop enforcement procedures and to distribute
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research regarding the education of the disabled.185 The Act required states to adopt suitable
practices and materials to support and educate these students.186
The EAHCA established responsibility for both state and local school officials to provide
appropriate educational services to students with disabilities.187 However, the EAHCA was
silent on transition services for students with disabilities from secondary to post-secondary
settings. Even though the EAHCA did not address transition services, a Senate report discussing
the number of students with disabilities who were not receiving an appropriate education noted:
The long-range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and
taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetime of these individuals to
maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With
proper education services, many would be able to become productive citizens,
contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through
such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence
on society.188
The EAHCA Senate debates also had post-secondary implications.189 Though silent on
the issue of transition services, the EAHCA contained several provisions peripherally affecting
transition services for students with disabilities.190 The EAHCA called for a FAPE to be
provided to all eligible children, between the ages of 3 and 21, regardless of the severity of the
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disability.191 The Act also stated educational services must be appropriate to meet each child’s
unique needs at no cost to the parent(s)/guardian(s).192 Included in this principle was the concept
of related services, requiring that eligible children receive services such as: physical therapy,
orientation and mobility, occupational therapy, as well as other services as necessary for students
to benefit from special education.193 Another mandate contained in the law was the concept of
least restrictive environment (LRE). The LRE provision directed children with disabilities were
to be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate, in their home schools with their general
education peers.194
The law also mandated the development of an individualized education program (IEP) for
each eligible child.195 School officials were directed to develop a written document with input
from the child’s parents describing an educational plan for each eligible student. The written
document, the IEP, provided the framework for individualized special education and related
services for each eligible student.196 The IEP was to address the following: the student’s present
level of academic functioning, annual goals and accompanying instructional objectives, and
educational services to be provided.197 The IEP was also required to address the extent the pupil
would be able to participate in general education programs, plans for initiating services, service
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delivery duration, and an annual evaluation process specifying objective criteria to determine if
instructional objectives are being mastered.198
The Act afforded parents several safeguards, including procedural due process rights
available to them.199 Other safeguards afforded to parents included: confidentiality of their
child’s educational records,200 examine all records,201 obtain an independent educational
evaluation, receive written notification (in the parents' native language) of proposed changes to
their child's educational classification or placement,202 an impartial hearing whenever
disagreements arose regarding educational plans for their child,203 and representation by legal
counsel, at parental expense.204
Another area addressed by the Act was nondiscriminatory assessment or evaluation.205
The law required, prior to a special education placement, a child must be fairly evaluated by a
multidisciplinary team in all areas of suspected disability.206 The multidisciplinary team
members included the parent, at least one general education teacher, at least one special
education teacher, a local education agency representative with knowledge of available
resources, an individual who could interpret the instructional implications of evaluation results,
others with knowledge or special expertise regarding the child, and when appropriate, the
child.207 The Act further stated the evaluation process could not be racially, culturally, or
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linguistically biased.208 Students were to receive several types of assessments administered by
trained personnel; a single evaluation procedure was not permitted for either planning or
placement purposes.209 Finally, the Act mandated meaningful parental participation, allowing for
the student and parent to be involved in shared decision making with school officials on issues
affecting the child’s education.210
When President Gerald Ford signed the EAHCA into law on December 2, 1975, he stated
he approved of the objectives of the bill. However, he warned the Act promised more than the
federal government could deliver.211 He was uncertain the law would accomplish its goal of
providing suitable educational for all eligible children with handicaps, because the Act’s
proposed funding levels would be difficult for the federal government to fulfill.212 President Ford
found the Act’s complex and costly administrative requirements objectionable. He suggested the
Act’s requirements asserted federal control over local functions and tax funds would be used for
administrative paperwork instead of the provision of educational programs. President Ford
believed, because the law would not become fully effective until 1978, there was time to revise
the Act.213 He also committed to working with Congress to assist states in fulfilling their
responsibilities for providing a FAPE to students with disabilities.214 In 1982, the U.S. Supreme
Court provided an initial interpretation of the Act. This initial review required the High Court to
analyze the Act’s FAPE provision and render an opinion regarding the level of student
achievement Congress expected school officials to provide eligible students.
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Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982)215
Although, transition services were not yet a statutory requirement nor an issue in Board
of Education v. Rowley,216 this case was important because it outlined the Supreme Court’s first
interpretation of the EAHCA and the decision set forth the court’s determination of a FAPE’s
contours. Amy Rowley was a child eligible for special education due to a hearing impairment.217
She had some residual hearing and was an excellent lip reader.218 Amy’s parents argued school
officials needed to provide their hearing impaired daughter a classroom sign-language interpreter
in order to maximize her potential for academic achievement.219 School officials refused,
pointing out Amy was able to lip-read and without an interpreter, she performed better than the
average students in her class.220 The year before Amy began kindergarten, a meeting was held
between her parents and the school officials.221 During this meeting, Amy’s parents requested a
sign-language interpreter for Amy.222 However, it was agreed Amy would be placed in a regular
kindergarten classroom and her needs would be assessed during that year.223 During Amy’s
kindergarten year, school officials provided her with an interpreter for a two-week trial basis.
Based upon this trial, school officials concluded Amy had not benefited from this support.224
Instead, school officials provided Amy with an FM amplification system to amplify the spoken
words of the teacher and other students in the classroom.225
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The IEP proposed for Amy’s first grade year included continued use of the FM hearing
aid, one hour of instruction a day from a tutor for the deaf, and three hours a week of speech
therapy.226 Amy’s parents continued to believe Amy required a sign-language interpreter for all
academic classes.227 When the Rowleys renewed their request for an interpreter, it was denied.
Thereafter the parents filed for a due process hearing before an independent examiner and the
independent examiner ruled in favor of school officials.228 The parents appealed to the New York
Commissioner of Education where the record was reviewed and the school administrators again
prevailed.229
The parents appealed and prevailed before the federal district court.230 The district court
found Amy was well adjusted, had developed rapport with her teachers, and performed better
than the average child in her class.231 However, the district court noted a disparity between
Amy’s achievement and potential because she was not able to understand all of what was going
on in class due to her hearing impairment.232 Because Amy was not achieving commensurate
with her academic potential, the district court concluded Amy was not receiving a FAPE thereby
rendering her special education inappropriate.233 The district court defined an appropriate
education as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children."234 School officials appealed and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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Second Circuit ruled in favor of the parents.235 A divided appellate panel concluded the district
court’s finding of law was “not clearly erroneous.”236 School officials again appealed, and the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the lower court’s interpretation of the meaning
of FAPE.237
By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Amy was in fourth grade and had
been receiving the support of a sign-language interpreter for two years.238 Upon review, the
Court determined the lower courts had mistakenly concluded the EAHCA required schools to
maximize the potential of each disabled student.239 The Supreme Court interpreted the EAHCA’s
FAPE provision to only require schools to confer some educational benefit to the handicapped
child. The Court further concluded Congress’ intent in passing the EAHCA was to open the door
of public education to children with disabilities, not to maximize their educational
achievement.240 The Court determined school officials had provided Amy an adequate education
as evidenced by her passing grades and advancement from grade to grade.241 Therefore, the
Court concluded school officials had satisfied their obligation to provide Amy a FAPE because
they had provided her with individualized instruction and support services allowing her to
benefit from instruction.242
The Rowley Court formulated a two-pronged test for determining if school officials had
met their obligation to provide a FAPE. The first prong asked the reviewing court to examine
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whether school officials’ proposed IEP complied with the Act’s procedural requirements. The
second prong assessed whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the child some
educational benefit.243 Courts have subsequently applied Rowley’s two-pronged test to decide a
multitude of disputes over the adequacy of services offered to children with disabilities.244 The
courts have used the Rowley two-pronged test to determine if the procedural requirements of
transition planning have been met, as well as determining if transition plans were reasonably
calculated to provide some educational benefit to the student.245
Gorski v. Lynchburg School Board (1989)246
A few years after the Rowley decision, the court in Gorski v. Lynchburg School Board
applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance.247 James Gorski was a 17-year-old student with a
specific learning disability. His family had moved from Pennsylvania to Virginia during James’
senior year and enrolled him in E.C. Glass High School.248 School officials met with James’
mother, Gretchen Gorski, twice prior to the 1985-1986 school year to determine James’
eligibility for special education and to formulate an IEP.249 During both meetings, Mrs. Gorski
expressed her concern regarding vocational education for her son.250 School officials agreed
James needed vocational training. However, they suggested vocational training should be
deferred until after James’ high school graduation.251 Mrs. Gorski mistakenly believed the school
system would pay for James’ post-graduation vocational training as a transitional service until he
243
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was 21.252 When the Gorskis discovered the error, they withdrew James from the graduation list
and began due process proceedings.253 The due process officer ruled in favor of the family,
concluding the IEP was invalid.254 The due process officer noted Mrs. Gorski gave her consent
believing school officials would pay for James’ post-secondary vocation training because James
had not successfully completed all of his IEP goals.255
School officials appealed the local hearing officer’s decision and the state hearing officer
found the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit. The state hearing officer
found James had successfully completed the IEP.256 The hearing officer noted children with a
disability were not entitled to education at state expense past graduation even if graduation
occurred prior to the student aging out of eligibility for special education services upon reaching
age 21.257 The family appealed the decision to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Virginia where the court’s application of Rowley258 standards yielded a conclusion the Gorskis
had been provided all relevant information regarding James’ IEP.259 The court further concluded,
the IEP offered James substantial educational benefits.260 The district court also found public
schools were not obligated to educate children with a disability after they graduated from high
school and the Virginia General Assembly had not authorized school boards to pay for post-
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secondary vocational training for students with disabilities.261 The Gorskis appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision.262
The Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990263
While the Gorski case was being litigated, Congress was in the midst of reauthorizing
and amending the EAHCA.264 During the amendment process, Congress acknowledged a
concern that students “move from school to adult life with varying degrees of success.”265
Congress further acknowledged when students are not prepared to transition from high school
the, “years of special education will be wasted while these individuals languish at home, their
ability to become independent and self-sufficient (therefore making a positive contribution to
society) placed at significant risk.”266 On October 30, 1990, President George H. Bush signed
into law the Education of All Handicapped Children Act Amendments of 1990.267 The
amendments renamed the EAHCA to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) of
1990. The amendments included a definition of assistive technology, the reauthorization and
expansion of discretionary programs and the addition of transition services.268 Although
transition was first specifically referenced in the 1990 amendments, this debut was in the form of
research and demonstration projects in the Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of
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1983 as well as the Rehabilitation Amendments of 1984.269 The demonstration projects included
developing service delivery models, developing procedures to evaluation training and transition
services, designing vocational programs to increase potential employment, and demographic
studies transition needs for students with disabilities.270 By 1989, transition demonstration
projects had helped more than 127,000 youth with disabilities and forty-two states had developed
and implemented service delivery models focused on transition services.271
The transition services found in the IDEA were designed to help disabled students move
from special education to further education, work, or independent living.272 The amendments
defined transition services as:
a coordinated set of activities for a student, designed within an outcome-oriented
process, which promotes movement from school to post-school activities,
including post-secondary education, vocational training, integrated employment
(including supported employment), continuing and adult education, adult services,
independent living, or community participation. The coordinated set of activities
shall be based upon the individual student's needs, taking into account the
student's preferences and interests, and shall include instruction, community
experiences, the development of employment and other post-school adult living
objectives, and, when appropriate, acquisition of daily living skills and functional
vocational evaluation.273

The amendments mandated the planning and implementation of transition services begin
for all IEP eligible students by age 16.274 Congress recognized the provision of these services
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could have a significantly positive effect on the employment and independent living outcomes
for students who otherwise would be likely to drop out of school before reaching age 16.275
The transition amendment required states to initiate transition services for all students
eligible for special education services (i.e., students with IEPs) beginning at age 16. However,
during floor debates, Congress expressed an expectation that transition services would be
considered for some students by age 14 or younger.276 Congress noted age 16 might be too late to
provide transition services to some students, particularly those students in danger of dropping out
of school.277
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997
On June 4, 1997 after years of consideration and implementation of transition services
from secondary to post-secondary settings, President Bill Clinton signed the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act of 1997 into law. 278 President Clinton, in his signing statement,
stated, “Successful implementation of the revised IDEA is the key to the future for children with
disabilities and it will help them become successful and contributing members of their
communities.”279
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The reauthorization’s intent, set forth in House Bill 5 by the Committee on Education and
the Workforce, was to improve IDEA and emphasize what was educationally best for students
with disabilities.280 The committee further intended to simplify the organizational structure of
the IDEA so it would be easier to comprehend.281 The committee viewed reauthorization as a
way to improve the IDEA and provide quality educational services.282 The improvements
included an expanded parental role, ensuring student access to the general education curriculum,
focusing on teaching and learning, assisting in addressing the cost of providing programs and
services, increasing attention on student diversity to prevent inappropriate identification of
students, ensuring schools were safe, and encouraging educators and parents to resolve issues
collaboratively.283
This reauthorization strengthened the IDEA’s transition language. Congress observed
training staff to provide transition services and supporting professional development for all
personnel who worked with children with disabilities would make the education of children with
disabilities more effective.284 This training would ensure staff had the needed skills and
knowledge necessary to enable children to lead productive, independent, adult lives.285 Congress
added a requirement for the identification of the related services required for successful
transition.286 The reauthorization also required that by age 14, and annually thereafter, student
IEPs must include a statement of the student’s transition service needs focused on the child’s
course of study. The course of study was intended to describe the student’s participation in either
280
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advanced-placement courses or a vocational education program as appropriate.287 The
reauthorization also required by the time the student turned 16, or earlier if appropriate, the IEP
would contain a statement of the student’s needed transition services, including a statement of
the interagency responsibilities.288 Another transition component listed in the 1997
reauthorization was that beginning at least one year before the student reaches the age of
majority he or she was to be informed of the rights that would transfer to him or her upon
reaching the age of majority.289
Individuals with Disabilities Improvement Act of 2004
Following the IDEA 1997’s enactment, transition received little attention until Congress
began hearings to discuss the next IDEA reauthorization.290 During the June 6, 2002 Senate
hearing, Senator Ted Kennedy asserted children with disabilities must have the opportunity to
learn alongside their non-disabled peers and ultimately live productive and independent lives.291
Senator Kennedy further stated, “Although children with disabilities now have a guarantee to an
education, they do not always receive the quality of education they deserve to succeed in school
or in later life.”292 He noted as a result of this void schools needed to provide supports and
services to enable students with disabilities to transition from the K-12 schools to either

Id. § 614 (d)(1)(A)(vii)(I), 11 Stat. 44 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (2006)).
Id. § 614 (d)(1)(A)(vii)(II), 11 Stat. 44 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (2006)). Age of
majority is 18 years old. Interagency agreements include agreements between a state or local education agency and a
state or local vocational rehabilitation agency. The services provided and the responsibilities of each agency are
determined at the state or local level. S. Rep. No. 357, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. 33 (1992); H. Rep. No. 659, 105th
Congress, 2d. Sess. 354 (1998).
289
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17§ 614 (d)(1)(A)(vii)(III), 11
Stat. 44 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (2006)).
290
School Safety, Discipline and IDEA: Hearing Before the Committee on Education and the Workplace, 106th
Cong. 67. (1999).
291
U.S. Senate, Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Accountability and IDEA: What Happens
When the Bus Doesn’t Come Anymore? Hearing, June 2, 1996 (S. Hrg. 107-672). Washington: Government Printing
Office, 2002.
292
Id.
287
288

43
employment or higher education.293 On October 2, 2001, President George W. Bush signed an
Executive Order creating the President’s Commission on Excellence in Special Education.294 The
Executive Order declared, “The education of all children, regardless of background or disability,
while chiefly a State and local responsibility, must always be a national priority.”295 He charged
the Commission on Excellence in Special Education to recommend policies designed to improve
special education by examining the effectiveness of special education programs, the cost of
special education, the impact of early intervention, and the use of federal resources to improve
educational outcomes for students with disabilities.296 The Commission held thirteen meetings
and hearings across the nation with special education experts, education finance experts,
education and medical researchers, parents of children with disabilities, and individuals with
disabilities.297 On July 1, 2002, the Commission presented its report.298 The report first discussed
federal regulations and the monitoring of special education.299 The report suggested previous
federal monitoring of special education services had been broad and focused primarily on
implementation in order to ensure states provided special education.300 The Commission
questioned whether procedural compliance had an effect on student achievement and post-school
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success.301 The Commission recommended monitoring guidelines be modified to focus on
results-oriented accountability as opposed the then current process-orientation.302
The report also addressed the need for effective transition services for students with
disabilities.303 The Commission found unemployment rates for adults with disabilities was at the
seventy percent level and adults with disabilities earned less than their non-disabled peers even
when employed.304 The Commission made several recommendations for improving transition
services in the IDEA reauthorization. One recommendation was to simplify the existing
transition requirements because the existing regulations were “too convoluted to implement in
practical ways.”305 Another recommendation was to examine whether the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 should be reauthorized and, if so, to align the terms used in both Acts.306 The report
suggested using similar terms in both Acts would improve the future for students with disabilities
by facilitating a smooth transition from high school to adult living.307 The Commission further
recommended mandating coordination of federal interagency resources by pooling funding for
transition services, as well as, to support post-secondary institutions receiving federal funds to
service students with disabilities including educating personnel on modifications and
accommodations.308 Other recommendations included linking IEP goals with transition goals and
providing support services designed to prepare students for success in competitive employment
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and post-secondary education.309 The Commission presented the report to President Bush as
Congress was preparing to reauthorize IDEA 1997.
On February 25, 2003, U.S. Secretary of Education Rod Paige issued a press release
unveiling several major recommendations for the upcoming IDEA reauthorization designed to
align the statute with the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act.310 The first recommendation was to
establish stronger accountability for results.311 This would ensure students with disabilities would
have access to and could make progress in the general education curriculum. This would also
ensure the students with disabilities testing results would be included in state accountability
systems.312 The next recommendation was to simplify IDEA-associated paperwork. Another
recommendation also focused on results, increasing flexibility by providing direct services for
students with disabilities and allowing for alternative dispute resolution with accompanying
improved mediation practices.313 One recommendation for improving the mediation process for
disputes over IEP services was to allow mediation requests at any time during the dispute
resolution process.314 Another recommendation was to allow voluntary binding arbitration for
both parents and school officials to resolve disputes over IEP services.315
Secretary Paige also recommended simplifying discipline requirements.316 Believing the
IDEA 1997 disciplinary procedures were complex, it was recommended school safety
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improvements be formulated to preserve protections for students with disabilities.317 This
recommendation focused on research-based or evidence-based instructional practices, early
intervention, and additional educational collaboration for parent training.318 The final
recommendation was to increase meaningful parental participation and to increase the choices
for appropriate educational placements and services.319 However, Secretary Paige’s press release
made no mention of school officials’ obligation to appropriately transition students with
disabilities to post-secondary settings.320
The proposed IDEA 1997 reauthorization was presented in April of 2003 with many
changes however, there were no changes to transition services addressed.321 House Bill 1350
would have radically reversed many of the IDEA 1997’s discipline protection provisions,
reduced the paperwork required in the IEP process, and provided local school officials flexibility
in improving early intervention and reducing misidentification.322 As indicated by the 251 to 171
vote, a majority of the members of the House of Representatives supported the bill.323
In May of 2004, the Senate introduced a separate bill addressing the IDEA 1997
reauthorization.324 Senate Bill 1248 was significantly different from House Bill 1350. However,
as with House Bill 1350, Senate Bill 1248’s proposed changes focused on student discipline and
simplification of the law.325 During the Senate floor debates Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa
tangentially addressed transition services when he noted investing in students with special needs
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provided society with adults equipped to go on to post-secondary education, gainful
employment, and the skills needed to live independently.326
On May 13, 2004 after minor revisions, there was bipartisan support for House Bill 1350
in the United States Senate.327 On November 14, 2004, the Senate met to review the conference
report accompanying House Bill 1350.328 On November 19, 2004, the House of Representatives
also met to review the conference report accompanying House Bill 1350. Representative Jeff
Miller praised the proposed bill for ensuring students receiving special education had the right to
receive the services they needed.329
In December 2004, a year and a half after the President’s Commission on Excellence in
Special Education presented their report, Congress reauthorized the IDEA 1997.330 The Act was
signed into law by President George W. Bush and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004. Today the reauthorized Act is commonly referred to as
IDEA 2004.331 This reauthorization continued to entitle all children with eligible disabilities a
free and appropriate public education. The reauthorization was more closely aligned with the No
Child Left Behind Act, requiring special education teachers to be highly qualified and
authorizing some services for special education students parentally placed in religious schools.332
IDEA 2004 also made the disciplinary process harsher for children with disabilities but
continued to require no child with a disability be expelled from school.

326

150 Cong. Rec. S 5250 (daily ed. May 12, 2004) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
150 Cong. Rec. S 5394 (daily ed. May 13, 2004).
328
150 Cong. Rec. S 11654 (daily ed. November 19, 2004).
329
150 Cong. Rec. H 10006 (daily ed. November 19, 2004) (statement of Rep. Miller).
330
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (2006).
331
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (2006).
332
Mark C. Weber, Reflections on the New Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act, 58 Fla. L. Rev.
7 (2006).
327

48
In considering the IDEA 2004, Congress observed, “as the graduation rates for children
with disabilities continue to climb, providing effective transition services to promote successful
post-secondary employment or education is an important measure of accountability for children
with disabilities.”333 As a result, several key IDEA 2004 provisions strengthened regulations on
transition services.
The 1997 version of the IDEA included language stating the Act was “to ensure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and
independent living.”334 IDEA 2004 strengthened this statement by including language regarding
preparing children with disabilities for further education along with employment and
independent living.335 IDEA 2004 also strengthened the definition of transition services as well
as the language regarding transition. Previous definitions of transition services suggested
transition services were to be an outcome-oriented process. An outcome-oriented process was
defined as promoting a student’s movement from school to post-secondary activities.336 IDEA
2004 mandated transition services be within a results-oriented process.337 A results-oriented
process focused on improving both the student’s academic and functional achievement in order
to facilitate movement from school to post-secondary settings, including vocational education.338
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IDEA 2004 also expanded the definition of transition services to include the child’s strengths, as
well as the previously required, individual needs and preferences.339
IDEA 2004 also added a post-secondary goal. The post-secondary goal was designed to
help a child achieve their employment or post-high school opportunity goals. Previous versions
of the Act had included a statement indicating transition services needed focus on course of
study and include interagency services and linkages.340 However, IDEA 2004 added language
requiring “appropriate measurable post-secondary goals based upon age appropriate transition
assessments related to training, education, employment, and where appropriate, independent
living skills.”341 An example of a measurable IEP goal in the area of education/training may
include a statement such as, after being provided Cook County Community College information
the student will demonstrate knowledge of the college’s admission requirements by verbally
describing these requirements and identifying admission deadlines with 90% accuracy. An
example of a measurable IEP goal in the area of employment may include a statement such as,
based on the results of career assessments through career counseling with the vocational
education teacher the student will be able to report three possible options for part-time
employment. An example of a measurable IEP goal in the area of independent living skills may
include a statement such as, given travel-training situations, the student will demonstrate sitting
quietly and refraining from talking to strangers while utilizing public transportation at least four
times across five opportunities as observed by the teacher.
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IDEA 2004 emphasized the IEP team must implement transition services, including the
course of study to assist the child in attaining their post-secondary goals.342 Transition services
were required to be in place beginning with the IEP in effect when the child turns sixteen, or
sooner as determined by state regulations.343
IDEA 2004 also discussed transition in the Act’s change in eligibility provisions. IDEA
2004 required schools to evaluate a student before there could be a change in eligibility,
including making a determination the child was no longer challenged by a disability.344 The Act
added an exception to the evaluation requirement. This exception allowed school officials to
terminate a child’s eligibility when the child either graduated from secondary school with a
regular diploma or exited school because they exceeded the age eligibility for IDEA.345
However, IDEA 2004 added a new transition component, a caveat to this exception. The Act
required school officials to provide a child whose eligibility terminated, whether due to
graduation or aging out, with a written Summary of Performance.346 The Summary of
Performance document would summarize the child’s academic achievement, as well as their
functional performance.347 The document must also include recommendations for assisting the
child in achieving their post-secondary goals.348
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Transition Cases Following the 1990 Enactment of the IDEA

Within five years of the initial implementation of the IDEA 1990 transition services
mandate, courts were asked to hear cases involving transition plans and services.
John Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools (1995)349
The Chuhran case, decided by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan, was among the first transition cases decided after enactment of the IDEA 1990 and the
implementation of the transition services mandate.350 John Chuhran had muscular dystrophy and
was eligible for special education services due to this physical health impairment.351 John
attended Walled Lake Consolidated School District’s Farmington Harrison High School where
he was enrolled in a program for students with physical health impairments.352 John was
wheelchair bound and had no motor function. He required the services of a nurse or
paraprofessional for deep tracheal suctioning every 50 minutes. John also required a ventilator
for 45 minutes during the school day.353
In April of John’s twelfth grade year, the IEP team met to develop a post-graduate plan.
School officials invited Michigan Rehabilitation Services to assist in identifying vocational
options for John after graduation.354 The IEP team referred John to New Horizons, a
rehabilitation corporation, for a vocational evaluation.355 New Horizons recommended John
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continue receiving public school programming including computer training, additional math
instruction, and business related classes.356
Two years after John’s twelfth grade year, the IEP team discussed continued placement at
Farmington Harrison High School or termination of services upon John’s graduation.357 John
opposed graduation and the team extended his high school program for two more school years.358
School officials provided John a vocational assessment to determine career opportunities.359 The
IEP team also provided transition services by coordinating with outside agencies so John would
receive vocational assistance in the event of graduation.360 School officials provided John classes
that directly related to the field of computers and business as recommended by the New Horizons
assessment.361 John completed his general education requirements for graduation and followed a
general education program leading to a high school diploma.362 John achieved his IEP goals to
pass his mainstream classes and received training in computers as well as career and college
counseling.363 School officials provided John transition services beginning in 1987 even though
transition services were not required until 1990.364 Five months before John’s twenty-second
birthday school officials held an IEP meeting to consider a change of status. The IEP team
determined John should graduate with an accompanying termination of special education
services.365
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John disagreed with the team’s recommendation and requested a due process hearing.366
John alleged school officials failed to provide him with adequate notice of termination of
services, failed to develop a written plan for transition services, and failed to implement
transition services.367 The Local Hearing Officer (LHO) concluded the IEP team’s
recommendations for graduation were appropriate and John appealed to the State Level Hearing
Officer who upheld the LHO’s decision.368 Following the state level hearing, John appealed to
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging school officials had not
provided him with a FAPE through the Farmington Harrison High School.369
Upon review, the district court found that John had received adequate notice of the
recommended termination of special education services.370 The court pointed out both John and
his parents were aware of the relevant information regarding graduation. The family argued the
letter they received indicated the purpose of the IEP meeting was to consider a change of status
but the letter had failed to specifically address graduation.371 The court observed school officials
proposed graduation as early as 1989 but provided services for another two years.372 The court
applied Rowley’s first prong, concluding no procedural violations had occurred, as the technical
defect, of not specifically addressing graduation, in the letter provided the family was not
sufficient to render the IEP inappropriate. The court also found there had not been any
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“reasonable basis for surprise” by the graduation issue being raised in May 1991 because
graduation had been discussed earlier.373
Next, the court addressed the alleged absence of a written plan for transition services.
John Chuhran contended school officials’ failure to develop a written transition plan was a
procedural violation. As a remedy, John argued the IDEA required school officials provide
transportation, nursing, occupational and physical therapy to him in college beyond the age of
eligibility for IDEA.374 The court noted school officials had provided John with an IEP and
assessed his progress annually.375 The court also observed the IEP team discussed graduation as
early as 1989 but had not recommended it until 1991. The court reasoned although school
officials had not written down the transition services, the provided services were adequate. The
court noted school officials provided John a vocational assessment to determine career
opportunities.376 The IEP team also provided transition services by coordinating with outside
agencies so John would receive vocational assistance in the event of graduation.377 School
officials provided John classes that directly related to the field of computers and business as
recommended by the New Horizons assessment.378 As a result, the court determined Rowley’s
first prong had been satisfied and the procedural error of not having a written transition plan had
not resulted in a denial of FAPE.379 The court also noted John completed his general education
requirements for graduation and followed a general education program leading to a high school
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diploma.380 John achieved his IEP goals to pass his mainstream classes and received training in
computers as well as career and college counseling.381 The court applied Rowley’s second prong
to conclude John had received a FAPE, thus indicating school officials’ failure to develop a
written transition plan was a procedural violation, not a substantial violation.382 John appealed
the case and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted summary judgment to the
defendants and affirmed the district court’s decision.383 The appellate panel agreed with the
district court’s determination that school officials established compliance with the IDEA under
the two-part Rowley test.384 The panel agreed the letter provided to the parents in 1991 had not
specifically advised the plaintiffs that the IEP team would be considering graduation.385
However, because graduation had been discussed as early as 1989 and based on Mrs. Chuhran’s
testimony regarding a telephone discussion with school officials prior to the meeting, the court
determined the Chuhrans were well aware school officials would be discussing John’s
graduation.386 The court found school officials provided John with adequate transition services
and the lack of a written plan was an insubstantial technical defect.387 The panel determined
school officials properly graduated and provided John Chuhran a FAPE.388
Urban v. Jefferson County School District (1996)389
One year after Chuhran, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided an
IDEA case involving transition planning and services.390 Gregory Urban was an eighteen-year380
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old student with severe retardation as well as delays in speech and motor skills. He moved into
the Jefferson County School District in November 1991.391 Gregory would have attended
Evergreen High School if he had not had a disability. However, Gregory’s IEP team placed him
at Golden High School in the Challenge Program and Physical Education Plus, a program
designed to provide supports and services to students with severe disabilities.392 In February of
1992, the IEP team met and recommended the Challenge Program at Golden High School as the
least restrictive placement option.393 The Golden High School placement would have allowed
Gregory to participate in both adaptive PE and job site training.394 The Evergreen High School
placement did not provide this type of programming.395
Gregory and his parents requested a due process hearing.396 They argued school officials
denied Gregory a FAPE by assigning him to a school other than the one he would have attended
if he did not have a disability.397 They also argued school officials failed to assess Gregory’s
need for transition services, make IEP provisions for transition services, and provide transition
services.398 The Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) found school officials had not provided
Gregory with a statement of transition services.399 The IHO ordered the IEP team to reconvene
and create a new IEP addressing transition services.400 The IHO concluded the IEP team must
predicate the statement of transition services on Gregory’s limited ability to generalize skills
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from one setting to another.401 Additionally, the IHO determined consideration of Gregory’s
placement in the Challenge Program should have taken place after the IEP team first considered
all available options at Evergreen and only then if the IEP required such placement.402 The IHO
also noted Gregory was receiving an appropriate education with educational benefit in the
Challenge Program.403
School officials agreed to create a new IEP. However, they appealed several aspects of
the IHO’s decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).404 Gregory and his parents crossappealed, requesting the ALJ require school officials to place Gregory at Evergreen High
School.405
The ALJ, like the IHO, ordered school officials to schedule a meeting to create a new
IEP when Gregory’s parents could be present.406 The ALJ rejected the argument that Gregory
was entitled to placement at Evergreen.407 The ALJ determined the IHO erred when she
determined transition services should be focused at Evergreen, stating the IEP team should make
these determinations.408 The ALJ also determined the IHO erred in concluding Gregory’s
transition services needed to be based on Gregory’s limited ability to generalize learning from
one setting to another.409
On, April 27, 1993, Gregory and his parents filed both an appeal and a motion for a
preliminary injunction that would have required school officials to place Gregory in Evergreen
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High School in the District Court of Colorado.410 The district court denied the motion for a
preliminary injunction and concluded the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Americans with
Disabilities Act had not given parents the right to reject school officials’ recommended
placements.411 The court concluded Gregory was receiving FAPE at Golden High School.412
Gregory and his parents appealed. In the appeal, they argued school officials deprived
Gregory of an appropriate education for seventeen months by failing to provide an IEP that
contained a statement of transition.413 They further claimed Gregory was entitled to
compensatory education due to this deprivation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
there was no deprivation of FAPE and denied petitioners’ request for compensatory services.414
The appellate panel affirmed all of the district court’s holdings.415 The court also stated school
officials’ failure to provide a statement of transition services was a “procedural deficit and the
appropriate remedy was to remand for completion of the IEP.”416 The appellate panel further
noted although Gregory’s IEP had not contained a statement of transition services, Gregory had
received transition services. The panel pointed out the difference between the statement of
transition services and the provision of transition services.417 The court reasoned Gregory had
been receiving services addressing transitional needs such as community awareness, daily living
skills, and how to generalize or transfer skills between differing environments.418
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Yankton School District v. Harold and Angie Schramm (1996)419
When the Tenth Circuit was deciding Urban, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was
also deciding an IDEA transition case. Tracy Schramm was a high achieving, college bound,
high school student with cerebral palsy.420 She had been receiving special education and related
services due to her orthopedic impairment since preschool.421 Tracy had weak hand strength,
limited hand-eye coordination, wrote and typed slowly, and used a walker for short distances and
a wheelchair for longer distances.422 Tracy’s May 10, 1993 IEP included adaptive physical
education, physical therapy, and transportation services. School officials also provided other
accommodations, which they had not listed on Tracy’s IEP.423 These accommodations included
physical assistance moving between classes, getting on and off the school bus, navigating the
stairs in the school, carrying her lunch tray, and setting up her saxophone for band. Other
accommodations provided, but not listed in the IEP, included shortened writing assignments,
photocopies of her teacher’s notes, use of computers, special typing instruction, and multiple
copies of books being provided so Tracy did not need to carry books from class to class.424 On
March 31, 1994, just prior to Tracy’s sixteenth birthday, her IEP team convened to discuss
transition services.425 The team created a transition plan that placed the bulk of the responsibility
on the Schramm family. The plan did not address issues such as driver education, self-advocacy,
or independent living skills such as cooking and cleaning.426
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In June of 1994, school officials determined Tracy was no longer eligible for special
education.427 This determination was based upon the fact Tracy had completed the district’s
requirements for physical education and her last IEP only provided special education in physical
education.428 School officials concluded Tracy no longer needed IDEA special education
services. School officials had not considered the accommodations she was receiving that were
not written into the IEP.429
Angie Schramm, Tracy’s mother, filed a request for an impartial due process hearing
claiming Tracy had many transition needs school officials failed to consider.430 In the due
process hearing, the hearing officer determined Tracy continued to be eligible for IDEA
services.431 The hearing officer noted Tracy’s eligibility was based upon the specially designed
instruction and related services she was receiving, but not included in her IEP.432
School officials appealed and the U.S. District Court for South Dakota found Tracy’s
impairment adversely affected her educational performance. The court determined without the
provided instructional modifications and related services, Tracy would not have been able to
benefit from regular classroom instruction.433 The court also observed school officials failed to
comply with the IDEA’s transition requirements and ordered them to formulate a new transition
plan.434 The Schramms had requested additional months of transition services to compensate for
school officials’ failure to provide transition services beginning when Tracy turned sixteen. The
court denied this request noting Tracy was an eighteen-year-old and she would remain eligible
427
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for transition services until she was twenty-one.435 The court observed there were no egregious
circumstances to justify the compensatory education.436
Yankton School District appealed this court decision arguing that the district court
erroneously determined that Tracy qualified as a disabled child under the IDEA.437 The Eighth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.438 The appellate panel
determined Tracy had required special education and related services as defined by the IDEA.439
The court considered Tracy’s abilities had school officials not provided service and determined if
Tracy had not had the specialized instruction and services provided by the school officials, her
cerebral palsy would adversely affect her ability to learn and complete the required class work.440
Because the services provided by school officials lead to Tracy’s adequate educational
performance, her need for special education services due to her orthopedic impairment was
highlighted.441 The appellate panel obligated the district to fashion an IEP for Tracy that included
appropriate transition services.442 The court stated transition services such as driver’s education,
self-advocacy, and independent living skills were not beyond the legislative scope of the
IDEA.443
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J.B. v. Killingly Board of Education (1997)444
One year after Yankton, the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut further
defined transition services within the legislative scope of the IDEA in Killingly.445 J.B. was
eligible for special education because of a language disability and a learning disability.446 In
1991, state officials identified fourteen-year-old J. B. as a sex offender after he was convicted of
a fourth degree sexual assault of several young boys.447 A subsequent psychiatric evaluation
diagnosed J.B. with a conduct disorder and a mixed specific developmental disorder.448 Two
years later, multiple specialists diagnosed J.B. with attention deficit disorder and multiple
personality disorder.449
After state officials identified J. B. as a sex offender, the Connecticut Department of
Children and Families placed him in a residential treatment facility for non-educational
reasons.450 Killingly School District agreed to pay for J.B.’s regular school term special
education services during his placement in the residential facility.451 On May 31, 1995, ten days
after his eighteenth birthday, the Connecticut Department of Children and Families transferred
J.B. to High Meadows, a residential treatment program.452 The Department of Children and
Families agreed to care for J.B. through an Uncared for with Specialized Needs commitment
until he turned twenty-one because his parents indicated that they would no longer support
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him.453 A few weeks later, school officials held an IEP meeting. The IEP team determined J.B.
had earned enough credits and should graduate high school.454 School officials issued J.B. a
diploma with an accompanying termination of special education services.455 Although school
officials issued a diploma, they gave J.B. the option to continue attending school at High
Meadows, which J.B. elected to do, extending his special education eligibility.456
A few months after school officials graduated J.B., an expert on sexual offenders
completed a “social-sexual evaluation” evaluation of J.B.457 The expert determined J.B.’s low
average intelligence and language disorder were not a contributing factor to his sexual
offences.458 The expert on sexual offenders found J.B. was at risk for re-offending. She
recommended the Department of Children and Families move J.B. to a community based
residential treatment program due to his ongoing need for supervision, ensuring he and his
community remain safe.459 The expert also determined J.B. could attend his community high
school with constant one-to-one supervision.460 On March 13, 1996, almost a year after J.B. was
graduated, school officials held an IEP meeting and determined J.B. had not needed placement in
a twenty-four hour residential setting for educational purposes.461 However, the Department of
Children and Families refused to place J.B. in a community residential treatment program due to
financial constraints.462
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Two days after the IEP meeting, J.B. filed for due process requesting a review of his
special education program and placement. The hearing officer concluded that J.B. had not
required a residential placement to benefit from special education services and that the “scope of
special education and related services does not include the acquisition of socialization or
community living skills in a residential treatment program.”463 The hearing officer reasoned
there was no evidence that J.B.’s emotional issues were intertwined with his educational
problems.464 The hearing officer had not made a determination on the issue of J.B.’s placement
in a community-based treatment center because she lacked jurisdiction over the Department of
Children and Families and could not order them to provide him with treatment.465 The hearing
officer also found that the transition services in J.B.’s IEP had not met the requirements of the
IDEA and found that J.B. was entitled to up to two years compensatory education.466 J.B.
appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
requesting a review of his special education program, as well as review of his entitlement to a
community based residential program.467
The district court determined Killingly School District was financially responsible for
J.B.’s education, including his residential placement.468 The court ordered school officials to hold
a meeting to determine an appropriate placement, including instruction on the acquisition of
community and daily living skills.469 Furthermore, the court upheld the hearing officer’s award
of compensatory education because J.B.’s transition plan was insufficient, causing him
463
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irreparable harm.470 The district court stated that, as part of the transition plan, J.B. “could
receive instruction in community living and social skills, including daily living skills, appropriate
behavior, socialization, and working skills as part of his transition services” indicating these
services are not beyond the scope of the IDEA and therefore objectively reasonable.471
Mandy S. v. Fulton County School District (2000)472
Three years after Killingly, an objectively reasonable transition plan was also at issue in
Mandy S. Mandy suffered a traumatic brain injury when she was eleven and was subsequently
eligible for special education.473 When Mandy was sixteen, she and her family moved to
Atlanta, Georgia and enrolled in the Fulton County School District as a special education
student.474 School officials provided Mandy with a comprehensive evaluation prior to
determining placement and provided homebound instruction during the evaluation.475 Once the
IEP team determined placement, Mandy received special education, related services, and an
Individualized Transition Plan (ITP) in a college preparatory diploma course of study at Roswell
High School.476 School officials placed Mandy in the college preparatory diploma course of
study at her mother’s request.477 On May 24, 1996, school officials met with Mandy and her
mother to create an IEP for the 1996-1997 school year.478 The IEP team agreed Mandy would
not graduate with a regular diploma by May of 1998. 479 During the IEP meeting, Mandy stated
that she did not want to return to Roswell High School because the environment was
470
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overwhelming for her, the students were immature, and she had no friends in the school.480
Despite Mandy’s request she not be placed at Roswell High School, the IEP team developed an
IEP and a transition plan with placement at Roswell High School for services including
instruction in and goals for English, study skills, personal management, work skills,
keyboarding, social awareness, and social skills.481 Other services offered to Mandy included
occupational therapy, physical therapy, speech therapy, and career services.482 School officials
also referred Mandy to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to determine eligibility for
vocational services as part of her transition plan.483 Mandy and her mother had previously
rejected Fulton County school officials’ offer of services from the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation.484 This time, however, they accepted and Mandy received a complete
neuropsychological evaluation.485 Mandy was interested in a career in computers and Mandy’s
mother requested she receive training at Asher Business School, a post-secondary business
school, at the district’s expense.486 School officials visited Asher Business School and
determined it was unable to provide an appropriate education for Mandy because Asher Business
School had never dealt with a student with a traumatic brain injury and had very little experience
with providing accommodations to students with specialized needs.487 School officials
determined Mandy was eligible for vocational rehabilitation services at Roswell High School and
developed a vocational plan.488 Mandy and her mother refused to sign the IEP.489 Mandy
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received the services described in the unsigned IEP and transition plan until she dropped out on
February 10, 1997 at twenty years old.490
Despite Mandy dropping out in February, school officials met with Mandy and her
mother in August to develop an IEP and transition plan for the 1997-98 school year. Prior to the
meeting, the district evaluated Mandy to determine her current levels of performance to develop
accurate IEP goals and objectives.491 The IEP team reviewed Mandy’s goals from the 1996-97
IEP and determined a starting point for goals and objectives in the new IEP.492 The team
recommended a placement in the Learning Disability Program at Roswell High School. They
offered a community-based program of instruction as well as speech therapy, physical therapy,
occupational therapy, career services, and information on transportation services.493 Mandy and
her mother rejected the proposed IEP and unilaterally placed Mandy in a private rehabilitation
program after Mandy withdrew from the district.494
In May 1998, Mandy and her mother filed for a due process hearing claiming Mandy’s
IEP and transition plans were inadequate because school officials had not proposed a
community-based program at the time of the 1996-1997 IEP meeting.495 Consequently, Mandy
and her mother were seeking compensatory education services.496 They were also seeking
reimbursement for Mandy’s private education and services for the 1997-1998 school year.497 The
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ALJ ruled against Mandy, denying compensatory services and tuition reimbursement.498 Mandy
and her mother appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The
court reviewed the administrative record and noted Mandy and her mother had insisted upon a
college preparation program, not a community-based program.499 Because Mandy’s mother
insisted on a college preparatory program for Mandy, the court found school officials were
unable teach Mandy independent living skills in preparation for a community-based program
prior to the 1996-97 school year.500 The district court found school officials met the procedural
requirements of the first prong of the Rowley test and complied with the requirements of the
IDEA when they developed the IEPs and transition plans for Mandy for the 1996-1997 and
1997-1998 school years.501 The district court also found the IEP and transition plan were
appropriate and reasonably calculated to provide Mandy educational benefit, noting Mandy had
mastered, or was in process of mastering, many of her IEP goals.502 The district court determined
school officials met the substantive requirement in the second prong of the Rowley test.503
Because the district court found the IEP and transition plan were appropriate, it did not consider
the issue of tuition reimbursement.504
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Kevin T. v. Elmhurst Community School District 205 (2002)505
In Mandy S., the court found school officials had properly implemented a transition plan.
Two years later, this was not the case in Kevin T.506 Kevin was a student with multiple
disabilities receiving special education services at Glen Oak therapeutic day school from eighth
grade through eleventh grade. During eleventh grade, school officials from York public high
school mainstreamed Kevin into some general education classes.507 In twelfth grade, school
officials transferred Kevin to York.508 His grades suffered and he did not graduate. At his
parents’ urging, school officials transferred Kevin to Acacia, a therapeutic day school
specializing in educating students with severe learning disabilities.509 Acacia tested Kevin’s
academic levels when he entered and again at the end of the school year.510 Based on the testing
provided by Acacia, Kevin made progress in all academic areas.511 He also earned enough credits
to graduate and school officials graduated nineteen year-old Kevin from high school with an
accompanying termination of special education services.512 Kevin’s parents opposed graduation
and asserted he should remain at Acacia until he was twenty-one. In May of 2000, Kevin and his
parents requested a due process hearing challenging the school officials’ decision to graduate
Kevin.513
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The IHO ordered school officials to continue paying for Kevin’s placement at Acacia
during the pendency of the hearing under the “stay-put” provision of the IDEA.514 Kevin started
the 2000-01 school year at Acacia, however, the hearing officer affirmed the district’s decision to
graduate Kevin in September and concluded school officials could issue Kevin a diploma.515
School officials stopped paying Kevin’s Acacia tuition thirty days after receiving the
hearing officer’s decision.516 Kevin continued to attend Acacia at his parents’ expense.517 Kevin
and his parents appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois.518 They contended school officials violated IDEA procedures when they
graduated Kevin from high school and requested compensatory education.519 Kevin and his
parents contended school officials failed to provide FAPE by failing to consider assistive
technology, drafting an IEP with vague and unmeasurable goals, not permitting Kevin to
participate in state-wide assessments, not offering extended school year services,520 and failing to
implement a transition plan.521
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The court reversed the hearing officer’s decision, determining school officials failed to
provide Kevin a FAPE.522 The court found Kevin’s IEP goals from 1990 to 1999 remained
almost identical and school officials had not amended past IEP goals even when they had
knowledge of Kevin’s present levels, strengths, and weaknesses.523 The court further found
school officials denied Kevin a FAPE because they failed to consider Kevin’s assistive
technology needs and had not given an explanation as to why they determined state testing was
not appropriate for Kevin.524 The court determined school officials had not violated the IDEA
with regard to extended school year services because the district believed that Kevin’s skills
would not significantly regress and Kevin’s parents had not provided any evidence regarding
regression of academic skills over the summer months.525 However, the court did find that the
district had failed to follow the IDEA with regard to Kevin’s transition plan.526
The district court found, school officials failure write a transition plan for Kevin until he
was seventeen years old was a procedural violation of the IDEA mandate noting, this violation
did not meet the standards of the first prong of the Rowley test.527 The court found the transition
plan school officials created for Kevin provided him with vocational services to help secure
employment after graduation. However, it failed to take into account Kevin’s interest in
attending junior college, thereby failing the substantive analysis of the second prong of the
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Rowley test.528 The court ruled failing to write an appropriate transition plan and neglecting
consideration of the student’s interests is a denial of FAPE.529 IDEA mandated transition services
to ensure students with disabilities function adequately in society after graduation.530 The court
ordered school officials continue to pay for Kevin’s education at Acacia past his 21st birthday to
remedy the district’s denial of FAPE.531
Susquehanna Township School District v. Jelani J. (2003)532
The year after the courts decided Kevin T., graduation requirements became a topic of
discussion in Susquehanna Township v. Jelani J.533 Jelani was in the twelfth grade and identified
as a student with dyslexia, memory disorder, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder making
him eligible for an IEP.534 On October 23, 2001, school officials held an IEP meeting for
Jelani.535 The transition plan proposed a year of post-secondary transitional services in a college
prep program at West Nottingham Academy in Maryland.536 During that same school year, on
May 16, 2002, school officials gave Jelani’s parents a Notice of Recommended Placement,
which stated Jelani had completed the 2001 IEP goals and objectives and school officials
recommended graduation.537 Jelani’s parents objected to the recommended graduation stating
school officials had not provided transition services. In response, school officials reconvened the
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IEP team on May 30, 2002 and finalized an IEP for the next school year.538 After this meeting,
school officials issued another Notice of Recommended Placement, changing Jelani’s graduation
date to 2004 and placing him into a special education placement for transition services rather
than the college prep program identified in the previous IEP.539 The following week, school
officials sent a letter to Jelani’s parents stating Jelani had met the school’s graduation
requirements. However, school officials would not issue a diploma because transitional services
were in process of being developed and graduation might render Jelani ineligible for the
transition services.540 Jelani’s parents filed a request for mediation.541
School officials rejected Jelani’s parents’ request for mediation and the parties moved to
a due process hearing.542 The hearing officer ruled that Jelani had graduated and therefore the
2002 IEP was moot and dismissed the case.543 Jelani’s parents filed exceptions to the hearing
officer’s decision, which resulted in the Pennsylvania Due Process Appeals Review Panel
conducting a de novo review of the record.544 The panel determined Jelani had not received the
transition services listed in the 2001 IEP and reversed the hearing officer’s opinion.545 The panel
determined school officials continued to be obligated to provide Jelani with a FAPE and awarded
him compensatory education in tuition and fees, except for room, board, and transportation costs,
for the college prep program at West Nottingham in Maryland for an “indefinite” amount
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time.546 The panel excluded the cost of room, board, and transportation in the compensatory
education award as Jelani’s parents were entitled only to the financial equivalent of what school
officials denied.547
School officials appealed the panel’s decision to the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania.548 The court upheld the Panel’s decision with one modification. The court limited
the school district’s obligation to pay tuition and fees at West Nottingham Academy or similar
college prep program to one year because this was the obligation set forth in the 2001 IEP to
provide Jelani with transitional services.549
Andrew B. v. Board of Education Community High School District 99 (2006)550
Three years after Susquehanna Township in Pennsylvania, an Illinois court heard another
case regarding transition services and graduation. Andrew B. was a twenty-year-old man with
cerebral palsy who received special education services at Downers Grove South High School
from August 2000 until June 2004, when he graduated.551 During his senior year, school officials
requested consent for reevaluation on several occasions. Andrew, being over the age of majority,
refused to sign consent for reevaluation.552 In February of 2004, Andrew’s senior year, the IEP
team met to review Andrew’s program and progress.553 The team discussed three educational
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options school officials could provide following the 2003-2004 school year.554 The first option
allowed Andrew to attend Downers Grove South for a half-day and take courses in a vocational
program at the Technology Center for DuPage for the remainder of the day until he was twentyone years old.555 Andrew rejected this option because he was only interested in the auto
mechanics program at the Technology Center for DuPage. However, due to his physical
limitations, Andrew was not eligible for the auto mechanics program.556 A transitional program,
offered at the high school, focusing on a functional curriculum was the second option the IEP
team discussed.557 The IEP team ultimately rejected this option because Andrew had already
mastered the skills taught in the functional curriculum program.558 The final option was for
Andrew to take vocational classes at the College of DuPage. However, this option required
Andrew to graduate from high school with an accompanying termination of special education
services.559 School officials recommended the third option, determining it would be better for
Andrew educationally.560 Andrew and his father met with the special services coordinator for the
college and determined Andrew would take a math class in the summer after his senior year, to
acquaint him with the campus.561 Andrew enrolled in the summer math class but withdrew one
week later.562
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In August 2004, Andrew attempted to re-enroll at Downers Grove South High School. As
a result of Andrew’s June 2004 graduation, school officials refused to allow him to re-enroll.563
Andrew and his family requested a due process hearing, claiming school officials failed to
provide Andrew a FAPE until the age of twenty-one and provide him with a clear and timely
notice of graduation.564 As a result of the due process hearing, the hearing officer concluded
school officials had properly graduated Andrew and determined school officials were not
required to re-enroll him.565
Andrew and his parents appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois. The district court found in favor of school officials on both the assertion school officials
had failed to provide Andrew a FAPE until the age of twenty-one and the assertion school
officials had failed to provide Andrew with a clear and timely notice of graduation.566 The
district court determined Andrew had completed all requirements for his diploma and had earned
sufficient credits in order to graduate. Thus, the court determined school officials had met the
procedural prong of the Rowley test when they provided timely notice of Andrew’s graduation.567
The court also determined school officials’ recommendation for Andrew to graduate was a result
of careful analysis and consideration of Andrew’s progress.568 Because school officials carefully
considered Andrew’s educational benefits, transition needs, and interests, the district court
concluded school officials met the substantive prong of the Rowley test when they recommended

563

Id. at 7.
Id. at 11.
565
Id. at 9.
566
Id. at 18.
567
Id. at 19. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
568
Andrew B., H.B., and D.B. v. Board of Education of Community High School District 99 and Dr. David R.
Eblen, Superintendent, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79838, 18 (E.D. ILL, Oct. 27, 2006).
564

77
graduation.569 The district court held school officials lawfully discontinued special education
services to Andrew because he had earned the credits needed for his high school diploma and
school officials issued a diploma pursuant to the agreement set forth in the IEP between his
parents and school officials.570
Virginia S. v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii (2007)571
A year after Andrew B., the U.S. District Court for Hawaii decided a case involving
transition planning. When planning transition services, the IDEA requires the IEP team to
consider the student’s interests, needs and strengths.572 In Virginia S., the family of seventeenyear-old Rachael claimed the lack of a transition plan was a procedural violation that resulted in
Rachel being denied a FAPE.573 Rachael was eligible for special education due to a learning
disability, emotional disability, and speech language impairment.574 School officials from the
Hawaii Department of Education developed an IEP for Rachael and provided special education
services from elementary school until the 2001-2002 school year, when she was in sixth grade.575
Rachael’s parents rejected the proposed IEP and unilaterally placed her at Malamalama
Waldorf School, a private general education school, for the next three years without requesting
reimbursement.576 In 2004, Rachael’s parents unilaterally placed her in a residential program at
Brehm Preparatory Academy in Carbondale, Illinois for the 2004-2005 school year.577 The
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Brehm Preparatory Academy served students with learning disabilities.578 In spring 2005,
Rachael’s parents contacted the Hawaii Department of Education about Rachael returning to
Hawaii for the 2005-2006 school year.579 In June of 2005, Rachael’s mother sent reports and
evaluations from the Brehm Preparatory Academy to the Hawaii Department of Education
school officials for their consideration.580 Rachael’s mother also sent Brehm a deposit for the
2005-2006 school year and made reservations for Rachel to travel to Carbondale, Illinois for the
start of the school year.581 On July 13, 2005, school officials held a meeting to determine needed
assessments for determining Rachael’s IDEA eligibility and for developing an IEP.582 Rachael’s
mother indicated August 28, 2005 would be the last day Rachael would be in Hawaii.583 School
officials held an eligibility meeting on August 10, 2005 and the IEP team determined Rachael
was still eligible for special education services.584 On August 17, 2005, school officials held an
IEP meeting. The notes from the meeting indicated the parents disagreed with several portions of
the proposed IEP, including: the lack of an Extended School Year, selection of special education
programing at the school district’s general high school, and the rejection of a private residential
facility as a placement option.585 On August 23, 2005, Rachael’s parents wrote the school’s
principal stating they were rejecting the proposed placement and Rachael’s parents advised the
principal of their intent to place Rachael at Brehm at public expense.586
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On September 7, 2005, the family filed for a due process hearing, alleging school
officials had failed to provide Rachael with a FAPE. The parents also sought tuition
reimbursement for the 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-05 school years.587 On October 10, 2005,
school officials filed a motion to dismiss all prior school years from consideration at the
hearing.588 The hearing officer dismissed the request for reimbursement for the 2002-03, 200304, and 2004-05 school years because the family had not requested the hearing within ninety
days of unilaterally placing Rachael.589 The hearing officer issued a decision dismissing the due
process hearing request finding the family had not proven school officials had failed to provide
Rachael a FAPE.590 Subsequently, the family filed with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Hawaii, seeking an order reversing the hearing officer’s decision.591
The family claimed the proposed IEP lacked measureable goals and objectives. The
district court found the goals to be both measureable and clearly indicative of how Rachael’s
progress was to be reported.592 The family also claimed school officials predetermined the
proposed special education program placement in the general high school.593 After review, the
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court found the placement had not been predetermined.594 The family claimed school officials
had denied Rachael a FAPE as well, because the 2005 IEP did not contain an appropriate
transition plan.595 In reviewing the transition plan within the IEP, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii found the transition plan was incomplete because school officials had not
interviewed Rachael or her parents to determine Rachael’s interests.596 The plan also did not
address Rachael’s strengths, preferences, and interests, and was generic and vague.597 The court
found the transition plan did not comply with the IDEA’s procedural requirements and thus
failed the first prong of the Rowley test.598 However, the district court applied the harmless error
test and concluded the procedural errors were harmless and had not resulted in a denial of
FAPE.599 The district court also observed there was “no doubt that Rachael would receive
educational benefits from the transition services provided.”600
Board of Education of Township High School District 211 v. Ross (2007)601
In the same year Virginia S. was being decided in Hawaii, determining whether a
procedural error was harmless was also at issue before the court in Board of Education of
Township High School District 211 v. Ross.602 Lindsey Ross was a student challenged by Rett
syndrome, a neurodevelopmental disorder afflicting carriers with the loss of purposeful,
distinctive hand movements, slowed brain and head growth, an abnormal gait, seizures, and
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mental retardation.603 Lindsey was nonverbal, had an inconsistent ability to control her body and
limbs, and often produced loud vocalizations.604 She had a cognitive level estimated to be
between seven and twelve years old, engaged in self-injurious behaviors, and struck others by
head butting them.605 School officials mainstreamed Lindsey into general education classes, with
support, during elementary school and during her ninth grade year.606 During her ninth grade
year, school officials placed Lindsey into regular education classes, where she received
assistance from a one-on-one aide. Lindsey also received assistance from her special education
teacher who accompanied her throughout the day.607 School officials provided Lindsey a
workroom to use when she needed either individualized instruction or separation from other
students.608 In May of the 2001-02 school year, Lindsey head butted two staff members, breaking
both of their noses.609 Over the summer, Lindsey’s parents had her evaluated by a specialist in
Alabama who recommended continued monitoring. School officials had her evaluated by the
University of Chicago Developmental Disorders Clinic.610 The University of Chicago examiners
determined Lindsey’s behaviors were interfering with her educational progress and
recommended placement in a highly structured, multi-needs, special education setting.611
In August of 2002, just prior to the start of the tenth grade year, school officials held a
meeting to review Lindsey’s IEP and a special education placement in a separate special school,
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designed to meet her needs, was determined appropriate for meeting Lindsey’s needs.612
Lindsey’s parents maintained it would be better if school officials placed Lindsey in a general
education setting with the provided accommodations and modifications.613 When this request
was not accepted, Lindsey’s parents filed for an administrative hearing requesting that Lindsey
“stay put” during the review.614 Before the administrative hearing was held, school officials filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking an order prohibiting the
parents from invoking the IDEA’s “stay put” provision.615 The district court granted school
officials’ request. However, Lindsey’s parents decided to keep her at home rather than having
her placed in the special education setting.616
The family and school officials came to a compromise and, under a settlement agreement,
Lindsey returned to the public school in April 2003 with a shortened schedule, a special
education teacher, and a one-on-one aide.617 According to logs kept by the special education
teacher, Lindsey attended school for 35 days. She spent most of her time in a private workroom
rather than the classroom due to her behavior.618 In the fall of 2003, the IEP team met to
determine services for the 2003-04 school year, Lindsey’s eleventh grade year. The IEP team
determined Lindsey should return to the public school and enroll in a full day of classes.619
Shortly after the school year began, Lindsey experienced problems and her behavior
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deteriorated.620 A meeting was held on November 5, 2003 and school officials placed Lindsey in
a multiple needs program operated by the North DuPage Special Education Cooperative. 621 Her
parents filed a request for administrative review and an independent hearing officer heard
testimony for 42 days.622 The hearing officer concluded school officials’ placement decision was
appropriate and the parents appealed.623 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois upheld the hearing officer’s decision, noting school officials had exercised professional
judgment and good faith when they created Lindsey’s IEP.624
Lindsey’s parents appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.625 The
family alleged the meeting school officials held on November 5, 2003 was an effort to ratify a
decision school officials had already formulated to place Lindsey in a more restrictive setting.626
The family also alleged school officials had violated the IDEA by failing to include a transition
plan and failing to consider all supplementary aides and services. In addition, the family asserted
school officials had violated Lindsey’s rights under Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.627
The Seventh Circuit found school officials had met their obligation to provide Lindsey a
FAPE in the least restrictive environment through placement in the separate special education
school setting.628 The appellate panel concluded this was the least restrictive placement for
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Lindsey and noted both the hearing officer and district court had reached rational conclusions.629
After considering the parents’ ADA and the Rehabilitation Act claims, the appellate panel found
school officials had not intentionally discriminated against Lindsey, noting there was no
evidence indicating school officials had treated Lindsey differently from other students.630
The family argued school officials had failed to include a transition plan for Lindsey and
therefore had violated the IDEA, denying Lindsey a FAPE.631 School officials argued Lindsey
had not yet progressed to the point where she needed a transition plan and therefore had deferred
transition planning.632 The appellate panel observed the IEP team should have discussed
transition measures in the IEP for Lindsey’s sophomore year.633 However, the panel reasoned
there was no difference between the basic skills included in Lindsey’s IEP and the skills her
transition plan would have addressed. Nonetheless, the panel acknowledged school officials
should have better explained and more fully addressed Lindsey’s transition needs in the IEP.634
The appellate court noted the IDEA did not grant school officials discretion to exclude a
transition plan from Lindsey’s IEP.635 The appellate court further reasoned, although school
officials erred by not including a specific transition plan, this was a procedural flaw and did not
automatically translate into a denial of a FAPE.636 As a result, the appellate court upheld the
district court’s decision.637
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Marple Newton School District v. Rafael N. (2007)638
In the same year the Seventh Circuit Appellate Court in Illinois decided Ross, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decided another case involving transition
services.639 Marple centered on Rafael, a 17-year-old Spanish-speaking student, who had a mild
to moderate cognitive impairment and severe seizures.640 He functioned at a developmental age
of four.641 Rafael moved from the Dominican Republic to Philadelphia in 1998 at age nine.642
Rafael’s father spoke only Spanish and was unable to read either English or Spanish.643 School
officials failed to provide notices in Spanish to Rafael’s father until 2006 and did not always
have a translator available for meetings.644
In April 1999, school officials gave Rafael a language assessment and began providing
him with English as a Second Language (ESL) services.645 Rafael made little progress and
school officials completed a comprehensive evaluation in October 1999.646 School officials
drafted and implemented an IEP for Rafael on November 17, 1999. The IEP included placement
in a general education classroom with both special education learning supports and ESL
services.647 However, Rafael continued to struggle and in 2001 school officials placed him in a
full-time special education classroom with pull-out ESL services.648 The following school year,
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school officials transferred Rafael to a life skills program.649 In November of 2001, the IEP team
discontinued Rafael’s ESL services and replaced them with speech language therapy.650
Rafael’s epilepsy was severe and untreatable.651 He suffered from five to ten seizures a
month and the medication used to help control the seizures made Rafael tired.652 After a seizure,
Rafael often had to return home to sleep, therefore missing instructional time at school.653 The
seizures, along with the medication to assist in controlling them, negatively impacted Rafael’s
cognitive functioning as well as his educational progress.654 Raphael’s father contended school
officials had not provided accommodations for Rafael’s epilepsy in his IEP.655
On June 27, 2006, Rafael’s father filed a due process complaint with Pennsylvania’s
Office for Dispute Resolution, challenging the educational program offered by school officials
and seeking compensatory education for the 2003-04, 2004-05, and 2005-06 school years.656 The
due process hearing officer determined that because school officials failed to communicate with
Rafael’s father in his native language he would be allowed to file a claim outside the two-year
statute of limitations.657 However, the hearing officer concluded school officials had provided
Rafael a FAPE.658
Shortly after receiving the hearing officer’s decision, Rafael’s father appealed the
decision and an Office for Dispute Resolution appeals panel found school officials had denied
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(2007).
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Rafael a FAPE.659 The appeals panel ordered school officials to: develop an IEP that included a
transition plan designed to assist Rafael in preparing to function in the adult world, provide
instruction addressing Rafael’s ESL needs, and accommodate Rafael’s health needs.660
Marple Newton School District appealed the decision to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.661 The district court agreed with the Office for Dispute
Resolution appeals panel’s decision.662 After reviewing the IEP, the district court found the IEP
was not reasonably calculated to address Rafael’s language needs because it did not take into
account Rafael’s failure to acquire information due to his seizures. The court also found the
transition plan in Rafael’s IEP was inappropriate to meet his needs.663
The district court found Rafael’s IEPs did include transition planning and did incorporate
goals addressing vocational needs and independent living skills meeting the first prong of the
Rowley test.664 However, these goals were generic, vague, remained static from year to year, and
had not capitalized on Rafael’s interests or strengths.665 The IEPs also did not address medical
self-monitoring to assist Rafael in becoming independent. Overall, the court determined the
vague and generic transition plan was not a meaningful plan, thereby failing Rowley’s second
prong and amounting to a denial of a FAPE.666
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Sinan v. School District of Philadelphia (2008)667
At the same time Marple was reviewed, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania discussed transition services in Sinan v. School District of Philadelphia, which was
later discussed in the Third Circuit Appellate Court.668 In the fall of 2004, Sinan was a student
with a learning disability and a hearing impairment in the 9th grade.669 At his parents’ request,
school officials agreed to place Sinan at Hill Top, a private day school.670 In December 2004,
Hill Top officials informed Sinan’s parents placement at Hill Top was not appropriate to meet
Sinan’s needs and they rejected his admission for the following year.671 School officials began
contacting other day schools in February 2005 to determine an appropriate placement for
Sinan.672 In May 2005, the IEP team met to create an IEP for the remainder of the 2004-05
school year and the 2005-06 school year.
The May 2005 IEP included academic goals, social skills goals and speech goals.673 This
IEP was also the first IEP after Sinan turned 16 therefore also included a transition plan.674 The
placement proposed by school officials was Pathway School, a private day school.675 The family
visited Pathway School and Sinan completed admissions testing at Pathway School in reading,
math, speech, and social skills.676 Pathway School accepted Sinan.677 During the May 6, 2005
IEP meeting, school officials provided the family with a Notice of Recommended Educational
667
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Placement, offering Sinan placement at an alternative special education day school setting such
as Pathway School.678 Sinan’s parents rejected both the IEP and accompanying placement
recommendation and requested a due process hearing to review the school officials’ proposal.679
The family also informed school officials of their intention to unilaterally place Sinan at
Maplebrook, a residential school, and seek tuition reimbursement from the school district.680
Sinan’s parents believed school officials’ recommended day placement at Pathway was
insufficient and would not provide a FAPE.681 They asserted the May 2005 IEP failed to include
any meaningful assessments of Sinan's educational functioning.682 Sinan’s parents also alleged
the May 2005 IEP was inadequate because it did not contain appropriate, measurable, annual
goals or a complete post-secondary transition plan.683
Sinan’s proposed IEP contained an incomplete transition plan.684 The plan did not contain
vocational or practical living goals. However, the plan included the following statement, “Sinan
will meet with his school counselor to discuss prerequisites he needs to apply to college and
explore college opportunities.”685 The hearing officer denied Sinan’s parents’ request for tuition
reimbursement.686 Sinan’s parents appealed to Pennsylvania’s Special Education Appeals Panel,
which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.687
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The family appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.688
The district court observed case law had not supported Sinan’s parents’ position that the IDEA
required vocational and practical training in all transition plans.689 Furthermore, the district court
observed Sinan’s transition plan focused on college planning and was appropriate given his
“needs, preferences, and interests at the time.”690 The district court indicated the transition plan
provided Sinan an opportunity to obtain meaningful educational benefit.691 The family appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appellate court upheld the district court’s
decision finding the May 2005 IEP was reasonably calculated to offer Sinan an opportunity to
obtain meaningful educational benefit and therefore met the Rowley standard.692
Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District (2008)693
In the same year as Sinan,694 Stephanie Lessard’s family questioned the Rowley standard
when they sued Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District.695 Stephanie was an
eighteen-year-old student eligible for special education based upon a moderate cognitive
impairment, speech impairments, a seizure disorder, scoliosis, a leg-length discrepancy, and
partial paralysis of her left side.696 In April 2004, Stephanie’s mother attended an IEP meeting to
discuss Stephanie’s services and placement for the 2004-05 school year.697 Between April and
December of 2004, there were at least four meetings.698 During the August 16, 2004 IEP
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meeting, school officials presented Mrs. Lessard with a proposed IEP for the school year.699 The
proposed IEP did not contain a behavior plan and the one-page transition plan was not complete
and ended in mid-sentence.700 Mrs. Lessard refused to sign the IEP. Following the meeting,
school officials sent Mrs. Lessard a letter requesting she clarify the portions of the IEP she
considered unsatisfactory.701 The Lessards did not respond to this request.702 School officials
continued to try to meet with Mrs. Lessard to understand her rejection of the proposed IEP. 703
School officials held an IEP meeting with Mrs. Lessard in October with no resolve.704 During a
December 2004 IEP meeting, school officials presented Mrs. Lessard an IEP with a completed
behavior plan as well as a completed transition plan.705 However, Mrs. Lessard once again
refused to sign the IEP and declined to provide any specific criticisms of the IEP, stating the
team had yet to develop a satisfactory IEP.706
After the December meeting, school officials invoked their right to a due process hearing
in order to determine the suitability of the most recent IEP.707 The parents submitted a crosspetition for compensatory education.708 The Lessards contended school officials’ delay in
proposing a completed IEP denied Stephanie of a FAPE.709 They further contended the IEP
failed to provide appropriate literacy and transition services.710 In March of 2005, the hearing
officer determined the December 2004 IEP did not contain either procedural or substantive faults
699
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and ordered implementation of school officials’ proposed IEP.711 The hearing officer denied the
parents’ cross-petition for compensatory education.712
The Lessards appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire
raising the same procedural and substantive objections raised in the due process hearing.713 The
district court applied Rowley in analyzing the parents’ claims and determined school officials had
proposed an acceptable IEP designed to provide Stephanie with educational benefit.714 The
district court upheld the hearing officer’s decision and the Lessards appealed to the First Circuit
U.S. Court of Appeals.715 The family continued to allege the proposed IEP failed to provide
appropriate literacy and transition services and assert school officials’ delay in offering a
completed IEP constituted a denial of a FAPE.716 The appellate panel determined the district
court had not erred in its decisions. The panel found school officials had not made a procedural
error by delaying the completed IEP.717 The panel pointed out the delay was due to the parents’
refusal to sign the IEP and state their objections to the IEP. The court also noted the parents’
scheduling conflicts for meeting times added to the delay.718
The Lessards’ objection to the adequacy of the literacy program stemmed from their
desire for a specific reading program to be utilized, the Lindamood-Bell Phoneme Processing
System. The parents’ objected to school officials’ consideration, but ultimate rejection, of this
requested program.719 The appeal panel observed the record showed the system used by school
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officials provided Stephanie educational benefit, and she was making reasonable progress.720
Therefore, the panel denied the parents’ claim.721
With regard to transition services, the Lessards claimed the transition plan contained in
the September IEP was incomplete and the transition plan contained in the December IEP was
too generic.722 Further, they contended, a plan tailored to Stephanie’s needs should have
contained intense community based services.723 The Lessards argued Congress “raised the bar
for IEP transition services,” requiring the services to result in “actual and substantial progress
toward integrating disabled children into society.”724 The appellate panel pointed out, the
Lessards had read “far too much” into the meaning of transition services.725 The panel indicated
the Lessards’ reliance on the 1997 definition of transition services, suggesting application of a
higher standard than Rowley, was misguided.726 The panel determined the meaning of the
definition of transition services outlined by Congress, was simply “a praxis,” indicating the
IDEA specified “the perspective that participants in the process should strive to attain but does
not establish a standard for evaluating the fruits of that process.”727
In reviewing the appropriateness of Stephanie’s transition plan, the appeal panel
observed, the record showed school officials had integrated a wide array of transition services
throughout the transition plan.728 The panel also noted Stephanie had received pre-vocational
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training and specific instruction in life skills.729 This led the panel to conclude Stephanie’s
transition skills were improving.730 The family contended because the August IEP was
incomplete it contained a fraction of what Stephanie was entitled to receive.731 The panel
observed the IDEA did not require a “stand-alone transition plan as part of the IEP.”732 The
appellate panel further noted, while the IEP must contain a statement of transition services, the
IDEA did not require those statements be articulated in a “separate component of the IEP” and
ruled in favor of the school.733
K.C. v. Mansfield Independent School District (2009)734
In the year following the Lessard decision, a reasonably calculated transition plan and a
FAPE are also addressed in K.C. v. Mansfield Independent School District. K.C. suffered from
Williams syndrome, a genetic disorder that typically results in mental retardation and learning
difficulties.735 Individuals with Williams syndrome often show an interest in music and,
according to research, music may be used in the academic development of children with the
disorder.736 K.C. received services in the Mansfield Independent School District (MISD). Her
parents were not satisfied with the IEPs developed by MISD.737 They argued that the program
developed by MISD for K.C. was not individualized and requested a due process hearing.738
K.C.’s parents argued school officials had not completed adequate testing to assess K.C.’s skills
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and abilities, and recommended a program that did not provide K.C. the appropriate skills to
transition into life after high school.739 K.C.’s parents also sought to have K.C. placed at
Berkshire Hills Music Academy, which is a residential facility, arguing that it was the best
choice for K.C. because it focused on functional living skills and music education.740 The
independent hearing officer denied the parents’ requested relief in its entirety and the family
appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.741
In reviewing the case, the district court found school officials offered a reasonably
calculated IEP and transition plan that provided educational benefit, in accordance with the
Rowley standard.742 The court discussed the question of individualization based on the student’s
assessment and performance.743 The court found K.C. received several tests to assess her skills
and level of performance and school officials used the assessment results in the development of
her IEP.744 K.C. was also enrolled in the district’s choir program and the Ready, Set, Teach
program as an attempt to foster her interest and develop her skill in music and childcare.745 The
court determined school officials created a program that accommodated K.C.’s needs. The
program reflected her skills and interests and provided her with opportunities to assist her in her
transition to post-secondary life.746 Therefore, the court rejected K.C.’s parents’ argument that
the Rowley standard is no longer applicable to the IDEA cases because of the IDEA 1997
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amendments, which embodied “high expectations for [disabled] children.”747 The court
maintained, Rowley continued to provide the standard for deciding an action brought under the
IDEA.748
J.L. v. Mercer Island School District (2009)749
A few months after Mansfield, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals decided a case
involving special education transition services. K.L. was student with a learning disability.750
School officials had provided K.L. services and accommodations in both the general education
setting and the special education settings from first through third grade.751 Beginning in the
fourth grade, K.L.’s parents paid to send K.L. to a private school for students with reading and
writing difficulties.752 K.L. returned to the public school for sixth grade. School officials
completed an evaluation and determined K.L. continued to be eligible for special education.753
School officials devised a program that included general and special education courses with
accommodations.754 K.L. continued to receive similar programming during the seventh and
eighth grades.755 After eighth grade, school officials reevaluated K.L. and developed an IEP for
high school.756
K.L. finished ninth grade and school officials believed the year had been successful.757
K.L.’s mother had not shared with school officials she had completed most of K.L.’s homework
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throughout the school year.758 In June 2004, the IEP team met and proposed a tenth grade IEP
that included a transition statement indicating after high school K.L. planned to attend a
community or technical college.759 At this meeting, K.L.’s parents told Mercer Island High
School officials they had not been satisfied with K.L.’s ninth grade education and were “looking
at other options.”760 K.L.’s parents had not previously mentioned their dissatisfaction with
K.L.’s education.761 On the same day as the IEP meeting, K.L.’s parents applied to Landmark
School, a private residential school in Massachusetts for students with learning disabilities.762
The day after the IEP meeting, school officials attempted to contact the parents to set up another
IEP meeting. However, the parents had not responded to school officials.763 K.L.’s case manager
asked K.L.’s mother if K.L. would be more comfortable in a more intensive reading program in
her home school and K.L.’s mother declined.764
Shortly after the IEP meeting, K.L.’s parents requested an independent educational
evaluation at school district expense and requested a specific evaluator. School officials accepted
the parents’ proposed evaluator and requested consent for an evaluation at Children’s Hospital
Regional Medical Center.765 K.L.’s parents did not consent to the Children’s Hospital Regional
Medical Center evaluation and K.L.’s parents had her evaluated by their chosen independent
evaluator only.766 The independent evaluator found K.L. had a language disorder and a mood
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disorder and recommended Landmark School.767 In early August 2004, K.L.’s parents enrolled
her at Landmark School and requested tuition reimbursement.768 School officials made a second
attempt to obtain consent for evaluation.769 In late August 2004, the parents again denied consent
for evaluation at the Children’s Hospital Regional Medical Center but indicated school officials
could review records including the independent evaluation.770
School officials sent the parents a third consent for evaluation and scheduled an IEP
meeting for mid-September 2004. During the IEP meeting, school officials presented a proposal
that followed many of the recommendations contained in the independent evaluation.771
However, school officials recommended placement at Mercer Island High School and rejected
the independent evaluator’s recommendation of Landmark School as a placement option.772 The
proposed IEP also included transition objectives relating to exploring career options, developing
self-advocacy skills, and increasing problem-solving skills.773 At the conclusion of the meeting,
the parents informed school officials they would not be sending K.L. to Mercer Island High
School.774
A few weeks later, school officials sent a fourth consent form for an independent
evaluation and the parents consented to the evaluation.775 In March of 2005, after the evaluation
was completed, school officials held an IEP meeting. School officials again presented the parents
with a proposed program at Mercer Island High School. School officials once again refused to
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fund a Landmark School placement.776 On June 6, 2005, K.L.’s parents filed for a due process
hearing.777
At the conclusion of the due process hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
determined school officials had provided K.L. a FAPE.778 The parents sought review from the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington and the district court reversed and
remanded the ALJ’s decision noting, “Congress sought to supersede the ‘educational benefit’
standard.”779 The district court analyzed the IDEA 1997 amendments and “yielded” a new
standard focusing on transition services.780 The district court observed the IDEA required school
officials to provide students with a transition plan that focused on post-secondary selfsufficiency.781 The district court observed that K.L. did not receive a FAPE under this new
standard and tasked the ALJ with determining if Landmark School was an appropriate
educational placement.782 On remand, the ALJ concluded Landmark School was appropriate and
the family was awarded tuition and related expenses for K.L.’s tenth and eleventh grades. 783 The
ALJ also awarded tuition for the twelfth grade year as compensatory education for the denial of
FAPE during the eighth and ninth grades.784
Mercer Island School District appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth
Circuit concluded the district court had erred in deciding the transition language in the IDEA
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1997 superseded the FAPE definition formulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rowley.785 The
panel observed the changes to transition language in the IDEA were procedural rather than
substantive in nature.786 The panel further noted if Congress had wanted to change the FAPE
standard, it could have done so clearly and expressly. The panel pointed out Congress had not
changed the FAPE definition.787 The court further observed Congress had not indicated a
disabled student could not receive a FAPE without the attainment of transition goals, and
Congress had not sought to supersede Rowley nor the FAPE standard.788 The panel remanded the
case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington where the original
decision of the ALJ was affirmed.789
Rosinsky v. Green Bay Area School District (2009)790
Shortly after the Mercer Island decision in Washington, special education transition
planning and services became the focus of litigation in Wisconsin. Alex Rosinsky had Fragile X
syndrome and was eligible for special education services based upon this health impairment, a
cognitive disability, and a speech and language disability.791 School officials held an IEP
meeting on May 31, 2007 to create an IEP for the 2007-08 school year. This IEP contained three
goals relating to transition: increasing Alex’s ability to request assistance with job tasks in a
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variety of settings, employability skills, and independence in the community. 792 School officials
reevaluated Alex at Ms. Rosinsky’s request and held a meeting on November 20, 2007 to discuss
the reevaluation results. Ms. Rosinsky requested that an IEP facilitator attend the meeting and
school officials arranged for a facilitator to attend the November meeting as well as two other
subsequent meetings in December.793
School officials had not intended to discuss Alex’s transition plan or revise his IEP at the
November 2007 meeting. Therefore, school officials had not invited Alex’s caseworkers from
Brown County Human Services and the Wisconsin Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to
attend the meeting.794 However, Ms. Rosinsky had invited the caseworkers and they attended the
meeting.795 During the November meeting, the team scheduled another meeting in December to
develop an annual review and a transition statement.796
The December meeting was three hours long and IEP notes indicate Ms. Rosinsky
participated in the meeting.797 Alex’s two caseworkers did not receive written invitations from
school officials for the December meeting. However, Alex’s Brown County caseworker
attended the meeting. The Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (DVR) caseworker did not
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attend.798 At the end of this meeting, the team scheduled another meeting for December 11,
2007. This meeting was to continue development of both the IEP and a transition statement.799
School officials sent written invitations for the December 11, 2007 meeting to all parties,
including Alex’s caseworkers. However, school officials had sent the invitation to the Brown
County caseworker to the wrong address who did not receive the invitation.800 The December 11
meeting lasted five hours and Ms. Rosinsky, the IEP facilitator, and the Brown County
caseworker attended. The DVR caseworker did not attend.801 During this meeting, Ms. Rosinsky
requested that Alex’s IEP include 15-20 hours of work time in the community. She later
amended this request to 10-15 hours.802 School officials rejected the request because Alex
required a variety of job skills training, instruction in quality and completeness of work without
prompts, and practice extending work time.803 Ms. Rosinsky requested school officials contract
with a community service provider for community activities.804 School officials denied this
request, determining they could adequately provide community activities without contracting
with a community service provider.805
On December 19, 2007, Ms. Rosinsky requested a meeting to discuss a behavior
intervention plan (BIP) for Alex and on December 20, 2007 Ms. Rosinsky requested a meeting to
discuss goals and placement for the current school year.806 School officials rejected Ms.
Rosinsky’s request for a meeting, noting they had recently met for eight hours and drafted a
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comprehensive IEP with the IEP facilitator’s input.807 Both the IEP created on May 31, 2007 and
the IEP created December 11, 2007 contained transition service statements.808 The transition plan
included a course of study, instruction, employment, post-school living, daily living, community
experiences, functional vocational assessment, related services, and post-secondary goals.809
Ms. Rosinsky filed for a due process hearing claiming the failure to invite Alex’s DVR
and Brown County caseworks, school officials had denied Alex a FAPE due to procedurally
inadequate prior notice of IEP meetings.810 Ms. Rosinsky also claimed she had not been included
as an equal participant in the IEP meetings, the resulting IEPs were not adequate, school officials
had not properly implemented the IEPs, and Alex’s educational placement was not
appropriate.811 The ALJ found school officials had not denied Alex a FAPE and school officials
had complied with federal and state special education laws.812
Ms. Rosinsky filed a petition for review of the ALJ’s decision with the Circuit Court of
Brown County Wisconsin. School officials removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.813 Ms. Rosinsky amended her complaint alleging the ALJ had
made improper evidentiary rulings, erroneous factual determinations, and misapplied the
IDEA.814 School officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion.815
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In reviewing the administrative record, the court considered Ms. Rosinsky’s request for
15-20 hours of vocational training to be included in Alex’s IEP and her request for his placement
with a community service provider.816 The court found the ALJ was correct in determining
school officials had not committed a procedural violation because school officials had provided
notice of their decision to reject the request within the conference notes contained in IEP. School
officials had also provided written notice of their refusal to provide Alex a placement with a
contracted community service provider for community activities.817
Ms. Rosinsky also claimed school officials had not provided her with appropriate notice
when they denied her request for a meeting to discuss a behavior intervention plan (BIP).818 On
this issue the court agreed with the ALJ’s determination that only eight days prior to the request
Ms. Rosinsky had been involved in several hours of IEP meetings where the IEP team
determined Alex’s behavior was not impeding either his learning or the learning of others.819 The
court reasoned this procedural error had not denied Ms. Rosinsky meaningful participation in the
IEP process nor did it result in school officials denying Alex educational benefit.820 In reviewing
Ms. Rosinsky’s claim, she had not been included as an equal participant in Alex’s IEP meetings,
the court agreed with the ALJ’s finding that Ms. Rosinsky had actively participated in the IEP
meetings.821
Ms. Rosinsky argued the IEP was inadequate because it had not included measurable
goals and had not provided Alex the opportunity to participate in extracurricular activities.822 She
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also alleged the placement had not included adequate life skills and transition programming that
took into account Alex’s preferences.823 The court disagreed with Ms. Rosinsky. The court
observed school officials had appropriately developed goals designed to address Alex’s unique
vocational and educational needs.824 While the court noted the goals did not address every area
of weakness identified in Alex’s re-evaluation, the goals were nonetheless measurable and
formulated to provide educational benefit.825
Ms. Rosinsky also alleged school officials had failed to invite all of the necessary
participants to Alex’s IEP meetings. Ms. Rosinsky pointed out school officials failed to invite
Alex’s caseworkers to the November 20 meeting, the December 6 meeting, and failed to send
invitations for the December 11 meeting in a timely manner.826 The court found this procedural
error did not result in a denial of a FAPE, reasoning that Ms. Rosinsky had invited the
caseworkers who both attended the November 20, 2007 meeting.827 School officials announced
the December 6, 2007 meeting at the November meeting; therefore, both the caseworkers had
been provided notice of that meeting.828 The Brown County caseworker attended the December
6, 2007 meeting where school officials announced the December 11, 2007 meeting and school
officials mailed invitations to both caseworkers for this meeting.829 Although school officials
sent the invitation to the Brown County caseworker to the wrong address, the caseworker was
able to attend the meeting. The court held any procedural errors were harmless. Therefore, the
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court found no basis to overturn the ALJ’s decision, noting school officials’ procedural failure to
invite Alex’s caseworkers had not resulted in a substantive denial of a FAPE.830
Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District (2010)831
Several months later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also decided a case
involving special education transition services. Stephanie Lessard was a nineteen-year-old
student diagnosed with mental retardation, a speech language impairment, and an orthopedic
impairment.832 Her parents claimed school officials had provided their daughter inadequate
transition services, thus denying Stephanie a FAPE.833
School officials had placed Stephanie in a day school setting in New Hampshire that also
served residentially placed students.834 From April to September 2005, Stephanie’s IEP team met
six times and developed a seventy-seven page IEP.835 The parents requested a home and
community based program and an outside vendor to work with Stephanie to adapt basic life
skills and community interaction.836 The IEP called for continued placement in the day school
setting with a significant increase in pre-vocational instruction, as well as the addition of classes
in horticulture and home economics.837 Stephanie’s parents were not satisfied with the proposed
plan and refused to consent to the IEP.838
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The Lessards withdrew Stephanie from the day school in December 2005 and school
officials filed a request for a due process hearing to determine the appropriateness of the IEP.839
The hearing was held in March 2006. In July 2006, the hearing officer upheld the school
officials’ proposed IEP and accompanying educational placement recommendation.840
The Lessards appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire.841
The district court upheld the hearing officer’s decision noting neither the IEP nor the transition
plan were substantively flawed.842 The Lessards appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit seeking compensatory educational services for Stephanie.843 Stephanie’s parents
claimed the IEP’s transitional services failed to offer Stephanie sufficient interaction with her
community.844 After reviewing the decisions of the district court and the hearing officer, the
appellate panel concluded school officials had provided Stephanie a FAPE.845 The panel noted
the significant increase in pre-vocational instruction as well as the addition of classes in
horticulture and home economics were appropriate for Stephanie’s transition and reasonably
calculated to provide some benefit.846 The panel also noted, “while an IEP must be ‘reasonably
calculated’ to deliver ‘educational benefits,’ an ideal or perfect plan [was] not required.”847
High v. Exeter Township School District (2010)848
Less than a month after Lessard, the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania also decided a case involving transition planning in High v. Exeter Township
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School District. Stephanie High was a junior in high school when she returned to the public
school for the 2007-2008 school year.849 She had previously attended a private school for
students with learning disabilities.850 She was eligible for special education services due to
dyslexia and learning disabilities in math, writing, and reading.851 During the spring of 2007,
school officials reevaluated Stephanie to measure her academic levels.852 At that time, Stephanie
was reading at a fourth grade level and school officials wrote an initial IEP goal for Stephanie
designed to increase her reading performance to a fifth grade level.853 In November 2007, school
officials increased the reading fluency indicating Stephanie would increase her reading
performance to a sixth grade level.854 By the end of the 2007-2008 school year, Stephanie had
improved in math, writing, and reading but did not meet the reading benchmark.855 Her 20072008 IEP also included a post-secondary transition plan designed to provide Stephanie an
opportunity to explore career options, file for accommodations on the Scholastic Achievement
Test (SAT) and practice filling out job applications.856 The district transition coordinator met
with Stephanie in the fall of 2007 to develop and expand the transition plan.857 Stephanie
continued to meet with the transition coordinator once or twice a week throughout the school
year. During this time, the transition coordinator administered assessments to determine
Stephanie’s skills and interests.858 These assessments showed Stephanie had interests in both
education and health-care careers. As a result, the transition coordinator provided Stephanie
849
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opportunities to intern in and shadow various fields in her identified interest areas.859 Stephanie
also expressed an interest in attending college.860 Subsequently, the transition coordinator had
Stephanie placed in a college-track English class, helped her apply for and obtain
accommodations for the SAT, sent her to a career and college fair, helped her identify postsecondary education programs, and had her take the placement test at the local community
college.861
During her junior and senior years of high school, Stephanie’s parents were concerned
with her progress and arranged for her to undergo several evaluations.862 All of the evaluations
showed Stephanie had made academic progress from her junior to her senior year and her
reading level had increased by one grade level.863
Stephanie’s mother compared the requirements for college courses with Stephanie’s
present level of achievement and became concerned school officials were not adequately
preparing Stephanie for college.864 Mrs. High requested school officials provide Stephanie with
extended school year (ESY) services.865 School officials denied this request in March 2008. In
June 2008, Mrs. High rejected school officials’ determination that Stephanie had not met the
eligibility criteria for ESY.866
Stephanie’s parents, dissatisfied with the education Stephanie was receiving, requested a
due process hearing.867 The hearing officer determined Stephanie had made meaningful progress
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on her IEP goals, received appropriate transition services, and found the parents had not provided
sufficient evidence showing ESY services were necessary.868
On May 18, 2008, the parents filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and school officials submitted a cross-motion for summary
judgment.869 The parents sought adequate progress monitoring and compensatory education for
Stephanie, asserting the hearing officer had incorrectly determined school officials had provided
Stephanie a FAPE.870 The parents argued Stephanie had not made meaningful progress on her
IEP goals and her IEP had not included an adequate transition plan.871
The court noted the parents conceded Stephanie’s progress had been more than trivial.872
However, the parents argued the progress was not meaningful because school officials could
have done more to close the six-year reading gap between Stephanie and her peers.873 The court
noted that during the year in question, Stephanie made meaningful progress on her IEP goals and
therefore school officials had not denied her a FAPE.874
The parents also argued the IEP was deficient because it did not contain a transition plan
or, if it did, the transition plan was inadequate to prepare Stephanie for college.875 However, the
court noted the parents had failed to show there was not a transition plan.876 The record clearly
showed school officials had provided Stephanie with a transition plan and the transition
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coordinator had met with Stephanie a minimum of 32 times throughout the school year.877 The
parents also argued the IEP was deficient because it did not state how Stephanie would meet her
goal of attending college.878 The court noted the IDEA did not require a transition plan to
“dictate” IEP goals and the transition plan was not strictly academic but addressed postsecondary skills.879 Therefore, the court pointed out, while school officials had helped Stephanie
realize she wanted to attend college, they were not required to ensure she was successful in
achieving this goal.880 Ultimately, the court upheld the hearing officer’s decision.881
Doe v. Marlborough Public Schools (2010)882
In 2010, a few months after High, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts also addressed transition planning and services. John Doe was a 19-year-old
student with a learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, difficulties with
executive functioning, auditory processing, social and emotional functioning, and displayed
inappropriate behaviors in school.883 In April 2003, when Doe was 12 years old, school officials
placed Doe in a private special education day school. In June 2006, school officials prepared an
IEP proposing John Doe continue his services and placement in the special education day school
for the 2006-07 school year.884 The proposed IEP included transition planning services, career
education, and stated Doe was making progress toward completing graduation requirements.885
John’s parent accepted this IEP. During the school year, school officials referred Doe to the
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Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission for transition and adult services.886 School officials
also administered the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System887 exams to Doe with
accommodations and he received a passing score.888 In June 2007, the IEP team proposed an IEP
for the 2007-08 school year. The proposed IEP continued Doe’s placement at the day school and
continued to provide career education and transition services.889 The IEP team noted
considerable progress academically, socially, and behaviorally during Doe’s junior year.890 The
IEP team documented Doe had been working toward June 2008 graduation.891
During his junior year, Doe’s mother informed the IEP team she wanted her son to attend
a private residential program after finishing his day school placement.892 In the fall of his senior
year, Doe applied for admission at Chapel Haven, a residential program.893 Chapel Haven’s
residential program granted Doe’s admission for the following school year.894
Although Doe had significant behavior problems during his senior year, school officials
noted he, nonetheless, made good progress.895 His mother met with officials from the
Marlborough Public Schools’ special education department in February 2008 and informed them
she believed Chapel Haven would be appropriate for her son after he left the day school. She
stated she planned to refuse Doe’s diploma.896 School officials informed her Doe would
graduate in June 2008 and graduation would result in termination of Doe’s eligibility for special
886
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education services. School officials also informed Doe’s mother the school district would not
fund an out-of-state private placement.897 In April 2008, the parent again informed school
officials, Doe would not accept a diploma in June 2008.898 School officials had not responded to
this notification nor had they taken further action after Doe completed the day school program.899
School officials issued Doe a diploma in June 2008 and terminated his eligibility for special
education services.900
In July 2008, Doe started attending Chapel Haven and continued attending there until
December 2008. He did not return to Chapel Haven after the winter break because his mother
was not able to pay the tuition.901 In October 2008, Doe’s mother filed a request for a due
process hearing, claiming school officials had improperly terminated her son’s special education
services.902 Doe and his mother claimed Doe had not met criteria for graduation because he had
received improper testing accommodations when school officials implemented the
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System exams.903
In March 2009, the hearing officer directed school officials to offer day school services
pursuant to the IDEA’s “stay put” provisions.904 At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing
officer found Doe had successfully completed the course requirements for graduation and passed
the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System exams without improper assistance.905
The hearing officer noted school officials had provided John Doe with adequate transition
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services and the school district was not required to reimburse the parent for Doe’s unilateral
placement at Chapel Haven because the evidence did not support a need for residential
placement.906
However, the hearing officer concluded school officials should not have terminated
Doe’s eligibility for special education services because he had not made sufficient progress
toward meeting his IEP goals.907 The hearing officer ordered school officials to provide Doe
special education services retroactive to the date when they had terminated services.908
In July 2009, school officials filed an action with the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts seeking judicial review of the hearing officer’s decision. Doe’s mother also
filed an action seeking affirmation of the decision requiring school officials to provide services
after June 2008 and seeking reimbursement for the cost of Doe’s placement at Chapel Haven.909
The district court issued an order to consolidate both cases and both parties filed motions for
summary judgment.910 The court denied the reimbursement of the Chapel Haven tuition because
the parent had unilaterally placed Doe in the private school and she was not able to prove the
residential placement was a proper placement for her son.911 The court also found Doe had
successfully passed his exams and completed the coursework required for graduation.912
However, the court observed the eligibility requirements for graduation were a prerequisite but
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school officials could not graduate a student with disabilities if the student had not been provided
a FAPE.913
This framed the question before the court as whether school officials had denied Doe a
FAPE by terminating services even though he was eligible for graduation.914 The hearing officer
had determined Doe had not made adequate progress on his IEP goals. This determination was
based upon the fact Doe had failed to achieve two of his eight IEP goals. Therefore, the hearing
officer concluded the termination of services had deprived Doe of a FAPE.915 The court analyzed
this issue by considering whether Doe’s failure to meet all goals was because the IEP was not
reasonably calculated to provide Doe with some educational benefit.916 The court noted the IEP
had identified Doe’s areas of weakness and included services designed to address each weakness.
The IEP had also contained transition services designed to prepare Doe for independent living
and school officials had referred Doe to outside agencies to assist with job coaching and other
adult services.917 The court determined the IEP had been reasonably calculated to provide a
FAPE and Doe had received educational benefit. Therefore, the court found school officials had
properly graduated Doe.918 The court noted the hearing officer had based his decision on the
result of the IEP, when the correct question was whether the IEP had been reasonably calculated
to provide Doe with educational benefit.919
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Dracut School Committee v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals (2010)920
A few months after Judge William G. Young decided Marlborough, Judge Patti B. Saris
ruled on Dracut, another case involving transition services, in the same court. C.A. was a twentyyear-old student eligible for special education services due to Asperger’s Syndrome, Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and an anxiety disorder.921 C.A. began
attending Dracut High School’s general education program as a freshman. During his freshman
year, C.A. experienced some academic, emotional, behavioral, and social difficulties. These
difficulties included altercations with other students.922 At this time, C.A.’s mother obtained a
private speech evaluation and shared the evaluation with school officials. School officials
considered the report but took no action.923 During C.A.’s sophomore year, he brought a letter
opener to school with the intent of using it as a weapon. This violation of school rules resulted in
school officials placing C.A. on a six-week suspension.924 After the suspension, C.A.’s mother
obtained an independent psychological evaluation and presented the evaluation to school
officials.925 After reviewing the independent evaluation, school officials determined C.A. was
eligible for special education services based on their observations of C.A. and the independent
evaluation.926 School officials further determined C.A.’s bringing the letter opener to school
constituted a manifestation of his disability.927

920

Dracut School Committee v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of the Mass. Dept. of Elementary and Secondary
Educ., 110 LRP 50313 (D.Mass. 2010).
921
Id. at 3.
922
Id. at 3.
923
Id. at 3-4.
924
Id. at 4.
925
Id. at 4.
926
Id. at 4.
927
Id. at 4.

117
C.A. received an initial IEP in May 2006. School officials had identified C.A. as eligible
for special education due to Asperger’s Syndrome, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder,
Bipolar Disorder, and an anxiety disorder.928 The IEP provided for various accommodations
including counseling, participation in a social skills group, and consultation with an
autism/inclusion specialist.929 The IEP also included a transition-planning chart listing C.A.’s
targeted post high school goals, furthering his education in computer programming and software
and attending college.930 The transition action plan stated C.A. was independent in the school
setting and he was enrolled in college preparation courses.931 The transition action plan also
stated a counselor would assist C.A. in developing a letter to use in explaining his disability to
future employers.932 Finally, the transition action plan stated school personnel and C.A. had
discussed sports-related participation opportunities for C.A., as well as opportunities for him to
assist coaches.933 While the IEP contained measureable goals, none of the goals directly related
to transition.934
In February 2007, school officials proposed C.A.’s next IEP. The IEP’s vision statement
added C.A.’s goal of becoming able to communicate and express himself appropriately.935 Other
than this statement, the transition plan was identical to the one contained in the previous IEP.936
School officials proposed another IEP in February 2008 designed to complete the school year.937
This IEP contained a more substantial transition plan that considered information from a
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vocational assessment.938 This plan included a referral to the Massachusetts Rehabilitation
Commission and a recommendation that C.A. obtain part-time or volunteer employment outside
of school.939 The plan also provided for vocational services including: a banking internship, a
computer internship, an internship during his gym class, as well as completion of money
management courses, and higher-level computer courses.940 The plan did not address
independent living skills.941
C.A.’s mother rejected all three IEPs, accepting only the areas describing C.A.’s
strengths and present levels of performance.942 She stated repeatedly the services proposed
would only be acceptable if provided by a person trained in the area of Asperger’s Syndrome.943
C.A.’s mother also rejected the June 2008 graduation date, believing C.A. required a transition
plan that would enable him to move on to college, function independently after high school,
participate in travel training, and obtain gainful employment.944 C.A.’s mother also emphasized
the need for C.A. to receive social skills training and pragmatic language services.945
School officials offered a social skills group in the first proposed IEP, but not in the two
subsequent IEPs because school officials believed C.A.’s social skills had improved to the point
where they were appropriate.946 School officials did not offer instruction in pragmatic
language.947 In May 2008, C.A., with his mother, requested a due process hearing, alleging
school officials had failed to provide adequate transition services and requesting compensatory
938
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education services.948 School officials honored a stay put order, allowing C.A. to participate in
the graduation ceremony without accepting or receiving his diploma.949 After C.A. graduated
from Dracut, he spent most of his time at home sleeping late, using the computer, and not
socializing with friends.950 He enrolled in classes at the local community college and only left the
house the two days a week when his classes were in session.951 C.A. was unable to obtain a
driver’s license and was only able to take public transportation to and from the community
college after his mother taught him how to access this system.952 C.A. was facing possible
disciplinary action at the community college due to his inappropriate behavior. In addition, he
was not able to follow classroom protocols in discussion-based classes.953 In October 2008,
C.A.’s mother had a readiness-to-graduate assessment conducted through Horace Mann
Educational Associates.954 The assessment indicated C.A. was not prepared to graduate even
though he had completed the formal graduation requirements.955
Upon conclusion of the due process hearing, the hearing officer found school officials
had denied C.A. a FAPE by failing to provide adequate transition services.956 The hearing officer
determined C.A. was ready to graduate and that Dracut should award him a diploma.957
Nonetheless, the hearing officer ordered school officials to provide C.A. with two years of
extended special education eligibility and two years of compensatory transition services.958
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School officials filed a request for judicial review with the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts.959 The court’s analysis focused upon two questions. First, was there a
procedural error and second, had school officials proposed an IEP that was reasonably calculated
to provide C.A. educational benefits.960
School officials argued the hearing officer had erred in finding they had failed to comply
with the IDEA’s procedural requirements by not conducting an appropriate transition
assessment.961 The court upheld the hearing officer’s decision, noting the assessments school
officials conducted failed to assess functional language pragmatics relevant to the transition areas
of education, employment, and independent living.962 The court further noted school officials
were slow in conducting transition assessments, and had failed to provide measurable transition
goals.963 Additionally, the court found school officials had failed to provide services to address
vocational skills for almost a two-year period when these services should have been provided.964
School officials also argued the hearing officer erred by applying the meaningful benefit
standard to transition services.965 The court determined the evidence demonstrated the proposed
IEPs were not reasonably calculated to provide C.A. benefit in pragmatic language, vocational
skills, and independent living skills. The court pointed out this finding showed the hearing
officer had applied the appropriate standard.966 The court upheld the hearing officer’s decision
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supporting the idea that school officials could provide transition services after a student has met
formal graduation requirements.967
J.D.G. v. Colonial School District (2010)968
Two months after Dracut, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware also
reviewed a transition plan in J.D.G. v. Colonial School District.969 J.D.G. was a mentally
disabled special education student with Down Syndrome.970 J.D.G. and his mother believed
school officials had failed to properly implement J.D.G.’s 2007-08 IEP and had proposed an IEP
for the 2008-09 school year without completing the previous IEP.971 J.D.G.’s mother opposed the
2008-09 IEP, stating it denied J.D.G. of his right to a FAPE. As a result, J.D.C.’s mother filed for
a due process hearing.972
The due process hearing panel observed the 2008-09 proposed IEP was designed to
provide J.D.G. with independent functioning and independent living training. The IEP also
allowed J.D.G. to practice skills in both school and community settings.973 The hearing panel
determined the IEP goals were a result of compromises between the parent and school officials,
with relevant data regarding J.D.G.’s abilities and progress having been considered by the
parties.974 The hearing panel observed transition goals were important due to J.D.G.’s age and
need to transition into independent living.975 The hearing panel found although the parent
preferred for school officials to focus on rote memorization and repetitive drills, the IEP school
967
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officials proposed for J.D.G. had been reasonably calculated to provide him with an appropriate
education.976
The parent appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The court
observed J.D.G. had not progressed under the previous IEP that had focused on the parent’s
preferred methods of rote memorization and repetitive drills.977 The court noted school officials
proposed an IEP that focused on understanding information, using information appropriately and
independent functioning.978 The court observed school officials had proposed an IEP that would
transition J.D.G. into independent living.979 The district court had found no reason to disagree
with the hearing panel and concluded school officials provided a reasonably calculated IEP
designed to provide J.D.G. meaningful benefit and significant learning.980
E. Z.-L. v. New York City Department of Education (2011)981
A few months after Gomez, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled on a case involving transition services. E. Z.-L. was a nine-year-old student with autism
who had been attending the Rebecca School, a private day school. 982 In April 2008, the IEP
team met to determine E. Z.-L.’s educational program for the following school year. The team
recommended an educational placement with a small class size, occupational therapy, speech
language therapy, and counseling.983 Later, the parents received a letter identifying the
Children’s Workshop School, a private day school, as the school E. Z.-L. would be attending.984
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E. Z.-L.’s parents disagreed with the Children’s Workshop School placement believing it was an
inappropriate placement and advised school officials of their intent to reenroll E. Z.-L. in the
Rebecca School, at the school district’s expense. The parents also requested an impartial hearing
stating school officials had failed to offer E. Z.-L. a FAPE during the 2008-09 school year.985
The parents believed and the hearing officer agreed, E. Z.-L. was denied a FAPE because
school officials had not recommended a specific school in the IEP meeting and school officials
had not developed a transition plan.986 School officials appealed the hearing officer’s decision to
the State Review Officer (SRO) who negated the hearing officer’s decision.987 The SRO found
school officials were not required to recommend a specific school in an IEP and noted the
Children’s Workshop School would have been able to address any of E.Z.-L.’s transition
needs.988
E. Z.-L.’s parents appealed the SRO’s decision to the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The court observed the term educational placement referred only to the
program including classes, individualized attention, and services the student would receive.989
Educational placement did not need to refer to the specific building or school where the services
will be provided.990
The court also addressed the parents’ transition concerns. The court determined E. Z.-L.’s
parents had failed to specify why a transition plan was necessary for nine-year-old E. Z.-L. The
court also noted the IDEA did not require a transition plan when a student moved from one
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school to another.991 The court further observed transition plans were required when a student
transitioned from high school to post-school activities and this type of transition was not
applicable to E. Z.-L.’s movement from one school to another.992 Because a transition plan was
not required, the court concluded school officials had not made a procedural error thereby
rendering the parents’ claims moot.993
Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation (2011)994
Several months after E. Z.-L., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
ruled on Tindell v. Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation, a case involving transition
planning and services.995 Chris Tindell was a 19-year-old student eligible for special education
due to medically diagnosed autism.996 He received special education services at the Gibault
School, a residential placement, to address his autism, bi-polar disorder, and severe autism
related anxiety.997 Prior to this placement, Chris was receiving services through a combination of
homebound schooling and general education classes in his local high school.998 Chris’ May 2006
IEP placed him in both general education classes at the local high school and homebound
instruction. The IEP noted after graduation Chris would attend college with support such as use
of a scribe.999 The IEP indicated Chris was able to complete his laundry and would “get a job at

991

Id. at 598.
Id. at 598.
993
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). E. Z.-L. v. New York City Department of Education, 763 F.Supp.
2d 584, 598 (S.D. NY, Jan. 24. 2011).
994
Tindell et al v. Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation et al, 805 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2011).
995
E. Z.-L. v. New York City Department of Education, 763 F.Supp. 2d 584 (S.D. NY, Jan. 24. 2011). Tindell et al
v. Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation et al, 805 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Ind. July 29, 2011).
996
Tindell et al v. Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation et al, 805 F. Supp. 2d 630, 633 (S.D. Ind. July 29,
2011).
997
Id. at 644.
998
Id. at 639.
999
Id. at 636.
992

125
the bowling alley.” The IEP noted Chris needed to increase his proficiency in traveling around
the school building and using the city bus system.1000
The IEP proposed for Chris in November 2007 continued both his general education and
homebound placement and indicated school officials would develop a transition plan at the
annual review later that year.1001 On January 31, 2008, Chris’ placement was changed to a fulltime homebound placement without classes in the local high school.1002 In March 2008, the IEP
team decided to explore residential programs and, in April 2008, a team from the Gibault School
agreed to observe Chris to determine if he met the criteria for their residential program.1003
Chris continued to receive homebound services until June 2008 when school officials
placed him in the residential program at the Gibault School.1004 When Chris entered the Gibault
School, school officials proposed a treatment plan with a projected a discharge date of June 2009
plus an additional year of aftercare services.1005 The treatment plan included teaching Chris to
cope with frustration, assisting him in functioning outside the home, earning credits toward
graduation, participation in daily recreation, developing trust with his therapist, and complying
with all medication.1006 The Gibault School provided Chris’ parents with monthly treatment
reviews. These reviews identified the areas in which Chris was receiving services and whether he
participated.1007
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School officials held an IEP meeting on September 9, 2008 and the IEP team discussed
Chris’ program of credit recovery as well as his transition plan.1008 The IEP team determined a
statement of needed transition services would be formulated at the next IEP meeting.1009 During
the following IEP meeting school officials indicated Chris was receiving “A” grades in his
twelfth grade equivalent classes.1010 School officials also indicated Chris would complete the
graduation requirements and discussed transition planning. The proposed transition plan
indicated Chris would enroll in a two-year college with support, live in an apartment with
support, and engage in a transition to adult independent skills program for more than half of his
school day from March through May of 2009.1011
In March 2009, Chris’ parents submitted a letter dissenting to the IEP to school
officials.1012 His parents stated they had agreed to Chris’ placement at the Gibault School
because school officials had assured them Chris’ educational services would continue until he
was twenty-two and Chris’ graduation would be based on his readiness to graduate.1013 Chris’
parents also filed for a due process hearing.1014
In July 2009, the hearing officer issued a decision, determining school officials had
provided a FAPE to Chris and had no further obligation to provide services.1015 Chris’ parents
appealed the decision to the Indiana Board of Special Education. The Indiana Board of Special
Education determined there was no error in the hearing officer’s findings.1016 In November 2009,
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Chris’ parents appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana.1017 The
parents contended school officials had denied Chris a FAPE by providing him homebound
services from March 2007 to May 2008 rather than placing him in a residential placement.1018
They further argued school officials had denied Chris a FAPE because a transition plan was not
in place when Chris turned sixteen years of age.1019
The court observed Chris’ mother had not wanted to explore residential placement until
after the effectiveness of his medications was determined.1020 The medication was determined
ineffective in December 2007 and Chris’ doctor recommended school officials explore
community-based services.1021 Chris’ mother indicated, in February 2008, via email, she was not
willing to consider non-residential placement options for Chris.1022 School officials conducted an
IEP meeting in March 2008 and agreed to explore residential placement options. Chris began
receiving services in the residential setting in June 2008.1023 The court observed residential
placements required the participation of third parties and generally required more time to
effectuate than other educational placements.1024 The court upheld the hearing officer’s
conclusion that school officials had provided Chris a FAPE while he received homebound
services.1025
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The court also upheld the hearing officer’s decision on the appropriateness of the
transition plan.1026 The court observed school officials had not provided a comprehensive
transition plan by the time Chris turned sixteen, but deemed this to be a procedural error. The
court also observed that prior to his placement in the residential setting school officials could not
have developed a reasonable transition plan.1027 The court noted school officials had not
developed a transition a plan until February 2009. However, the progress reports provided by the
Gibault School showed Chris had received comprehensive life skill training as well as social
skills training.1028 The court determined although the transition plan was improperly delayed,
school officials had nonetheless provided Chris with adequate services and the delay had not
denied Chris an appropriate education.1029
K.C. v. Nazareth Area School District (2011)1030
Only one month after Tindell, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled on K.C. v. Nazareth Area School District,1031 a case involving transition
planning and services.1032 K.C. was eligible for special education due to a genetic disorder that
adversely affected her academic and functional skills1033 known as Prader-Willi syndrome.1034
Prader-Willi syndrome is a congenital disorder causing low muscle tone, incomplete sexual
development, an uncontrolled feeling of hunger, and, typically, an IQ in the 70 range.1035 K.C.’s
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parents claimed school officials had denied K.C. a FAPE because her IEP had not included
transition services such as physical therapy, sensory occupational therapy, executive functioning
services, and an appropriate transition plan.1036 K.C.’s parents filed for a due process hearing and
the hearing officer found in favor of the school officials. K. C.’s parents appealed to the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.1037
K.C.’s parents claimed school officials had denied K.C. a physical therapy as a transition
service as well as a multi-year transition plan, travel training, and they claimed her transition
plan was not individualized.1038 While school officials had discontinued K.C.’s direct physical
therapy services, she had participated in an Equilibrium Equine Program, which, the court found
addressed her physical therapy needs.1039 The court also found K.C.’s IEP had adequately
addressed her occupational therapy needs and her executive functioning needs.1040 K.C.’s parents
argued the transition plan was “generic and inadequate to provide for K.C.’s individualized
needs.”1041
K.C.’s parents requested a multi-year transition plan that would have included earlier
vocational and assistive technology assessments.1042 The court found school officials had
provided a coordinated set of transition activities in the first IEP and school officials added
services and activities during each subsequent school year.1043 The court observed the IDEA did
not require school officials to initially complete a multi-year transition plan and noted a
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“sequential series of transition plans” effectively established a multi-year plan.1044 K.C.’s parents
also argued school officials had not provided K.C. travel training.1045 Nevertheless, K.C. had
participated in a program that provided basic travel skills including, but not limited to, safety
skills, navigation skills, problem-solving skills, and self-advocacy skills.1046 The court found the
records indicated K.C. had made meaningful educational progress in this program.1047
K.C.’s parents further argued school officials had not individualized K.C.'s transition
plan.1048 The court pointed out school officials had begun discussing transition goals for K.C.
prior to her 2005 evaluation. This evaluation had indicated a functional vocational assessment
was required.1049 However, by January of 2008, school officials had not completed a functional
vocational assessment, and as a result, the parents contracted Dr. Cavaiuolo, a consultant, to
review K.C.’s IEP and transition plan.1050 Dr. Cavaiuolo had concluded the proposed transition
plan was too generalized to meet K.C.’s individual needs and provided various
recommendations.1051
The records indicated school officials had attempted to complete a functional vocational
assessment, but the parents delayed signing consent for the evaluation until after they had
contracted with Dr. Cavaiuolo.1052 The court reasoned, although school officials could have
provided more services, K.C. was not deprived of educational benefit as school officials were not
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required to provide the best-possible transition plan.1053 In sum, the court found K.C. had made
progress on her IEP goals and had benefited from the transition plan school officials
provided.1054
Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Board of Education (2011)1055
Within weeks of the K.C. decision, the U.S. Appeals Court for the Third Circuit decided
Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Board of Education,1056 another case involving transition services. 1057
Zena Rodriguez was eligible for special education services due to a diagnosis of cerebral palsy, a
condition adversely affecting her fine motor and speech skills.1058 During 11th and 12th grade,
Zena attended one special education class for study skills. School officials provided all other
classes in the general education setting.1059 School officials provided Zena with a one-to-one
aide, speech-language therapy, a laptop with voice recognition, and provided extended time on
tests in all settings.1060 School officials proposed a transition plan that noted Zena planned to
attend college.1061
In 2006, Zena and her father filed for due process with the New Jersey Office of
Administrative Law, claiming school officials had denied Zena a FAPE during the 11th and 12th
grades because school officials proposed a deficient statement of transition services that was not
individually designed to meet her needs.1062 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the
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claim, and Zena’s father appealed.1063 The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
agreed with the ALJ’s analysis. The court noted the proposed IEP stated Zena intended to enroll
in college, set forth academic requirements for doing so, and provided a checklist designed to
assist Zena in transitioning to life after high school.1064
The family appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The family
argued the proposed IEPs developed for Zena during 11th and 12th grades lacked measurable
goals and did not contain an adequate transition plan.1065 The appellate panel agreed with the
ALJ’s findings with regard to the measurable goals. While school officials acknowledged they
had erred with respect to the goals, both the ALJ and the panel concluded this amounted to a
procedural error and did not deny Zena a FAPE.1066 The record indicated Zena had participated
in general education programming, and her progress was measurable based on her high grades
and her passing of the New Jersey High School Proficiency Assessment.1067
In discussing Zena’s transition plan, the appeals panel noted it was unclear whether the
statement of transition services was deficient.1068 The panel found the IEPs acknowledged Zena’s
desire to attend college and set forth the academic requirements necessary for her to attain this
goal.1069 Furthermore, the panel noted the proposed 12th grade IEP included a detailed checklist
designed to assist her with transition. Also, school officials had provided Zena extensive
information about agencies that could help with her transition.1070 The appeals panel reasoned the
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transition plan was substantively adequate because it contained a discussion of transition services
and school officials had tailored it to address Zena’s post high school goals.1071
Carrie I. v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii (2012)1072
Less than a year after Rodriguez, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii also
ruled on a special education case involving transition services. In 2010, Greg I., Carrie I’s son,
was an eighteen-year-old student eligible for special education and related services due to autism
as well as a diagnosis of Landau-Kleffner syndrome.1073 Greg had a history of behavioral issues
including running away from others, invading the personal space of others, lifting people’s
clothes, putting his hands inside others’ shirts, and touching others.1074 Greg had been receiving
specialized services at Loveland, a private mental health treatment facility that had a school
component.1075 Loveland was a small, gated, highly structured facility.1076 On July 19, 2010, the
IEP team met and school officials proposed a placement at Aiea High School, Greg’s local high
school.1077 The proposed placement included special education classes, speech therapy,
occupational therapy, additional special education after school, assistive technology, communitybased instruction, counseling, behavioral supports, and an extended school year program.1078
Aiea High School’s student enrollment was over one thousand students and the school was
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situated at a heavily traveled intersection.1079 Greg’s mother disagreed with the proposed
placement and requested a due process hearing.1080 Greg’s mother claimed school officials had
predetermined Greg’s placement without her participation and without considering the potential
harmful effects of a placement at Aiea High School.1081 Greg’s mother also asserted school
officials had failed to implement an appropriate transition plan that included measurable goals
and failed to provide transition assessments in the areas of education/training, employment, and
independent living skills.1082 The hearing officer determined the parent had not shown the
placement proposed by school officials was inappropriate.1083
The parent appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii.1084 The court found school officials had offered Greg a placement without
considering the possible harmful effects of the change in placement.1085 The court noted school
officials had not formulated goals, objectives, or a plan to address Greg’s behavioral issues, such
as elopement from a large campus between two major thoroughfares.1086 Although school
officials considered the benefits of a public school placement, and the accompanying opportunity
for Greg to interact with nondisabled peers, the court reasoned school officials’ failure to
adequately consider the harmful effects of their proposed was detrimental to Greg.1087 Therefore,
the court determined this procedural violation had resulted in a denial of a FAPE.1088
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When the court reviewed the parent’s concerns regarding transition service errors it found
school officials had not completed any transition assessments.1089 The court also found school
officials had not determined Greg’s career interests and had not attempted to obtain his mother’s
consent to invite a representative from any public agency that would be providing postsecondary services to Greg as required by the IDEA.1090 The court noted school officials relied
on the transition regulations set forth in the IDEA prior to 2004 when developing Greg’s
transition plan.1091 In the plan, school officials simply identified the agencies responsible for
providing transition services.1092 The court explained that had school officials followed the
appropriate transition regulations, they should have used age-appropriate transition assessments,
used the assessment results to develop appropriate post-secondary goals and determine the
transition services Greg needed to reach his post-secondary goals.1093 The court also observed,
"the lack of assessments alone is enough to constitute a lost educational opportunity."1094 The
court also reasoned school officials should have invited a representative of the State Department
of Vocational Rehabilitation to the IEP meeting because ultimately this agency would be
responsible for providing post-secondary services or funding Greg’s transition plan.1095 The court
concluded the procedural violations were not harmless and resulted in Greg being denied a
FAPE.1096
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Klein Independent School District v. Hovem (2012)1097
A little over two months after Carrie I. was decided, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit also addressed transition services in Klein Independent School District v.
Hovem.1098 Student, Per Hovem, attended a high school within the Klein Independent School
District.1099 He presented with high intelligence and above average performance in math and
social studies. Per was eligible for special education due to a diagnosis of Attention Deficit
Disorder and severe deficits in spelling and writing skills.1100 School officials had placed Per in
all general education classes and allowed him the use of a portable speller to address his spelling
difficulties.1101 School officials provided study guides, hard copies of class notes, and the use of
a computer for written responses. Per received no penalty for spelling errors and was provided
extra time on written work, and the ability to answer essay test questions orally.1102 Per had a
transition plan that stated he would graduate with a regular diploma and attend college.1103 He
had expressed interest in attending New York University.1104 Per passed all of his high school
courses with high grades.1105 During his junior year, school officials administered the state
mandated Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS). Per passed all sections of the
TAKS except the written composition section.1106
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Per was placed in a practical writing course his senior year due to his failure to pass the
TAKS written composition section.1107 The practical writing teacher offered Per additional
tutoring but he did not take advantage of this assistance.1108 In September of Per’s senior year,
school officials reduced Per’s accommodations to the use of the computer and the portable
speller for writing assignments.1109 He also received monitoring by a special education teacher
for 30 minutes per semester.1110 School officials made no changes to his transition plan.1111
Per was unable to independently complete college applications and his parents believed
Per was not capable of performing college level work.1112 In addition, notwithstanding the
assistance he received in his writing class, Per failed the TAKS writing assessment in the fall and
spring of his senior year.1113 In the spring of Per’s senior year his parents had him reevaluated
and considered placing him in Boston’s Landmark School.1114 The Landmark School specialized
in teaching intelligent students who were challenged by disabilities.1115 In the spring of his senior
year, Per dropped his required economics class resulting in a delay to his graduation.1116 In May,
school officials held a series of IEP meetings. During these meetings school officials urged Per
to complete the required economics class during the summer and graduate with a waiver of the
TAKS.1117 Per did not complete the economics class. Instead, he enrolled in the Landmark
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School’s summer program.1118 School officials refused to reimburse the parents for Landmark’s
tuition costs. The parents responded by filing for a due process hearing.1119
The hearing officer concluded school officials’ failure to adequately tailor Per’s IEPs to
meet his unique needs constituted a denial of a FAPE. The hearing officer noted school officials
had not addressed Per’s learning disability and, because school officials maintained the same
transition goals from year to year, the hearing officer found the IEP did not contain sufficient
transition planning for Per’s entry into college.1120 The hearing officer ordered school officials to
reimburse the parents for Landmark School’s educational and residential costs.1121 School
officials appealed and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas affirmed the
hearing officer’s findings.1122 The court noted school officials had ignored Per’s areas of
weakness, failed to modify the IEP when it proved ineffective, and found neither the IEP nor the
transition services were reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.1123 The court
awarded reimbursement for educational costs, noting the IDEA required school officials provide
special education services targeting a student’s disability.1124 However, the court determined
school officials were not responsible for Landmark School’s residential costs.1125
The parents appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court
disagreed with both the district court and the hearing officer.1126 In its discussion, the appeals
panel determined school officials had adequately addressed Per’s learning disability, noting
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school officials had tailored his accommodations to allow him to take general education
classes.1127 The appellate court applied Rowley and determined Per’s IEPs had been reasonably
calculated to provide him with an educational benefit. The court noted Per had progressed from
one grade to the next in his mainstreamed classes.1128 The panel pointed out Rowley required the
student to receive educational benefit, not remediation of the child’s disability.1129
The goals in Per’s transition plans had called for him to pass his classes and move
through the curriculum.1130 In considering Per’s transition plans the appeal panel noted although
the plans contained the same goals year after year, they consistently called for Per to graduate
with a regular diploma.1131 The panel also recognized Per and his parents had failed to utilize the
college application assistance resources offered by school officials.1132 The panel reasoned the
insufficient transition plans did constitute a procedural violation; however, this procedural
violation did not amount to a denial of FAPE.1133 Following this decision, Per’s parents appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States of America. The Supreme Court did not grant the
parents’ petition for appeal.1134
M.Z. v. New York City Board of Education (2013)1135
Three days after the Supreme Court denied Per’s parents’ request for appeal in Hovem,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York considered alleged procedural
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violations of the special education transition planning process in M.Z. v. New York City Board of
Education.1136 During the 2010-11 school year, M.Z. was an eighteen-year-old student eligible
for special education due to significant cognitive issues and both language and social skills
deficits.1137 M.Z. displayed behavioral issues such as inappropriate touching and
vocalizations.1138 In March 2010, school officials held an IEP meeting. The IEP team, including
a vocational education teacher, discussed numerous reports, including a report on M.Z.’s
transition progress.1139 School officials proposed an IEP that included a transition plan. The
proposed transition plan did not identify the parties responsible for implementing M.Z.’s
transition services.1140
Three months after the IEP meeting, school officials proposed placement at the
Manhattan Occupational Training Center.1141 M.Z.’s father rejected the proposed placement.1142
The father informed school officials he planned to enroll M.Z. at Kulanu, a private special
education school. The father also informed school officials he would seek reimbursement for
tuition costs.1143 The father filed for a due process hearing alleging school officials failed to
provide M.Z. a FAPE due to several substantive and procedural deficiencies, including the
failure to provide an adequate transition plan.1144
The hearing officer found the transition plan was vague and incomplete. However, the
hearing officer also determined school officials would have provided appropriate transition
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services thereby rendering the procedural errors in the transition plan insignificant and not a
denial of a FAPE.1145 The parent appealed to the State Review Officer and the SRO determined
although school officials had not implemented an appropriate transition plan, this was a
procedural deficit and did not deprive M.Z. of a FAPE.1146
The parent appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.1147
The district court found school officials had failed to develop and implement an appropriate
transition plan.1148 The court noted the transition plan failed to specify activities that would lead
to the development of math skills and the acquisition of science concepts.1149 The court further
noted school officials had failed to both list post-secondary activities available to M.Z. and
identify the individuals responsible for implementation of the plan.1150 However, the court
pointed out the IEP had provided for biannual progress reports that included progress on M.Z.’s
pre-vocational goals. The court further observed different portions of the IEP identified the staff
responsible for providing services linked to the transition plan.1151 As a result, the court reasoned
while school officials had developed a procedurally flawed transition plan, the plan did not cause
actual harm to M.Z., and therefore, the plan did not result in a denial of a FAPE.1152
Gibson v. Forest Hills School District Board of Education (2013)1153
A few months after M.Z., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
decided Gibson v. Forest Hills School District Board of Education,1154 a case involving
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transition planning and services. Chloe Gibson attended Anderson High School (AHS) and was
eligible for special education services due to her multiple disabilities including severe seizure
disorder, mental retardation, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder - Not Otherwise
Specified.1155 School officials had placed Chloe into a multi-disabilities self-contained special
education classroom at AHS and provided her with occupational therapy, physical therapy,
speech language therapy, and an individual aide.1156
Chloe’s parents disagreed with this placement and requested school officials place her in
the Turpin High School life skills classroom.1157 School officials refused, indicating the multidisabilities placement was an appropriate placement.1158 During the time Chloe was enrolled in
high school, school officials had modified Chloe’s IEP several times. Many of these
modifications were the result of requests from either the parents or the parents’ attorneys. 1159
Federal and state regulations required school districts to invite students to IEP meetings when the
team was discussing post-secondary goals and transition services.1160 However, school officials
had not invited Chloe to any IEP meetings.1161
Chloe’s IEP addressed transition services by noting she was to participate in school-based
work and supervised learning experiences. School officials had also addressed personal care,
independence, and recreational activities in the IEP.1162 However, school officials had not invited
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Chloe to attend an IEP meeting held during her 12th grade year.1163 In the future planning section
of the IEP, Chloe’s parents indicated they envisioned her living and working in a supported
environment.1164 In contrast, school officials believed Chloe would live in an assisted living
environment, and she would participate in an adult program that included a small group
recreational environment.1165
During Chloe’s 12th grade year, school officials contracted with a transition specialist to
develop a transition plan.1166 The specialist recommended Chloe should transition to a nonvocational adult program with a work component. Chloe’s parents disagreed.1167 Chloe’s parents
filed for a due process hearing alleging, in part, school officials had denied Chloe a FAPE due to
inadequate instruction in reading and math, inappropriate transition services, and failure of
school official to provide Chloe with an educational placement in the least restrictive
environment.1168 The hearing officer found IEP deficiencies in the areas of reading and math.
The hearing officer ordered compensatory education in both subject areas.1169 However, the
hearing officer concluded Chloe’s placement in the multi-disabilities classroom complied with
the IDEA’s least restrictive environment mandate.1170 Finally, the hearing officer ordered school
officials to complete a vocational assessment designed to assist in creating appropriate
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measurable post-secondary goals.1171 School officials completed the vocational assessment with
the assistance of Goodwill Industries.1172
Chloe’s parents filed an appeal of the hearing officer’s decision with a State Level
Review Officer.1173 The review officer upheld the hearing officer’s order requiring school
officials to incorporate specific reading and math goals into Chloe’s IEP and ordered school
officials to provide compensatory education in reading and math.1174 The review officer found
school officials had provided Chloe an educationally appropriate placement in the AHS multidisabilities classroom.1175 However, the review officer found the hearing officer had erred in
ordering school officials to provide Chloe a vocational assessment.1176 The review officer
determined school officials had provided appropriate measurable post-secondary goals based on
age appropriate transition assessments.1177 The review officer further noted school officials had
developed the proposed transition goals using the school official’s initial transition assessment
and the assessment completed by Goodwill Industries.1178
The parents appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging
the review officer erred by failing to require school officials to provide compensatory relief for
transition services and recommending an educational placement in the least restrictive
environment.1179 The district court agreed with the hearing officer and the review officer, noting
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the placement in the multi-disabilities classroom was appropriate and designed to provide Chloe
with a meaningful educational benefit.1180
The district court disagreed with the review officer’s conclusions regarding Chloe’s
transition services.1181 The court observed Chloe had turned 16 during ninth grade and school
officials had not invited her to any of the IEP meetings when transition services were
discussed.1182 The court noted this procedural violation could not result in substantive harm if
school officials considered Chloe’s preferences and interests.1183 Chloe’s teacher testified she
had based Chloe's interests on what she liked to do in class as well as the choices she made with
respect to school jobs.1184 The court determined this informal approach of ascertaining Chloe’s
interests and preferences for post-secondary outcomes was insufficient.1185 The court also
determined school officials had not completed age-appropriate assessments related to postsecondary goals in a timely manner observing school officials had not provided transition
assessments until Chloe’s 12th grade year.1186 The court determined these violations resulted in
substantive harm and, as such, constituted a denial of a FAPE.1187
Pape v. Board of Education of the Wappingers Central School District (2013)1188
Several weeks after Gibson was decided, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York also ruled on a case involving transition services, Pape v. Board of Education of
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the Wappingers Central School District.1189 Riley Pape was eligible for special education
services due to an emotional disability. On March 27, 2003, Riley and his parents requested a
due process hearing, alleging school officials had denied Riley a FAPE by failing to provide
psychological and vocational counseling, psychiatric evaluations, and transitional services. In
June 2003, Riley graduated, thereby resulting in the termination of special education services,
from the Summit School, a private residential high school for students with emotional
disabilities.1190 When Riley graduated, school officials referred Riley to the State Educational
Department’s Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities for
future transition services.1191 In December of 2003, an Impartial Hearing Officer conducted a due
process hearing.1192 In October 2004, the hearing officer found school officials had failed to
provide Riley with psychological and vocational counseling, psychiatric evaluations, and
transitional services.1193 The hearing officer ordered school officials to convene an IEP meeting
to create a transition plan for Riley.1194 The hearing officer stated Riley must attend the IEP
meeting and, if he did not attend, school officials would have no further obligations to provide
services.1195
Six months later, school officials convened the meeting ordered by the hearing officer,
with Riley in attendance.1196 School officials proposed a new IEP and recommended psychiatric
and vocational evaluations.1197 School officials had also contacted a representative from the State
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Education Department’s Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with
Disabilities (VESID) to provide transition services.1198 On November 4, 2005, Riley had a
psychiatric evaluation as part of a VESID referral requested by the school district.1199 Riley went
to VESID to discuss transition services and VESID officials informed him he did not qualify
based on his parents’ income.1200 Riley and his parents had not contacted the school district to let
school officials know Riley did not qualify for VESID services.1201
Despite receiving the psychiatric evaluation and the VESID referral, Riley and his
parents believed school officials had failed to comply with the 2004 hearing officer’s order and
requested review of the order by a different hearing officer.1202 In October 2006, a second
Impartial Hearing Officer dismissed the due process hearing request.1203 In November 2006,
Riley and his parents appealed to the State Review Officer, who also denied their appeal.1204
Riley and his parents appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York,
alleging, under Section 504 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, school officials
had discriminated against Riley because of his disability by denying him reasonable
accommodations and shifting the burden of paying for transition services to the family.1205
Section 504 prohibits an entity that receives federal financial assistance, like a public school
district, from discriminating against a student solely on the basis of a disability.1206 The family
contended school officials had retaliated against them, alleging school officials had not
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implemented the 2004 hearing officer’s order and unlawfully attempted to shift the burden of
paying for transition services to the family.1207
The court rejected the family’s allegation that school officials had failed to comply with
the due process decision requiring school officials to provide transition services.1208 The court
noted the hearing officer ordered school officials to thoughtfully consider Riley's need for postsecondary transition services. The court determined school officials fulfilled this order.1209 The
court noted, school officials convened an IEP meeting six months after the 2004 IHO ordered
one and school officials provided transitional services through VESID, and recommended
psychiatric and vocational evaluations.1210
The court acknowledged VESID found Riley ineligible for post-secondary transition
services based on his parents' income, but explained the family never contacted school officials
to inform them about the resulting lack of services.1211 Furthermore, the court observed the
family had not demonstrated school officials had shifted the obligation to provide transition
services because of Riley's disability.1212 Without clear evidence of intentional discrimination,
Riley and his parents were not able to prevail on their Section 504 and Title II discrimination
claims.1213 The court also granted judgment for school officials on Riley's Section 504 and Title
II retaliation claims, stating Riley and his parents had not shown a six-month delay in convening
the required IEP meeting was retaliatory.1214
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Maksym v. Strongsville City School District (2013)1215
A few weeks after the Pape decision,1216 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio assessed the adequacy of a student’s transition plan.1217 Steven Maksym, a student in the
Strongsville City School District, was eligible for special education due to brain damage and
cerebral palsy.1218 Steven aged out of the school district at the end of the 2010-11 school year
with an accompanying termination of special education services.1219 During the 2009-10 school
year, there were several IEP meetings and, at Steven’s mother’s request, school officials
provided a situational assessment through Polaris’ Community Work Experience Program. 1220 In
March 2010, the IEP team met to review the Polaris assessment and proposed Steven participate
in the Polaris program for the last quarter of the school year.1221 School officials agreed to review
Steven’s transition goals in the fall of 2010 as Steven’s mother requested.1222 In June 2010, the
IEP team met with Steven’s mother and proposed an IEP that provided goals in language arts,
math, reading, and employability skills.1223 Steven’s mother refused to sign the IEP and left the
meeting abruptly.1224
In response to a request from Steven’s mother, school officials held another IEP meeting
in September 2010.1225 Steven’s mother objected to Steven’s scheduled study hall during the last
period of the day and, as a result, the school officials assigned Steven to work as an aide in the
1215
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guidance office.1226 In February 2011, the IEP team met again and the parent again expressed
concern regarding Steven’s last period study hall.1227 School officials responded by placing
Steven in an art exploration class three days a week in lieu of the study hall and continued his
work assignment in the guidance office two days a week during last period.1228
The IEP team met in June 2011 to determine Steven’s eligibility for the extended school
year program.1229 The team determined Steven was eligible for the program. However, his
mother refused to sign the IEP, stating she agreed with the extended school year eligibility but
did not agree with the delivery of services in his current IEP.1230
In July 2011, Stephen’s mother filed a due process hearing request alleging school
officials had engaged in predetermination. She also claimed Steven derived no educational
benefit from his last period placement as an aide in the guidance office.1231 School officials
argued the last period guidance office placement was part of Steven’s transition plan and workstudy program.1232 The hearing officer found the mother had failed to establish school officials
violated the IDEA.1233 The mother appealed to the State Level Review Officer who rejected the
family’s arguments and affirmed the hearing officer’s findings.1234
The mother appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The
court addressed both of the mother’s claims, beginning with the predetermination allegation.1235
The court noted Steven’s mother had participated in the numerous IEP meetings and school
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officials changed some services, thereby showing school officials had allowed parental
participation and had not engaged in predetermination.1236
Next, the court addressed the mother’s claim that Stephen’s last period placement as an
aide in the guidance office was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.1237
Steven’s mother argued no learning occurred during this placement.1238 The court noted the
mother had failed "to point to any requirement that every minute of every school day must
provide the maximum educational benefit".1239 The court determined the IEP had addressed the
student's needs by focusing on Steven’s functional skills.1240 These skills included reading, math,
and vocational skills, to assist him in his transition into adult life.1241 The court found the last
period placement expanded those goals and as a result Steven had made progress toward his IEP
goals throughout the school year.1242 The court also observed the office aide experience had
provided Steven with an in-school work experience to foster his employability.1243 The court
noted inclusion of post-secondary transition services were required to offer a FAPE. The court
also noted a FAPE did not depend on the quality of each component of the transition services in
isolation.1244 Therefore, Steven’s transition services needed to be reasonably calculated to
provide him with educational benefit.1245
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Jefferson County Board of Education v. Lolita S. (2013)1246
About one month after the court determined Maksym in Ohio, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit in Alabama reviewed Jefferson County Board of Education v. Lolita
S.,1247 another special education case involving transition services. M.S. was a student in the
Jefferson County School System who became eligible for special education services in eighth
grade after failing seventh grade.1248 The IEP team determined he was eligible due to a specific
learning disability in the area of oral language.1249 In September 2011, school officials proposed
an IEP for eighth grade addressing reading, personal management, and math.1250 The pages of
the IEP that addressed these services had another child’s name typed in and crossed out with
M.S.’s first name hand written across the top.1251 In the area of personal management, the IEP
listed transition services needed and stated M.S. had a problem asking for help with assignments
and was easily frustrated.1252 The goal school officials wrote to address this issue was to
“develop communication skills to interact with others in integrated settings (e.g. expressive,
receptive, written) with 100% accuracy.”1253
In January 2011 school officials proposed, M.S. be moved to ninth grade. School officials
proposed summer school for M.S. to make up credits and proposed placement in the regular,
college readiness, diploma track.1254 School officials indicated M.S.’s grades would be
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monitored and he would be placed in the occupational diploma track if his grades declined.1255
M.S.’s mother agreed to this change and school officials moved M.S. to ninth grade in the spring
semester.1256
M.S. passed only two of his classes during the spring semester of ninth grade and, due to
a lack of communication, M.S. did not attend summer school.1257 In August 2011, M.S.’s mother
requested an IEP meeting. The IEP meeting was held in September. The IEP proposed for M.S.’s
tenth grade placed him in the occupational diploma track and had him enrolling in the courses he
needed to remain at grade level despite the difficulty he had making passing grades.1258 The
resulting IEP focused on M.S.’s personal management, oral/written expression, math, and
reading comprehension skills.1259 The IEP’s transition provisions did not address employment,
education, or community living.1260
One month later, M.S.’s mother requested a due process hearing alleging the IEP was
vague and the goals were limited and insufficient to meet M.S.’s needs.1261 The hearing officer
found the transition services were appropriate and met the IDEA’s requirements.1262 The hearing
officer acknowledged the IEP’s transition services were broad and non-specific, but found the
actual services provided demonstrated school officials were preparing M.S. for post-high school
living.1263 The hearing officer noted M.S. attended a class to improve note taking, organization,
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and career planning and school officials brought outside contractors in twice a week to aid M.S.
with job assessment and interests.1264
School officials and M.S.’s mother both appealed to the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama. The court found the evidence did not support the hearing officer’s
determination that the transition services were appropriate.1265 The court determined the IEP
team’s inclusion of the vague statement, the “student will be prepared to participate in postsecondary education” demonstrated school officials had used “stock language,” therefore, the
IEP was not individualized to meet M.S.’s unique needs.1266 The court noted school officials had
placed M.S. in an occupational diploma track and therefore had not positioned him for
college.1267
The court found the transition services were not sufficiently designed to prepare M.S. for
post-high school living, noting school officials had failed to either conduct transition assessments
and or include personalized transition services addressing M.S.’s unique needs.1268 The court
also observed the transition services had failed to deliver meaningful educational benefit.1269 The
court further observed the generalized goals had not addressed M.S.’s unique academic and
functional performance, and were not reasonably calculated to provide M.S. with meaningful
educational benefit. Therefore, the court found the IEP violated the IDEA’s FAPE provision.1270
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School officials appealed the district court’s decision but the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.1271 The appeal panel noted M.S. was
almost six years below the expected reading level thereby rendering the proposed ninth grade
reading goal to be unrealistic.1272 The panel also noted school officials had failed to conduct
transition assessments and instead developed a plan that was not individualized but rather called
for M.S. to take a class on note taking that was open to all freshmen.1273 The panel determined
school officials’ failure to conduct transition assessments was a procedural flaw that denied M.S.
a FAPE. The panel observed school officials had provided M.S. the same transition services as
his peers received without determining if those services were appropriate to meet M.S.’s
individual needs.1274 The panel concluded the overall failure of school officials to individualize
M.S.’s IEP and transition plan was a denial of FAPE. 1275
M.M. v. New York City Department of Education (2015)1276
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York addressed special
education transition services in M.M. v. New York City Department of Education six months after
Lolita S. 1277 J.S. was an eighteen-year-old student eligible for special education due to a
diagnosis of autism.1278 He had been receiving special education services at the Cooke Center for
Learning and Development, a private special education school.1279 During a May 2012 IEP
meeting, school officials reviewed a 2009 psycho-educational evaluation, progress reports, and a
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transitional report. School officials had not conducted a vocational assessment of J.S.1280 During
this IEP meeting school officials proposed J.S. be placed in a twelve month special education
program at the Stephen D. McSweeny School.1281 The proposed IEP also included measurable
post-secondary goals focused on transitioning J.S. to adulthood.1282 During a tour of the
McSweeny School, a parent coordinator told J.S.’s mother J.S. would be placed in a full-day
work site.1283 The parent sent school officials two letters objecting to the McSweeny placement.
Thereafter, the parent unilaterally reenrolled J.S. in the Cooke Center for Learning and
Development.1284
In March 2013, the parent filed for a due process hearing alleging school officials had
failed to conduct a vocational assessment of J.S.1285 The parent also alleged school officials had
not appropriately balanced J.S.’s proposed vocational training with academic instruction.1286 The
parent claimed the proposed McSweeny placement was inappropriate because it focused more on
vocational training than academic instruction.1287 The hearing officer found school officials had
appropriately addressed J.S.’s disability and found the proposed placement provided a proper
balance of academic instruction and vocational training.1288 The parent appealed to the State
Review Officer. The review officer agreed with the hearing officer and found the lack of a
vocational assessment had not rendered the proposed IEP inappropriate.1289
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The parent appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.1290
The parent alleged school officials had failed to offer J.S. a FAPE. The parent argued school
officials failed to conduct evaluations and therefore deprived the parents an opportunity to
participate in the decision making process when developing the IEP.1291 The court noted school
officials had made a procedural violation by not conducting a vocational assessment.1292
However, the court pointed out, school officials had sufficient information regarding J.S.’s
transition needs and were able to propose an appropriate, comprehensive IEP.1293 Additionally,
the court found the proposed IEP included transitional and vocational goals related to both
academics and post-secondary transition.1294 The court concluded the failure to provide a
vocational assessment was a procedural violation.1295 However, the court reasoned this
procedural violation had not resulted in substantive harm and determined the parent failed to
establish there had been a denial of FAPE.1296
Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School (2015)1297
Six months after M.M, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed
Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School, another case involving special education transition
services.1298 G.H. was a high school aged student eligible for special education due to attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder.1299 In February 2013, school officials placed G.H. at Options
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Public Charter School, a general education school.1300 At Options Public Charter School, school
officials had provided G.H. special education services in an instructional program for students
with behavior management challenges.1301 During his placement at Options Public Charter
School, G.H. had poor attendance and failed half of his classes.1302 G.H.’s IEP stated that daily
he would receive forty-five minutes of college and career preparation as a transition service.1303
Other transition services listed in the IEP included career related field trips.1304 G.H.’s weekly
schedule listed academic classes and physical education. The schedule also included social skills
groups such as “Fun Friday” and “Real Talk.”1305 The weekly schedule did not include transition
services.1306 In April 2013, G.H.’s mother requested school officials change G.H.’s placement to
the New Beginnings Vocational Program.1307 School officials honored this request in October
2013 based on G.H.’s aggressive behavior and lack of progress at Options Public Charter
School.1308
G.H. passed all of his classes in the New Beginnings Vocational Program although his
attendance continued to be poor.1309 However, in January 2014, G.H.’s mother requested a due
process hearing, alleging school officials had failed to provide G.H. an appropriate school
placement prior to the New Beginnings Vocational Program placement.1310 She also alleged
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school officials failed to implement the transition services listed in G.H.’s IEP.1311 The due
process hearing officer found school officials had provided G.H. an appropriate placement and
had implemented G.H.’s IEP.1312 G.H.’s mother appealed to the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.1313
The court observed school officials had provided G.H. specialized instruction in an
appropriate placement.1314 However, the court also observed school officials had failed to
provide G.H. with the transition services listed in his IEP.1315 The court noted the transition
services listed in G.H.’s transition plan were feasible and designed to help G.H. realize his goal
of becoming a mechanic.1316 School officials did not dispute G.H.’s mother’s allegation that they
had failed to include transition services. However, they argued G.H.’s sporadic attendance
prevented him from participating in transition services.1317 The court acknowledged even if the
transition plan had been fully implemented, G.H. poor attendance would have prevented him
from benefiting from the services. However, the court observed G.H. had not received any
transition services.1318 The court held the lack of transition services constituted more than a
procedural flaw but was a “material departure” from the IEP resulting in a denial of FAPE.1319
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CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS

Relevant History

Prior to the time an IDEA-eligible student graduates from high school or, due to age,
becomes ineligible to continue receiving services, school officials must have developed and
implemented a series of IEPs that include transition planning and services.1320 Since the IDEA’s
transition services requirement was implemented in 1990, the federal district courts and federal
circuit courts of appeal have decided a total of thirty-four cases involving transition planning and
services. Of the thirty-four cases, courts have only ruled in favor of the family in ten cases. To
date, there has been only one case involving the IDEA’s mandated transition services where a
party has applied for U.S. Supreme Court review. In that case the High Court denied
certiorari.1321 This study examined transition planning and services in placement disputes,
program disputes, and disputes over the termination of special education services. Additionally,
judicial interpretations of the Congressional intent underlying transition planning and services
and Rowley’s application to transition planning and services litigation were considered.1322
In Chapter Two, the judicial decisions and legislation impacting IDEA transition
planning and services were reviewed. The following timeline sets forth this history. After 1972,
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the Brown,1323 PARC1324 and Mills1325 decisions, paved the way for federal legislation addressing
the exclusion of children with disabilities from public schools. The right to a free and appropriate
public education (FAPE) for children with disabilities was codified in the 1975 Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA).1326 Since its passage, Congress has reauthorized and
amended the EAHCA three times. 1327 In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Rowley decision
interpreted the EAHCA’s FAPE mandate. Rowley declared while public school officials were
required to provide IDEA services to eligible children they were not required to maximize the
educational benefit bestowed upon the child.1328 In Rowley, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated a
two-pronged test for determining if school officials had met their obligation to provide a FAPE.
Under this test, the courts first determine if the IEP complies with the IDEA’s procedural
requirements, and second, examine if the child’s IEP was reasonably calculated to provide the
child some educational benefit.1329
As a result of 1990 amendments, the EAHCA was renamed as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The 1990 IDEA mandated that school officials incorporate
transition planning and services into the IEP.1330 These transition services were designed to help
disabled students transition from high school to adulthood and entry into either the workforce or
post-high school education. In either case, transition services were intended to facilitate
successful independent living. School officials were required to utilize the IEP as the vehicle for
1323
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developing and implementing a coordinated outcome-oriented set of activities for every IDEAeligible student.1331 School officials were expected to provide activities designed to facilitate the
student’s progression from high school to life after high school. It was anticipated this planning
would prepare students for activities such as post-secondary education, vocational training,
integrated employment, continuing and adult education, adult services, independent living, or
community participation.1332 The specific activities were to be based upon each student's
individual needs, taking into account the student's preferences and interests.1333 Generally, these
preparatory activities were to include instruction, community experiences, the development of
employment and other post-school adult living objectives, and, when appropriate, the acquisition
of daily living skills and a functional vocational evaluation.1334
In 1997, Congress reauthorized the IDEA and fortified the language pertaining to
transition planning and services. Congress added a directive for school officials to identify and
provide related services required for students’ successful transition.1335 The reauthorization also
required that by age 14, and annually thereafter, each student’s IEP would include a statement of
the student’s transition service needs. The statement was to focus upon the child’s course of
study.1336 The reauthorization also required that by the time the student reached age 16 (earlier if
appropriate) his or her IEP would contain a statement delineating the student’s needed transition
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services, including a description of interagency responsibilities.1337 Another transition
component listed in the 1997 reauthorization stated beginning at least one year before he or she
reached age 18, a student must be informed of the rights that would transfer to him or her upon
reaching this milestone.1338
In 2004 Congress again strengthened special education transition planning and services
language in the IDEA. The 2004 amendment strengthened the Act by included language
regarding the duty to prepare children with disabilities for further education, employment, and
independent living.1339 IDEA 2004 also strengthened the definition of transition services.
Previous definitions had suggested transition services were to be outcome-oriented, defined as
promoting a student’s movement from high school to post-secondary activities.1340 IDEA 2004
mandated transition services were to be delivered via a results-oriented process that focused
upon student performance.1341 This change was designed to improve both the student’s academic
and functional achievement in order to facilitate movement from high school to post-secondary
settings, including vocational education.1342 IDEA 2004 also expanded transition services
requirements to articulate the child’s strengths, as well as the previously required individual
needs and preferences.1343 Additionally, IDEA 2004 added a requirement for the inclusion of
post-secondary goals designed to help the child achieve their employment or post-high school
1337
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opportunity goals. These post-secondary goals were to be measurable and based upon age
appropriate transition assessments related to training, education, employment, and where
appropriate, independent living skills.1344 Transition assessment includes a data collection
process which identifies the individual student’s needs, preferences, and interests as they relate
to the student’s current and future working, educational, living, and personal and social
environments.1345 Assessment data serves as the basis of the transition process and provides the
data for defining goals and services to be included in the IEP. Transition assessments may
include: behavioral assessment information, aptitude tests, interest inventories, work values
inventories, intelligence tests, achievement tests, personality or preference tests, career readiness
tests, self-determination assessments, work-related temperament scales, and transition planning
inventories.1346
Subsequent to the implementation of the IDEA’s post-secondary transition language, the
courts issued several decisions involving transition planning and services. From 1990 to the time
of this writing there have been thirty-four disputes reviewed in the federal circuit court system
involving IDEA transition and planning. Table 1 sets forth descriptive statistics resulting from an
analysis of the thirty-four federal cases to the time of this writing addressing post-secondary
transition planning and services. Although this is a relatively small number of cases, it suggests
school officials have the advantage in transition planning and services disputes. This may be due
to the fact parents have the burden of proving the student was not offered a FAPE, and the
transition planning and services were inappropriate. In contrast, school officials must only show
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the student was offered a FAPE. Although this is a small number of judicial decisions, there is
much to be learned about transition planning and services from an analysis of this body of case
law. An analysis of these decisions reveals important trends and aids school officials in
providing IDEA eligible students sound transition planning and services.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Cases

Description
Cases where the courts ruled in favor of the family
Cases where the courts ruled in favor of the school officials
Cases where a party sought U.S. Supreme Court review
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and educational placement
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and educational placement where the parents
prevailed
Cases involving issues related transition planning and
services and educational placement where school officials
prevailed
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and programmatic disputes
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and programmatic disputes where the parents
prevailed
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and programmatic disputes where school officials
prevailed
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and the termination of special education services
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and the termination of special education services
where the parents prevailed
Cases involving issues related to transition planning and
services and the termination of special education services
where school officials prevailed

Percentage of Total
(34) Transition Cases
29%
71%
3%
44%

Number
of Cases
10
24
1
15

9%

3

35%

12

26%

9

6%

2

21%

7

26%

9

15%

5

12%

4
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School Officials Generally Prevail in Transition Planning Disputes

School officials prevailed in seventy-one percent of the cases involving transition
planning. The majority of the cases involved transition planning disputes coupled with other
issues. This may be due to a “kitchen sink” approach to special education litigation where the
aggrieved party files as many causes of action as possible in the hopes of persuading the court in
their favor. In some cases, parents and school officials disputed the placement option offered to
the student. In formulating placement recommendations, school officials must utilize a
continuum of options including the regular education classroom with support services,
designated instruction services such as pull out (resource) educational services, special education
classes, and separate day or residential special education programs.1347 Parents and school
officials may also dispute the content of the provided program. Programs may include such
services as occupational therapy, speech therapy, applied behavioral analysis, or specific
curricular approaches.1348 Additionally, parents and school officials may dispute the termination
of special education services. Special education services may be terminated through the IEP
process or when an IDEA eligible student leaves high school as a result of either graduating with
a regular diploma or reaching the age where they are no longer eligible for IDEA services. 1349
Nonetheless, when transition planning disputes arise, school officials generally prevail.

1347

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1401-1491 (2006).
Id.
1349
Id.
1348
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Educational Placement Disputes

To date, there have been thirty-four cases involving transition services, fifteen of which
(forty-four percent) also involved placement disputes. Courts ruled in favor of school officials in
twelve of these cases (eighty percent) and ruled in favor of the family in three cases (twenty
percent).

Program Disputes

There have been nine judicial rulings (twenty-six percent of all transition cases),
involving program issues, e.g., related services, health services, English as a Second Language
services, curricular supports as well as transition planning and services to date. In these cases, the
courts ruled in favor of school officials on the issue of transition services seven times (seventyseven percent) again indicating courts generally rule in favor of school officials in disputes over
transition planning and services when other issues are present.

Termination of Services Disputes
When school officials terminate a student’s special education eligibility, transition
services are also terminated. To date, the termination of transition services has been at issue in
nine (twenty-six percent) of the thirty-four judicial rulings. In these nine cases, the courts ruled
in favor of the parents five times (fifty-five percent). This area of litigation showed the highest
number of judicial rulings in favor of the parents. Cases that involved both termination of special
education and transition issues accounted for half of the rulings in favor of parents on transition
services overall.
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Disputes with Procedural Errors Constituting an IDEA Violation

In cases involving educational placement, program issues, or termination of services and
transition planning and services issues, all courts considered transition issues separate from the
additional issues. In one hundred percent of the cases where parents were victorious, courts
found school officials made procedural or substantive errors resulting in the denial of a FAPE.
The procedural errors found to have violated the transition planning mandate included issues
such as: failing to provide appropriate transition assessments, taking into account the student’s
strengths and preferences, inviting the student, and/or inviting representatives from postsecondary settings to the IEP transition planning meeting. Substantive errors found to have
violated the transition planning mandate included failure to implement or provide transition
services. Many of the procedural errors, resulting in an IDEA violation, were highlighted in
Carrie I. v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii.1350 Another case where procedural errors
resulted in an IDEA violation was Gibson v. Forest Hills School District Board of Education.1351
Analysis of these cases demonstrates the importance of school officials providing age
appropriate transition assessments to determine the student’s preferences and strengths as they
relate to the transition planning process.
The courts ruled for the parents in both Marple Newton School Dist. v. Rafael N. 1352 and
Jefferson County Board of Education v. Lolita S.1353 In both cases, school officials provided
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Carrie I., on behalf of her son, Greg I. v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1247
(May 31, 2012).
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Gibson v. Forest Hills School District Board of Education, 113 LRP 24797, 17 (6 th Circuit June 11, 2013).
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Marple Newton School District v. Rafael N., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62494, 31-32 (2007).
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Jefferson County Board of Education v. Lolita S., 113 LRP 39783, 13 (N.D. Alabama Sept. 30, 2013).
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transition plans that included generic and vague statements and goals.1354 These decisions
suggest it is not enough to simply include a transition statement and goals in a student’s IEP.
School officials must sufficiently personalize transition plans in order to provide IDEA
compliant transition plans.
In Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School, the court held school officials provided
an appropriate transition plan; however, the school failed to implement the transition services
listed in the plan. This failure resulted in the denial of a FAPE.1355 This case illustrated it is
essential that school officials provide the transition services specified in the student’s IEP. While
the identification of appropriate services is an essential function of school officials, it is equally
important school officials carry out the identified services. Failure to carry out an otherwise
sound transition plan can, and likely will, result in a school district losing a judicial challenge.
Parents also prevailed in Yankton School District v. Harold and Angie Schramm.1356 In
this case, school officials terminated eligibility for special education for a college bound student,
who was challenged by cerebral palsy. School officials terminated her special education services
after she had completed all of her special education classes.1357 However, the student had been
receiving many supplementary services and accommodations that were not listed in the IEP or
any other document. The court determined the student would have needed services and
accommodations such as a note taker, extra time on assignments, and assistance with physical
needs in a post-secondary setting.1358 The court held, school officials also failed to address the
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Marple Newton School District v. Rafael N., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62494, 31-32 (2007). Jefferson County Board of
Education v. Lolita S., 113 LRP 39783, 26 (N.D. Alabama Sept. 30, 2013).
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Id. at 1372.
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student’s need for transition services such as driver’s education, self-advocacy, and independent
living skills. 1359 As a result, the court concluded the student should continue to be eligible for
special education and transition services throughout her high school career.1360
The next case also involving both termination of services and transition services was J.B.
v. Killingly Board of Education.1361 In this case the student, who was over eighteen years of age
and also a sex offender, had completed enough credits to graduate from high school.1362
However, school officials provided the student the option of continuing to attend school for one
year because the Department of Children and Family had placed him in a residential facility due
to his status as a sex offender.1363 The following year, school officials held an IEP meeting and
determined the student’s educational needs did not require an educational placement in a twentyfour hour residential setting and terminated the student’s special education services.1364 The court
noted the transition plan was insufficient and resulted in a denial of a FAPE because it failed to
address community living and social skills, such as daily living skills, appropriate behavior,
socialization, and working skills.1365 The court determined school officials were financially
responsible for the student’s residential placement and awarded two years compensatory
services.1366
In Kevin T. v. Elmhurst Community School District, the student had earned enough
credits to graduate and thus school officials graduated the 19 year-old from high school and
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terminated special education services.1367 The court found the transition plan school officials
created had provided the student with vocational services to help secure employment after
graduation. However the plan failed to take into account the student’s interest in attending junior
college.1368 This rendered the transition plan inappropriate because it had not taken into account
the student’s interests. This flaw resulted in the student being denied a FAPE.1369 The court
ordered school officials continue to pay for the student’s education past his 21st birthday to
remedy the district’s denial of FAPE.1370 In Susquehanna Township School District v. Jelani J.,
school officials proposed a transition plan that included a year of post-secondary transitional
services in a college prep program.1371 However, prior to implementing the transition plan,
school officials informed the parents the student had completed the IEP goals and objectives and
recommended graduation.1372 The court determined while the student had earned enough credits
to graduate, the recommended graduation and termination of services was inappropriate because
the student had not received the transition services listed in the IEP resulting in a denial of a
FAPE.1373 The court required the school district to pay tuition and fees at a college prep program
for one year because this was the obligation set forth in the IEP to provide transitional
services.1374
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Kevin T., W.T., and K.T. v. Elmhurst Community School District 205, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4645, 4 (E.D.
ILL, Mar. 20, 2002).
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Id. at 40.
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Id. at 46.
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Id. at 251.
1373
Id. at 257.
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In Dracut School Committee v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals, school officials
determined the student had met the graduation requirements and proposed a graduation date.1375
The court observed the transition assessments school officials conducted failed to assess the
areas of education, employment, and independent living.1376 The court further noted school
officials were slow in conducting transition assessments and had failed to provide measurable
transition goals.1377 Additionally, the court found school officials had failed to provide services
to address vocational skills for almost a two-year period when these services should have been
provided. These cumulative failures resulted in the student being denied a FAPE.1378 The court
awarded compensatory transition services even though the student had met formal graduation
requirements.1379
These cases highlight the need for school officials to consider all aspects of a student’s
needs when formulating a transition plan. It is essential school officials take into account the
student’s needs beyond academics or graduation requirements and provide the appropriate
services. Failure to provide appropriate transition services may result in a district losing a
judicial challenge and being obligated to provide compensatory services.

Disputes Where the Courts Found Transition Planning Was Not Required

As discussed above, there are many components of the IDEA transition mandate
including age requirements. It is essential for school officials to be mindful of transition planning
1375

Dracut School Committee v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals of the Mass. Dept. of Elementary and Secondary
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age requirements under the IDEA. E. Z.-L. v. New York City Department of Education was the
only transition case overall that involved a child who had not yet reached high school age.1380
The IDEA requires school officials develop transition plans when students reach 14 years of
age.1381 In E.Z.-L., the court concluded school officials were not required to develop a transition
plan for a 9 year-old child.1382 Although the court ruled in favor of school officials, the decision
illustrates school officials must be aware of the IDEA’s age requirements that trigger the
transition planning process. As this decision suggests, the court has rejected parental requests to
expand the age at which it is appropriate for transition planning to take place. Thus, while school
officials must be careful to ensure students who reach the IDEA-mandated age of 14 receive a
written transition plan, they need not engage in the transition planning process before a child
reaches the statutorily specified age.

Disputes Where Procedural Errors in Transition Planning Process
Did Not Constitute an IDEA Violation

Procedural errors in transition planning and services do not always result in a denial of a
FAPE, provided school officials deliver appropriate transition services. Procedural errors in
transition planning were identified in seventeen (fifty percent) of the thirty-four overall transition
planning and services cases. Nonetheless, the courts ruled in favor of school officials even with
the presence of procedural errors in ten cases (fifty-nine percent) where procedural errors were
found. In Urban v. Jefferson County School District, school officials failed to provide a
statement of transition services in the student’s IEP however, they did deliver transition
1380

E. Z.-L. v. New York City Department of Education, 763 F.Supp. 2d 584 (S.D. NY, Jan. 24. 2011).
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services.1383 Similarly, in Board of Education of Township High School District 211 v. Ross,
school officials failed to include a transition plan in the student’s IEP.1384 However, the student
did receive instruction in skills the transition plan would have addressed.1385 In Tindell v.
Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation, the court concluded, school officials had
committed a procedural error by failing to provide a transition plan.1386 However, the student was
provided adequate services and the court reasoned school officials’ delay in providing a written
plan had not denied the student an appropriate education.1387 In Virginia S. v. Department of
Education, State of Hawaii1388 school officials also made procedural errors and failed to provide
an appropriate transition plan. Nonetheless, the court concluded the procedural errors were
harmless and had not resulted in the denial of a FAPE.1389 In M.Z. v. New York City Board of
Education, school officials developed a transition plan that was both vague and incomplete.1390
However, the court found the IEP had provided for progress reports setting forth the student’s
progress on pre-vocational goals.1391 Thus, the court reasoned although school officials had
developed a procedurally flawed transition plan, the plan neither caused actual harm nor resulted
in the denial of a FAPE.1392
Another court found school officials also committed procedural errors in Klein
Independent School District v. Hovem when they provided transition plans that repeated the
1383
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same goals year after year.1393 However, because the student consistently passed his classes and
both the student and his parents had failed to utilize the resources offered by school officials, the
court reasoned the procedural violation of providing insufficient transition plans did not
constitute the denial of a FAPE.1394 School officials were also found to have committed
procedural violations in M.M. v. New York City Department of Education.1395 Specifically,
school officials failed to conduct a vocational assessment for the student.1396 However, the court
found school officials did have sufficient information regarding the student’s transition needs
and proposed an appropriate, comprehensive IEP that included a transition plan.1397
In Rosinsky v. Green Bay Area School District school officials failed to provide an
invitation to representatives from agencies who were likely to provide post-high school transition
services to the student’s IEP meeting.1398 Noting the family had invited these representatives to
the IEP meeting, the court found this procedural error did not result in the denial of a FAPE.1399
In Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Board of Education, school officials proposed what the court
characterized as a deficient statement of transition services that was not individually
designed.1400 However, the court observed the IEP had acknowledged the student’s desire to
attend college and set forth the academic requirements needed to attain this goal.1401 Although
the plan was deficient, the court reasoned the transition plan was substantively adequate.1402
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In Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools, the court found school officials
committed procedural violations by failing to delineate the transition services in the IEP.1403
However, the court observed transition services were both provided and found to be adequate.
Also, school officials had provided the student a vocational assessment to determine career
opportunities.1404 Based upon these observations the court determined school officials had
properly graduated the student and had provided a FAPE.1405
These cases demonstrate a procedural violation alone may not result in the denial of a
FAPE as long as the student progresses and school officials provide appropriate services. While
creating a sound transition plan is an important aspect of the transition services mandate, it is
perhaps more important to provide sound transition services. Implementing sound transition
services, even when the transition plan itself is flawed will likely provide districts a better chance
of winning a judicial challenge.

Disputes Where Procedural Errors in Transition Were Not Present

Not all disputes involving transition planning and services have resulted in procedural
error findings. Courts have found no procedural or substantive violations in several disputes. For
example, in Mandy S. v. Fulton County School District, the family argued school officials’
proposed transition plans were inadequate because school officials had not proposed communitybased services for the student who had been placed in a college bound program.1406 The court, in
contrast, concluded school officials had met the procedural requirements of Rowley’s first prong
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and had complied with the IDEA’s requirements when developing both the IEPs and transition
plans.1407 In Sinan v. School District of Philadelphia1408 school officials provided a transition
plan that did not contain either vocational or practical living goals. The parents argued these
goals were required. However, the court observed the proposed transition plan focused on
college planning and was appropriate given the student’s interests, needs, and preferences.1409 A
court also determined school officials had developed transition plans providing an opportunity
for meaningful educational benefit in K.C. v. Mansfield Independent School District1410 and in
J.L. v. Mercer Island School District.1411
In Mansfield, the family argued the program developed by school officials had not
provided their daughter the appropriate skills she needed to transition to life after high school.1412
In reviewing the case, the court found school officials had written an IEP and transition plan that
were reasonably calculated to provide the student with some educational benefit.1413
In Mercer Island, school officials proposed an IEP that included transition objectives
related to exploring career options, developing self-advocacy skills, and increasing problemsolving skills. The court concluded these goals provided the student some meaningful benefit.1414
Likewise, the court did not find either procedural or substantial errors in the 2008 case Lessard v.
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Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District.1415 In this case the family claimed school
officials’ proposed transition plan was too generic.1416 However, in reviewing the
appropriateness of the transition plan, the court applied both prongs of Rowley and determined
the transition plan was reasonably calculated to meet the student’s needs.1417 Again, no
procedural errors were found in the 2010 case Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative
School District.1418 In this case, school officials provided transition services within the school
setting and determined the student did not require community based services and interaction.1419
The family believed the absence of community based interactions amounted to a denial of a
FAPE. The court concluded school officials had provided a FAPE by formulating a transition
plan that was both appropriate and reasonably calculated to provide the student some benefit.1420
The court also pointed out the IDEA did not require an IEP to be either ideal or perfect. 1421
In High v. Exeter Township School District, the family believed the IEP school officials
provided included a transition plan that did not adequately prepare the student for college.1422
The court noted although school officials had helped the student decide she wanted to attend
college, they were not required to ensure she was successful in achieving this goal.1423 Parent
preference was discussed in J.D.G. v. Colonial School District.1424 Here school officials had
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provided a transition plan that provided the student independent functioning skills and
independent living services in both school and community settings.1425 However, the parent
preferred for school officials to focus on rote memorization and repetitive drills. The court
rejected the parent’s preference and found school officials’ proposed IEP was reasonably
calculated to provide an appropriate education.1426
In Maksym v. Strongsville City School District, the parent claimed the transition plan’s
work program component was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit because
the student was not participating in this component of the program on a daily basis.1427 The court
noted the student did not need to be in a daily work program as there was no requirement “that
every minute of every school day must provide the maximum educational benefit."1428 The court
also explained a FAPE was not dependent upon an isolated examination of the quality of each
component of the transition services.1429
In Andrew B. v. Board of Education Community High School District 99, school officials
graduated the student which allowed him to enroll and take courses at the junior college.1430
School officials determined he had mastered the functional life skills offered by the high school
and had earned enough credits to graduate.1431 The court determined the school officials’
graduation recommendation was based upon a careful analysis and consideration of the student’s
progress.1432 Because school officials carefully considered the student’s educational benefits,
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transition needs, and interests, the court concluded school officials properly terminated special
education services and issued a diploma to the student pursuant to the IEP.1433 In Doe v.
Marlborough Public Schools, school officials determined a student was eligible for graduation
after he successfully passed the state required exit exams and completed all of the required
coursework.1434 The court noted the IEP had identified the student’s areas of weakness and
included services designed to address each weakness. The IEP also contained transition services
designed to prepare the student for independent living, and school officials had referred the
student to outside agencies to assist with job coaching and other adult services.1435 As a result of
these findings, the court determined the IEP had been reasonably calculated to provide a FAPE
and school officials had properly graduated the student.1436
It is important for school officials to carefully consider the transition needs of students
during the transition planning process. These cases indicate school officials must provide
transition services that match the student’s needs but a “Cadillac” transition service plan
addressing all of a parent’s preferences is not required. These cases also indicate the courts do
not typically find procedural errors when school officials provide transition plans and services
tailored to meet the student’s needs. Along with sound transition planning and implementation of
the transition plan, it is important to identify the areas of need required by the student for
successful transition. It is also important to note, not every student will require transition services
in every possible transition area however, transition services must be provided in areas of need.
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Rowley Has Been Applied to All IDEA Cases
Involving Transition Disputes

To date, the courts have applied the two-prong Rowley test in all IDEA cases involving
transition planning and services. Rowley has emerged as the appropriate test for application in all
IDEA disputes involving transition planning and services claims with particular emphasis on
Rowley’s second prong.1437 The Rowley standard applies a two-prong test to determine if an IEP
is reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.1438 The first prong asks the reviewing
court to examine whether school officials’ proposed IEP complied with the IDEA’s procedural
requirements. The second prong is substantive, and evaluates whether the IEP was reasonably
calculated to provide the student some educational benefit.1439 This is true notwithstanding
Congress’ use of IDEA 1997 to mandate increased transition services and strengthen the Act’s
transition language.1440 In the 1997 IDEA reauthorization, Congress raised the transition
planning and services standards by adding requirements such as the identification of the related
services and goals needed for successful, results-oriented, transition promoting independence and
self-sufficiency.1441
Cases Challenging Rowley’s Application After the IDEA 1997 Amendments

Since the IDEA 1997 amendments, there have been three cases that unsuccessfully
challenged Rowley’s application to judicial rulings regarding transition planning and services.
However, in each case the courts determined Rowley’s two-prong test continued to be the
1437
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appropriate measure for determining FAPE in transition cases. The first case challenging
Rowley’s application was Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District.1442
Here, referencing Congress’ new IDEA language, the parents argued by requiring special
education services to result in “actual and substantial progress toward integrating disabled
children into society” Congress had “raised the bar for IEP transition services.”1443 The Lessard’s
believed Congress had established a standard for evaluating the outcomes of the transition
process in the 1997 IDEA reauthorization. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
the parents had read “far too much” into the meaning of transition services.1444 The court further
observed the parents’ belief that Congress’ 1997 definition of transition services, calling for
substantial progress toward integrating children with disabilities post-secondary settings, applied
a higher standard than Rowley was a misguided belief.1445 The panel determined the transition
services definition outlined by Congress was simply a process indicating to school officials the
expectations students with disabilities should strive to obtain. The court noted this
Congressional guidance did not require application of a higher standard than the one applied by
Rowley.1446
The next case, after the IDEA 1997 amendments to challenge Rowley’s application as the
legal standard for evaluating the adequacy of an IEP was Mansfield Independent School District.
1447
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IDEA 1997 amendments embodied “high expectations for [disabled] children.”1448 However, the
court rejected this assertion and declared, Rowley continued to provide the appropriate test for
deciding IDEA disputes.1449
Mercer Island was the third challenge to Rowley’s application in transition planning and
services cases post the 1997 IDEA amendments in disputes involving transition services.1450 In
Mercer Island, the district court analyzed the IDEA 1997 amendments and concluded the Act
required school officials to provide students with a transition plan focused on post-secondary
self-sufficiency.1451 The district court held Congress formed a higher standard than Rowley, a
standard that focused on the outcome of transition services.1452 School officials appealed. The
appellate panel explained the changes Congress had made to the IDEA’s transition language
were procedural rather than substantive in nature and were consistent with previous judicial
opinions.1453 Based upon this observation the court held Congress had not changed the FAPE
definition and Rowley continued to be the appropriate test.1454 The court further observed
Congress had not indicated the delivery of a FAPE was contingent upon a disabled student
attaining transition goals. Additionally, the court pointed out Congress had not sought to
supersede either Rowley or the FAPE standard.1455 As these decisions suggest, the courts have
consistently rejected arguments that Congress intended to implement a standard higher than the
Rowley standard with regard to transition planning and services. While school officials must
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implement results-oriented transition plans and services, they need not strive to meet a higher
standard than Rowley’s meaningful benefit standard.

Transition Decisions Where School Officials Prevailed

Through the application of the two-prong Rowley test in IDEA cases involving transition
planning and services the courts have found procedural errors in seventeen cases and substantive
errors, with no procedural flaws, in two cases. However, the courts have determined in nine of
the nineteen cases school officials’ procedural errors did not result in the denial of a FAPE. This
outcome suggests the courts may find procedural violations are less egregious than the
substantive violations that emerge when Rowley’s second prong is applied. In six of the cases
where the courts ruled in favor of the school district, school officials had either failed to provide
a transition plan or included an incomplete or insufficient transition plan. For example, in Urban
v. Jefferson County School District, school officials failed to provide a statement of transition
services.1456 The court noted while the IEP did not contain a written transition plan, the student
had, in fact, received transition services. The court noted there was a difference between
providing a written statement of transition services and implementing transition services, thereby
indicating the procedural error of failing to memorialize a transition plan in writing may not
result in an IDEA violation if school officials actually provide appropriate transition services.1457
In both Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools and Board of Education of Township
High School 211 v. Ross, school officials failed to include a transition plan in the student’s IEPs.
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Urban by Urban v. Jefferson County School District R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 727 (1996).
Id. at 726.
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However, the courts found this procedural violation did not result in the denial of a FAPE.1458 In
Chuhran, the court reasoned although school officials had not written down the transition
services, the services provided by school officials were adequate.1459 Similarly, in Ross, the court
determined the services school officials provided would have been the services written into the
transition plan. The court noted the IDEA did not grant school officials discretion to exclude a
transition plan from an IEP. However, the courts reasoned this was a procedural flaw and did not
automatically translate into the denial of a FAPE.1460
In Virginia S. v. Department of Education, Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Board of Education,
and Klein Independent School District v. Hovem each court determined school officials had made
procedural errors by providing either incomplete or insufficient transition plans.1461 However,
each court reasoned the procedural errors had not resulted in the denial of a FAPE. In Virginia S.,
the court reviewed the IEP’s transition plan and found it was incomplete because school officials
had not interviewed the student to determine her interests.1462 The court also found the transition
plan was generic and vague and did not address the student’s strengths or preferences. As a result
of these procedural errors, the court held the transition plan failed Rowley’s first prong.1463
However, the court concluded the procedural errors were harmless and had not resulted in the
denial of a FAPE. The court explained the student would have received educational benefits
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Id. at 472.
1460
Board of Education of Township High School 211 v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 276 (2007).
1461
Virginia S. ex rel. Rachael M. v. Department of Educ., Hawaii, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518 (2007); Rodrigues v. Fort
Lee Bd. of Educ., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18791 (3rd Circuit Sept. 9, 2011); Klein Independent School District v.
Hovem, 690 F. 3d 390 (5th Circuit Aug. 6, 2012).
1462
Virginia S. ex rel. Rachael M. v Department of Educ., Hawaii, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518, 31 (2007).
1463
Id. at 31.
1459

186
from the transition services provided passing Rowley’s substantive second prong.1464 Similarly,
in Fort Lee, the court reasoned the flawed transition plan was substantively adequate because it
contained a discussion of transition services and school officials had tailored the plan to address
the student’s post high school goals.1465
In Klein, school officials had neither updated nor changed the student’s transition plan
from year to year. In considering the transition plans, the court acknowledged that repetitive
transition plans constituted a procedural violation. However, the court declared this procedural
violation did not amount to the denial of a FAPE because the transition plans consistently called
for the student to move through the curriculum and graduate with a regular diploma.1466 These
examples reinforce the notion that identifying appropriate transition services is important;
however, the implementation of appropriate transition services will likely result in a school
district winning a judicial challenge.
In Rosinsky v. Green Bay Area School District, school officials failed to invite
representatives from community agencies who would potentially be responsible for the student’s
post-high school transition services. However, the representatives were able to attend the IEP
meetings and the court held this procedural error was therefore harmless. The court concluded
this harmless error had not resulted in a substantive denial of a FAPE.1467 In Tindell v.
Evansville-Vanderburogh School Corporation, school officials failed to provide a transition plan

1464

Id. at 32. The court can assess the school district’s error for harmlessness by considering if a procedural error
resulted in a loss of educational opportunity or parent involvement. M.L. v Federal Way Sch. Dist., 394 F.3d 634,
651-652 (2005).
1465
Rodrigues v. Fort Lee Bd. of Educ., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18791, 8 (3rd Circuit Sept. 9, 2011).
1466
Klein Independent School District v. Hovem, 690 F. 3d 390, 22 (5th Circuit Aug. 6, 2012).
1467
Rosinsky v. Green Bay Area School District, 667 F. Supp. 2d 964, 983, E.D. Wis. (2009).

187
by the time the student reached 16 years of age.1468 Nevertheless, school officials provided
comprehensive life skills training as well as social skills training.1469 The court reasoned though
school officials had improperly delayed formulating the transition plan, they had provided
adequate services. Therefore, the delay had not resulted in the denial of a FAPE.1470 In M.M. v.
New York City Department of Education, school officials failed to conduct age appropriate
transition assessments. Here the court determined this procedural flaw did not constitute the
denial of a FAPE because school officials had sufficient information regarding the student’s
transition needs and were able to propose an appropriate, comprehensive IEP.1471 As shown by
the above cases, school officials are able to prevail in cases involving transition services even
after failing Rowley’s first prong because the needed transition services are actually provided.

Transition Decisions Where the Parents Prevailed

Cases Where Vague or Insufficient Transition Plans
Constituted IDEA Violations

In ten of the thirty-four cases involving special education transition services, the courts
found school officials’ procedural or substantive errors resulted in the denial of a FAPE. Many of
these cases involved either insufficient, missing, or vague transition plans. For example, in
Yankton v. Schramm, school officials created a transition plan that did not address issues such as
driver education, self-advocacy, or independent living skills.1472 The court found the transition
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plan was insufficient and resulted in the denial of a FAPE.1473 Similarly, in J.B. v. Killingly
Board of Education, the court stated community living and social skills, such as working with
peers and exhibiting appropriate behavior in the work place, were not beyond the IDEA’s
scope.1474 The court found the transition plan provided by school officials was insufficient
because it had not included appropriate services in all of the student’s areas of need, and thereby
caused irreparable harm.1475
Likewise, the court found multiple errors in the transition plan provided by school
officials in Kevin T. v. Elmhurst Community School District resulting in a failure of Rowley’s
first prong.1476 The court noted school officials had improperly delayed the transition plan’s
implementation and failed to take into account the student’s interests. These failures resulted in
the denial of a FAPE.1477 Multiple procedural errors were also found in Dracut School
Committee v. Bureau of Special Education Appeals. Here, the court found school officials had
failed to assess the student’s speech and language needs relevant to the transition areas of
education, employment, and independent living.1478 The court further noted school officials were
slow in conducting transition assessments, failed to provide measurable transition goals, and
delayed delivery of transition services. The court concluded these breaches resulted in the denial
of a FAPE.1479
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As indicated by these cases, school officials should provide transition planning and
services that are specific to the student’s unique needs. If school officials fail to provide
personalized transition plans and services based on the student’s interests and transition
assessments they may be more likely to lose a judicial challenge.

Cases Where the Absence of Transition Assessments
Constituted IDEA Violations

Courts ruled in favor of parents in three cases involving the absence of appropriate
transition assessments. The IDEA’s transition planning and services mandate requires school
officials implement appropriate transition assessments related to training, education,
employment, and where appropriate, independent living skills.1480 In Carrie I. v. Department of
Education, the court found school officials had not completed any transition assessments.1481 The
court also found school officials had not determined the student’s career interests and had not
attempted to obtain the mother’s consent to invite a representative from any public agency that
would be providing post-secondary services.1482 The court concluded the lack of appropriate
transition assessments alone was enough to establish a lost educational opportunity and
concluded the procedural violations resulted in the denial of a FAPE.1483
In Gibson v. Forest Hills School District Board of Education, school officials failed to
invite the student to any of the IEP meetings when the team discussed transition services.1484
School officials determined the student's interests based upon what she liked to do in class as
1480
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well as the choices she made with respect to school jobs. However, school officials failed to
interview the student.1485 School officials also failed to complete appropriate assessments related
to the student’s post-secondary goals in a timely manner.1486 The court determined school
officials’ informal approach to ascertaining the student’s interests and preferences was
insufficient.1487 The court determined these violations constituted substantive harm and resulted
in the denial of a FAPE.1488
In Jefferson County Board of Education v. Lolita S., school officials failed to conduct
transition assessments. This failure resulted in a vague transition plan that was not individualized
to meet the student’s needs.1489 The court concluded the overall failure of school officials to
individualize the IEP and the transition plan constituted the denial of a FAPE. 1490 In Marple
Newton School District v. Rafael N., the court found school officials had provided transition
planning and they had incorporated goals into the IEP addressing the student’s transition needs,
thereby meeting Rowley’s first prong.1491 However, these goals were generic, vague, remained
static from year to year, and did not capitalize upon the student’s interests or strengths.1492 The
court found the IEPs did not address the skills needed for independent functioning. These
findings led the court to conclude the vague and generic transition plan was not a meaningful
plan. The court held this failure did not pass muster under Rowley’s second prong and, as such,
amounted to the denial of a FAPE.1493 Based upon these judicial records, in order for school
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officials to provide a procedurally sound transition plan they must include appropriate transition
assessments that determine the student’s needs as they relate to training, education, employment,
and independent living skills. Failure to provide appropriate transition assessments can, and will
likely, result in a district losing a judicial challenge.

Cases Where School Officials Violated the IDEA
by Failing to Implement the Transition Plan

Courts ruled in favor of parents in two cases where school officials followed procedural
guidelines and proposed appropriate transition plans but failed to implement the plans, which
was determined a substantive error. In Susquehanna Township v. Jelani J, the court found no
procedural errors.1494 However, school officials made a substantive error by failing to provide the
transition plan’s prescribed services. The court found this failure resulted in the denial of a
FAPE.1495 In Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School, as in the previous case, the court
observed school officials had provided a transition plan that was feasible and designed to help
the student realize his post-secondary goal.1496 However, school officials failed to provide the
transition services.1497 The court held this failure was not merely a procedural flaw; it was a
substantial departure from the IEP resulting in the denial of a FAPE.1498
A review of these cases indicates courts will likely apply Rowley’s two-prong test to
determine procedural or substantive errors in the transition planning and services. Courts may
overlook procedural errors, however they appear likely to rule in favor of parents when school
1494
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officials commit a substantive violation and either fail to implement components of the transition
planning process such as provide appropriate transition assessments or fail to provide transition
services.

Trends Within the Circuit Courts

In the thirty-four reviewed transition services and placement decisions the courts found
procedural errors in fifty percent (seventeen) of the cases. These procedural errors included
errors school officials committed in following the IDEA’s procedures such as failing to provide
transition assessments, failing to provide a transition statement, or providing insufficient
transition goals. However, school officials prevailed in more than seventy percent (twenty-four)
of the thirty-four cases. Although this is a relatively small number of decisions, it nonetheless
suggests school officials may have the advantage in disputes over transition planning and
services. All courts have applied Rowley’s two-prong test to determine the appropriateness of the
challenged transition planning and services. When errors have been found in the procedural firstprong of the test, many courts have, nonetheless, determined the services provided were
appropriate to meet the students’ needs meeting the second-prong of the Rowley test. While it is
important for school officials to implement procedurally sound transition plans, it appears more
important for school officials to provide appropriate transition services.
Cases involving transition planning and services have been litigated in all Federal circuits
except for one (the Fourth Circuit). Even though transition planning and services cases originate
from nearly all of the circuits, they are not evenly represented. A significantly disproportionate
number of cases, twenty-one percent (seven) of the thirty-four cases have, to date, been litigated
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in the Third Circuit. The percentage of cases litigated in the Third Circuit is considerably more
than that of any other circuit. 1499 The atypicality of this high percentage of transition cases can
be attributed to the high number of cases litigated in one state. To date, of the seven cases
litigated in the Third Circuit, five of the cases originated in Pennsylvania.1500 The number of
transition planning and services cases litigated in Pennsylvania alone equals the number of cases
litigated in all of the Second Circuit. Parents prevailed in two of the five (forty percent)
Pennsylvania cases. This is also higher than the overall trend as parents prevailed on the issue of
transition in twenty-nine percent of cases nationally. Although the Third Circuit decided the
majority of cases involving transition planning and services, school officials prevailed in more
than seventy percent of these cases.
Fifteen percent (five) of cases involving transition planning and services were litigated in
the Second circuit and another fifteen percent (five) of cases were litigated in the Seventh Circuit
courts. In the Second Circuit, four of the five cases originated in New York. Within the Seventh
Circuit, three of the five cases originated in Illinois. In both the Second and Seventh Circuits,
school officials prevailed in eighty percent of these cases. Of the thirty-four cases involving
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transition planning and services, eleven were appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals and in only
one case was U.S. Supreme Court review sought. In that case the High Court denied
certiorari.1501 Table 2 illustrates the overall combined district and appellate court case outcomes
by circuit.
Since the initial 1990 implementation of the IDEA’s transition planning and services
mandate, most of the transition planning and services cases were litigated concurrently with
issues such as educational placement or the termination of services. This demonstrates, to date,
transition planning and services has not been a catalyst for administrative hearings, disputes, and
litigation. As described in this analysis, transition planning and services cases may involve a
number of complex legal issues both procedurally and substantively. The courts have
consistently pointed out there is no requirement for either an IEP or a transition plan to be either
ideal or perfect. Through the application of Rowley, courts have identified procedural violations
that have not resulted in a denial of a FAPE. The courts have however; uniformly and
consistently demand that students are provided with a FAPE.1502
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Table 2
Case Outcomes by Circuit
Circuit

Number of
Cases

Percent of 34
Total Cases

1st Circuit

4

12%

1

3

Number of
Decisions
Terminating
in the Court
of Appeals
2

2nd Circuit

5

15%

1

4

0

3rd Circuit

7

21%

2

5

2

5th Circuit

2

6%

0

2

1

6th Circuit

3

9%

1

2

1

7th Circuit

5

15%

1

4

1

8th Circuit

1

3%

1

0

1

9th Circuit

3

9%

1

2

1

10th Circuit

1

3%

0

1

1

11th Circuit

2

6%

1

1

1

District of
Columbia
Circuit

1

3%

1

0

0

(% Rounded to the
Nearest Whole)

Number of
Overall
Decisions for
the Family

Number of
Overall
Decisions for
the District

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Summary

Transition planning and services have been a required part of the IEP process since 1990.
Congress mandates school officials to provide results-oriented transition services designed to
enable IDEA eligible students to successfully move from school to post-school settings.1503 The
transition planning and services mandates require school officials to formulate a transition
statement for all IDEA eligible students who have reached age 14 and older.1504 Transition goals
and services are required for all students who are eligible for IDEA services who are age 16 and
older. These goals and services must be based upon both age appropriate assessments and the
students’ interests and strengths.1505
Because the focus of the federal court, when deciding transition planning and services
cases, has been on the transition process and the benefit of transition services, post-secondary
outcomes do not appear to be addressed through the current case law. As such, it is difficult to
determine if the outcomes Congress envisioned for IDEA eligible students have been achieved.
However, the discrepancy in the unemployment rate may be one indication the transition services
currently being provided by school officials are not meeting the needs of IDEA eligible students.
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The U.S. Department of Education, along with the Institute of Education Sciences has a planned
study to address how IDEA eligible students are achieving the post-high school outcomes
envisioned by IDEA. The planned U.S. Department of Education study will assess how IDEA
eligible students’ college, training, and employment rates compare with those of their nondisabled peers. 1506 This study may provide an indication of how successful the IDEA’s transition
planning mandate has been in meeting Congressional expectations.
The Rowley Test
To date, courts have consistently applied Rowley’s two-prong test in one hundred percent
of conflicts involving transition services.1507 In some of these cases parents argued that when
drafting the IDEA’s transition mandate Congress intended to elevate the expectations for the
level of special education services school officials were obligated to provide eligible students.
However, the federal courts have consistently rejected this argument and continued to apply
Rowley’s two-prong test to determine if school officials fulfilled their obligation to the student
with respect to providing a FAPE. Given that all of the IDEA transition planning and services
cases to date have involved analysis under Rowley’s two-prong test, it is reasonable for school
officials to assume the Rowley test would be the relevant judicial test courts will apply in future
cases to resolve transition planning and services disputes. It is also reasonable for school officials
to assume the courts will apply more weight to the substantive second-prong of the Rowley test
when deciding transition planning and services disputes. When the Rowley test is applied to
1506
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IDEA transition disputes the federal courts focus first on procedures then upon the meaningful
benefit the student received from the transition services. As such, the federal courts, through the
use of Rowley, do not appear to address outcomes such as a student’s post-secondary success as a
result of the services provided.
Recommendations for School Officials
School officials need to have an in-depth understanding of the IDEA’s transition planning
and services mandate. They should periodically review their special education transition
planning and services procedures to ensure they are providing students with appropriate supports
and services. Federal courts have found IDEA violations when school officials have failed to
either appropriately assess a student’s transition services needs or provide the student with
appropriate transition services.
School officials should also ensure each eligible child’s transition plan and services are
designed to provide a FAPE. Transition plans need to be reasonably calculated to provide the
student with educational benefits.1508 School officials must ensure the transition plans meet the
needs of the students and are based on transition assessments as well as the student’s interests.
Transition plans must be free of procedural errors that may compromise the provision of
services. School officials must be familiar with both their respective state’s FAPE expectations
as they apply to transition services and federal court decisions interpreting the IDEA’s transition
services mandate.
Figure 1 illustrates the IDEA’s transition planning and services mandate. The Transition
Planning Flowchart provides school officials with a model of activities that need to take place in
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Figure 1:

Transition planning and services flowchart.
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order for school officials to provide sound transition planning and services. The Transition
Planning Flowchart was created after analysis of the IDEA’s transition planning and services
mandates.
Analysis of the judicial decisions reviewed in this study found, the courts identified
procedural errors in transition planning and services made by school officials, in fifty percent of
the cases. However, the parents prevailed in only twenty-four percent of the cases. This may
suggest courts give judicial deference to public schools.
With respect to transition services, school officials have committed three broad types of
procedural errors. The first type of error commonly committed by school officials is formulating
a vague or insufficient transition plan. The IDEA transition planning and services mandate was
an attempt by Congress to ensure students with disabilities graduated from high school prepared
to successfully transition to post-secondary education settings or the work force.1509 Vague or
insufficient transition plans generally do not provide an eligible student sufficient preparation for
life after high school. Therefore, vague transition plans do not pass muster under Rowley’s first
prong, which may result in the denial of a FAPE when the courts review the provided services
under Rowley’s second prong.1510 It is important for school officials to carefully consider the
individual needs of the student with regard to transition planning and create a sound,
individualized transition plan.
The second commonly committed procedural error is a lack of transition assessments
based on student need. Transition assessments may include but are not limited to adaptive
behavior assessments, career interest inventories, or vocational aptitude tests. IDEA 2004
1509
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required school officials to formulate “appropriate measurable post-secondary goals based upon
age appropriate transition assessments related to training, education, employment, and where
appropriate, independent living skills.”1511 A lack of transition assessments is a violation of
Rowley’s first-prong. However, judicial rulings have noted a lack of transition assessments may
result in lost educational opportunity because a plan without appropriate assessments may not be
sufficiently individualized to meet the student’s needs.1512 It is important for school officials to
provide transition assessments in their data collection process to formulate a sound,
individualized transition plan. School officials should utilize age-appropriate transition
assessment data in formulating appropriate post-secondary goals and determining the transition
services a student will need in order to reach his or her post-secondary goals.1513
The final error commonly made by school officials was failing to implement the
transition plan. The courts have consistently viewed school officials’ failure to implement a
transition plan or provide transition services as a denial of a FAPE, noting this error does not
pass muster with Rowley’s substantive second-prong. One judicial ruling indicated the lack of
transition services was a departure from the IEP constituting more than a procedural flaw,
resulting in the denial of a FAPE.1514
To date, federal courts have consistently applied the Rowley test to resolve disputes
involving IDEA transition planning and services. Figure 2 is a Transition Planning and Services
Checklist and is provided to guide school officials in meeting both prongs of the Rowley test.
This Transition Planning and Services Checklist was created after careful analysis of all the
transition planning and services mandates and case law to date. This figure is a checklist to be
1511

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (614)(d)(1)(A)(VII)(aa) (2006).
Carrie I., on behalf of her son, Greg I. v. Department of Education, State of Hawaii, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1247
(May 31, 2012).
1513
Id. at 1245.
1514
Joaquin v. Friendship Public Charter School, 115 LRP 41781, 8 (Sept. 3, 2015).
1512
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utilized by school officials in ensuring the transition plans developed for IDEA eligible students
are free of both procedural and substantive errors. Use of this checklist may assist school
officials in developing transition plans that are inclusive of specific goals based on appropriate
transition assessments. It may also ensure school officials have implemented sound transition
plans.

Transition Planning and Services Checklist
☐ The IEP includes a current, measurable post-secondary employment goal.
☐ The IEP includes a current, measurable post-secondary education and/or training goal.
☐ If appropriate, the IEP includes a current, measurable independent living post-secondary
goal.
☐ An age appropriate transition assessment was administered prior to the IEP meeting when
employment options were discussed.
☐ An age appropriate transition assessment was administered prior to the IEP meeting when
education and/or training options were discussed.
☐ If appropriate, an age appropriate transition assessment was administered prior to the IEP
meeting when independent living was discussed.
☐ The IEP provides for the delivery of at least one transition service, including academic
and functional activities, addressing the post-secondary employment goal.
☐ The IEP provides for the delivery of at least one transition service, including academic
and functional activities, addressing the post-secondary education and/or training goal.
☐ If appropriate, the IEP includes at least one transition service, including academic and
functional activities, addressing the post-secondary independent living goal.
☐ The IEP includes a course of study delineating the current and remaining years of
schooling (including course names) that depicts the anticipated progression toward
meeting the student’s post-secondary goals.
☐ Evidence shows the student was invited to the IEP meeting.
☐ If appropriate, there is evidence a representative of a participating agency who is likely to
be responsible for providing or paying for transition services was invited to the IEP
meeting with prior consent of the parent or the student, if he or she has reached the age of
majority.
Figure 2:

Transition planning and services checklist.

Recommendations for Further Study
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The purpose of IDEA’s transition planning and services mandate is to ensure public
school officials adequately prepare students with disabilities for further education, employment,
and independent living. 1515 Ongoing monitoring and study should be conducted to determine the
effectiveness of the IDEA mandates on transition planning and services. One possible area of
study for future researchers includes continued monitoring of the use of Rowley’s two-pronged
test by the courts as a standard test to apply in determining whether a student has sufficiently
received educational benefit from their transition planning and services. Another possible area of
study for future researchers is to examine transition planning through the educational benefit lens
to determine if the Rowley standard sufficiently assesses the needs of students with disabilities
coupled with future definitions of transition services provided by Congress in future
reauthorizations of the IDEA.
It can be assumed the next IDEA reauthorization will impact transition planning and
services, as transition planning and services has been strengthened in each reauthorization of the
IDEA since its 1990 implementation, and as Congress has authorized a study addressing how
IDEA eligible students are achieving the post-high school outcomes.1516 Reauthorization could
include either modification of the Act’s FAPE mandate or a strengthening of the transition
planning and services regulations. Any of these changes would impact how school officials
implement transition planning and services. A possible future study should examine judicial
trends following the next IDEA reauthorization to determine what, if any, impact modification of
1515

Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).
The U.S. Department of Education in conjunction with the Institute of Education Sciences has a planned study to
address how IDEA eligible students are achieving post-high school outcomes including college, training, and
employment rates compare with those of their non-disabled peers. Agency Information Collection Activities;
Comment Request; National Longitudinal Transition Study 2012 Phase II, 80 Fed. Reg. 81299, 81300 (Dec. 29,
2015).
1516
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the IDEA’s transition services mandate has on students’ successful transition from secondary to
post-secondary settings. As the court noted in Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative
School District, the IDEA did not require an IEP to be either ideal or perfect. 1517 Nonetheless,
school officials must strive to implement meaningful transition plans that benefit students with
disabilities.

1517

Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Cooperative School District, 592 F.3d. 267, 270, U.S. App (1 st Cir. 2010).

APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

206

Case

Year

State/Circuit

John Chuhran
v. Walled Lake
Consolidated
Schools
Urban by
Urban v.
Jefferson
County School
District R-1
Yankton
School District
v. Harold and
Angie
Schramm
J.B. v.
Killingly
Board of
Education
Mandy S. v.
Fulton County
School District

1995

Michigan –
6th Circuit

Whether a failure to write a transition plan
result in a loss of FAPE.

Decision
for
District

1996

Colorado –
10th Circuit

Whether a failure to assess the need for
transition services, make provisions for
transition, and provide transition services is
a denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
District

1996

South Dakota
– 8th Circuit

Whether teaching driver ed., self-advocacy
skills, and independent living skills are
beyond scope of IDEA’s transition planning
mandate.

Decision
for
Family

1997

Connecticut –
2nd Circuit

Whether an insufficient transition plan
Decision
caused irreparable harm resulting in a denial for
of FAPE.
Family

2000

Decision
for
District

Kevin T. v.
Elmhurst
Community
School District
205
Susquehanna
Township
School District
v. Jelani J.
Andrew B. v.
Board of
Education
Community
High School
District 99
Virginia S. v.
Department of
Education,
State of

2002

Georgia – 11th Whether transition plan was inappropriate
Circuit
when school district included community
based programming after parent insisted on
college based planning.
th
Illinois – 7
Whether providing vague and unmeasurable
Circuit
transition goals, failure to write a transition
plan, and failing to take student’s interests
into account was a procedural violation
resulting in a denial of FAPE.
Pennsylvania Whether identified transition services must
– 3rd Circuit
be provided after a student has earned
enough credits to graduate.

2006

Illinois – 7th
Circuit

Whether transition services have to be
provided until a student ages out of IDEA
eligibility.

Decision
for
District

2007

Hawaii – 9th
Circuit

Whether incomplete transition plan, lack of
measurable goals, missing student interest,
and lack of student interview resulted in a
denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
District

2003

Summary of Issue

Decision

Decision
for
Family

Decision
for
Family
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Hawaii
Board of
Education of
Township
High School
District 211 v.
Ross
Marple
Newton School
Dist. v. Rafael
N.
Sinan v.
School District
of
Philadelphia
Lessard v.
WiltonLyndeborough
Cooperative
School District
K.C. v.
Mansfield
Independent
School District
J.L. v. Mercer
Island School
District
Rosinsky v.
Green Bay
Area School
District
Lessard v.
WiltonLyndeborough
Cooperative
School District
High v. Exeter
Township
School District
Doe v.
Marlborough
Public Schools

2007

Illinois – 7th
Circuit

Whether exclusion of a transition plan due
Decision
to a student’s lack of readiness for transition for
services is a denial of FAPE.
District

2007

Pennsylvania
– 3rd Circuit

Whether a static, vague, and generic
transition plan was a denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
Family

2008

Pennsylvania
– 3rd Circuit

Whether vocational services and training
are required in a college bound student’s
transition plan.

Decision
for
District

2008

New
Hampshire –
1st Circuit

Whether Congress raised the bar for IEP
transition services requiring actual and
substantial progress.

Decision
for
District

2009

Texas – 5th
Circuit

Decision
for
District

2009

Washington –
9th Circuit

2009

Wisconsin –
7th Circuit

Whether Rowley continued to provide the
standard for deciding action under IDEA
when considering transition from school to
life.
Whether Congress had sought to supersede
Rowley when transition planning and
services were mandated.
Whether procedural errors resulted in denial
of FAPE.

2010

New
Hampshire 1st Circuit

Whether ideal or perfect transition plans are
required to provide FAPE.

Decision
for
District

2010

Pennsylvania
– 3rd Circuit

Whether transition plan was required to
ensure a student was successful in achieving
post-secondary outcomes.
Massachusetts Whether all IEP transition goals must be
– 1st Circuit
achieved prior to a student graduating from
high school with a resulting termination of
special education services to receive a
FAPE.

Decision
for
District
Decision
for
District

2010

Decision
for
District
Decision
for
District
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Dracut School 2010
Committee v.
Bureau of
Special
Education
Appeals
J.D.G. v.
2010
Colonial
School District
E. Z.-L. v. New 2011
York City
Department of
Education
Tindell v.
2011
EvansvilleVanderburogh
School
Corporation
K.C. v.
2011
Nazareth Area
School District
Rodrigues v.
Fort Lee
Board of
Education
Carrie I. v.
Department of
Education,
State of
Hawaii
Klein
Independent
School District
v. Hovem
M.Z. v. New
York City
Board of
Education

Massachusetts Whether school officials could provide
– 1st Circuit
transition services after a student has met
formal graduation requirements when the
school officials had failed to provide
measurable transition goals and failed to
provide vocational skills.
Delaware –
Whether transition goals were reasonably
3rd Circuit
calculated despite parent preference being
something other than what the IEP
identified as an area of focus for transition.
New York –
Whether transition plans are necessary for a
2nd Circuit
9 year old student moving from one school
to another.

Decision
for
Family

Indiana – 7th
Circuit

Whether a delay in the implementation of a
transition plan resulted in a denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
District

Pennsylvania
– 3rd Circuit

Whether school officials must provide the
best possible transition plan that includes
multi-year transition planning to provide a
FAPE.
Whether a lack of measurable transition
goals and lack of transition plan was
procedural error resulting in a denial of
FAPE.
Whether a lack of transition assessment and
a failure to invite representative from postsecondary setting constitutes a loss of
educational opportunity resulting in a denial
of FAPE.
Whether an insufficient transition plan
constituted a procedural violation resulting
in a denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
District

Whether failing to list available postsecondary activities and failing to develop
an appropriate transition plan constituted a
procedural violation resulting in a denial of
FAPE.
Whether failing to invite the student to the
transition planning conference, failing to
provide age appropriate transition

Decision
for
District

2011

New Jersey –
3rd Circuit

2012

Hawaii – 9th
Circuit

2012

Texas – 5th
Circuit

2013

New York –
2nd Circuit

Gibson v.
2013
Forest Hills
School District

Ohio – 6th
Circuit

Decision
for
District
Decision
for
District

Decision
for
District
Decision
for
Family

Decision
for
District

Decision
for
Family
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Board of
Education

Pape v. Board 2013
of Education
of the
Wappingers
Central School
District
Maksym v.
2013
Strongsville
City School
District
Jefferson
2013
County Board
of Education v.
Lolita S.

New York –
2nd Circuit

M.M. v. New
2015
York City
Department of
Education
Joaquin v.
2015
Friendship
Public Charter
School

New York –
2nd Circuit

assessments, and using an informal
approach to identify student interests
constituted a procedural violation resulting
in a denial of FAPE.
Section 504 case – Whether school officials
shifted responsibility for transition planning
and services to parents was intentional
discrimination.

Decision
for
District

Ohio – 6th
Circuit

Whether a work-study program (as a part of
a larger transition plan) that did not provide
maxim benefit was a violation of FAPE.

Decision
for
District

Alabama –
11th Circuit

Whether a transition plan that did not
address employment, education, or
community living, was vague and included
limited and insufficient goals, used stock
language and was not individualized to
meet students’ unique needs, and lacked age
appropriate transition assessments resulted
in a procedural flaw and a resulting denial
of FAPE.
Whether the lack of vocational transition
assessment constituted a procedural
violation resulting in a denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
Family

Whether failing to implement listed
transition services constituted a procedural
violation resulting in a denial of FAPE.

Decision
for
Family

District of
Columbia
Circuit

Decision
for
District
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Transition Planning and Services Flowchart
Determine Age of Student

Below Age 14

Age 14+

No Planning or
Services Required

Statement of
Transition Service
Needs

Age 16+

Initial Course of
Study

Conduct Age-Appropriate Transition Assessments

Interests

Needs

Preferences

Strengths

Write Measurable Post-Secondary IEP Goals

Post-Secondary
Education
and/or
Vocational
Training

Employment

Independent
Living

Course of Study/Coordinated Set of Activities

General/Special
Education
Instruction

Community
Experiences

Related Services

Coordinate Services/Identify Adult Agency Linkages
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Transition Planning and Services Checklist
This checklist was created after careful analysis of all the transition planning and services
mandates and case law to date.
☐ The IEP includes a current, measurable post-secondary employment goal.
☐ The IEP includes a current, measurable post-secondary education and/or training goal.
☐ If appropriate, the IEP includes a current, measurable independent living post-secondary
goal.
☐ An age appropriate transition assessment was administered prior to the IEP meeting when
employment options were discussed.
☐ An age appropriate transition assessment was administered prior to the IEP meeting when
education and/or training options were discussed.
☐ If appropriate, an age appropriate transition assessment was administered prior to the IEP
meeting when independent living was discussed.
☐ The IEP provides for the delivery of at least one transition service, including academic and
functional activities, addressing the post-secondary employment goal.
☐ The IEP provides for the delivery of at least one transition service, including academic and
functional activities, addressing the post-secondary education and/or training goal.
☐ If appropriate, the IEP includes at least one transition service, including academic and
functional activities, addressing the post-secondary independent living goal.
☐ The IEP includes a course of study delineating the current and remaining years of schooling
(including course names) that depicts the anticipated progression toward meeting the
student’s post-secondary goals.
☐ Evidence shows the student was invited to the IEP meeting.
☐ If appropriate, there is evidence a representative of a participating agency who is likely to be
responsible for providing or paying for transition services was invited to the IEP meeting
with prior consent of the parent or the student, if he or she has reached the age of majority.

